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(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
Unfortunately, questions of the moral psychology of racism have been neglected as philosophers 
and other thinkers have tried to gain a better understanding of systemic racism. This dissertation 
aims to provide a way of thinking about how racism affects our moral psychology by thinking about 
how the dominant stereotypes, stories, beliefs, and affects about race in our society distort our 
perception of people of color making it morally problematic perception. What I call moral perception 
builds off a reading of Iris Murdoch’s arguments that our perception of others can be morally 
evaluable. That our perception, when centered around our own self-preoccupations, can be morally 
problematic. Along these lines, we also perceive people of color in a morally problematic way due to 
the distortive nature of race, and the dominant stereotypes, stories, beliefs, and affects that race 
carries with it. Despite the morally problematic nature of perceiving through the racial veil, people 
are not morally responsible for this perception, but are instead put in a position to take responsibility 
for this perception which involves owning said perception and resolving to perceive better. 
Perceiving better involves returning to Murdoch’s idea of a just and loving attention, which in the 











 When I was a freshman in college, I took a philosophy in literature class taught by Larry 
Bowlden, an unapologetic Iris Murdoch fan. Due to Larry, I read The Sovereignty of Good that summer, 
which I largely misunderstood. But it started my own fascination with exploring moral perception 
and understanding moral philosophy as a way of figuring out how to be a better person. Larry also 
told me that I needed to take a class with Angela Coventry. Angie ended up taking me under her 
wing, teaching me everything she could about philosophy and did her best to prepare me for 
graduate school. If it wasn’t for her caring and supportive mentoring, there is no way I could have 
ended up doing a PhD. They both, especially Angie, deserve huge thanks for making this 
dissertation possible. 
 It would also not be possible without Susan Wolf who helped me define the project since its 
conception and help me figure out which questions I was answering. Working with Susan has been 
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piece significantly. Thanks especially to Sarah and Jen for meeting with me regularly, even during the 
pandemic, to discuss the development of my ideas.  
 I also received feedback from philosophers outside of my committee who deserve 
recognition, namely Larry Blum, Bryce Huebner, and especially Kate Stockdale. Kate has been a 
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Now, in a perfect world, I probably won't be insensitive 
Cold as December but never remember what winter did 
I wouldn't blame you for mistakes I made or the bed I laid 
Seems like I point the finger just to make a point nowadays 
Smiles and cold stares, the temperature goes there 
Indigenous disposition, feel like we belong here 
I know the walls, they can listen, I wish they could talk back 
The hurt becomes repetition, the love almost lost that 
Sick venom in men and women overcome with pride 
A perfect world is never perfect, only filled with lies 
Promises are broken and more resentment come alive 
Race barriers make inferior you and I 
-Kendrick Lamar, PRIDE. 
 
When I was a kid, before every school year, I’d go clothes shopping with my mom. And 
every year, I’d try to get her to buy me one thing: a beanie. She always refused. Though it took her 
some time, when I was around eleven or twelve years old, she explained why: she was worried about 
my safety. I was a young, brown, Mexican-American kid living in southern California. Kids who 
looked like me and wore beanies were viewed as what some may call today a bad hombre. She was 
afraid of white kids at school making fun of me or drawing attention to my race. She was afraid of 
teachers singling me out as a problematic student. More than anything, she was afraid of police 
perceiving me as a gang member when I got older.  She wanted people to see me for me, not for 
being a young, brown, Mexican-American kid and everything that was wrapped up in that image.  
 This dissertation is about what my mom wanted to protect me from: racist perception. It is 
about how our everyday interactions and perceptions of people of color can be distorted and 
misleading. I am interested in how racism manifests in these micro-scale interpersonal contexts and 
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in its moral psychology: that is, with how racism influences our attitudes, perspectives, and 
decisions. I am interested in what effects this has on our moral character and in what sense we are 
responsible for the ways we may perpetuate racist oppression. And finally, I am interested in what 
we can do about it: how people can reorient their perspective.  
One may be concerned that in order to explore these topics and answer these questions, we 
first need to explain what racism is. However, when one tries to articulate what racism is—give it a 
definition, delineate the central and peripheral cases, or explain what it means for a person or 
institution to be racist—it becomes significantly more opaque. Given the difficulty in articulating 
these details, it should not be surprising that there is significant philosophical disagreement about 
what those details are. I will not be attempting to give a full account of racism here or trying to fit all 
these elements into a single theory. Instead, I want to explore these micro-scale interpersonal 
instances of racism in such a way that my account will be largely consistent with most approaches to 
understanding racism.  
Historically, there have been two dominant approaches to understanding racism. On the one 
hand, some philosophers and race scholars argue that racism is paradigmatically a moral vice: a 
problem of individuals’ characters, of hatred and disgust.1 On the other hand, some argue that 
racism is paradigmatically a socio-systemic force: a problem of social and political institutions that 
perpetuate misguided beliefs.2 Other philosophers have tried to break out of this socio-systemic vs. 
individualistic debate over racism. Lawrence Blum, for example, takes all of these different areas of 
racism to be separate, complexly interwoven regions, none of which are more central than any 
 
1 See, Garcia, “The Heart of Racism”. 
2 See, Mills, The Racial Contract and Lebron, The Color of Our Shame. 
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other.3 Michael Philips has placed racism centrally in actions,4 Joshua Glasgow has placed it in terms 
of disrespect,5 and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin has attempted to merge the socio-systemic and 
individualistic views together in his “genealogical” account of racism.6 In order to see how my 
project is situated in relation to this debate, let us look at the two historically dominant positions in 
more detail.  
In the philosophical literature, the individualistic approach is primarily defended by J.L.A. 
Garcia. Garcia argues that to be racist is to have ill-will toward and/or an immoral disregard for a 
group of people on the basis of their race.7 Thus, to be racist is necessarily to have vicious attitudes, 
and locating the central problem of racism as one of individual character.8 In claiming this, Garcia 
does not argue that systemic or institutional racism does not exist, but rather that institutions are 
corrupted by individuals who have a racist character.9  
For Garcia, racism is volitional and non-doxastic: it does not have to do with any beliefs we 
have about people of other races (at least, not primarily), but with our moral attitudes towards 
individuals of a race or races other than our own.10 The fact that racism is non-doxastic does not 
mean that there are no such things as racist beliefs, but that beliefs do not a racist make. In order to 
have a racist belief on Garcia’s view, someone’s belief must come from the racial ill-will or immoral 
 
3 See, Blum, “I’m No Racist, But…” 
4 See, Philips, “Racist Acts and Racist Humor”. 
5 See, Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect”. 
6 See, Mitchell-Yellin, “A View of Racism”. 
7 “Heart of Racism”, p. 6. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Ibid., p. 10-12.  
10 Ibid., p. 8. 
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disregard central to racism.11 Similarly, actions are racist insofar as they come from racist attitudes. 
There are some cases where one may have a “characteristically” racist belief, without the belief or 
person being truly racist, where one has the beliefs without having the racist attitudes.12 These kinds 
of cases, Garcia argues, reinforce that it is non-doxastic attitudes, and not beliefs, that are the 
determining factors for racism. It is the non-doxastic component of racism that puts it in the “heart” 
for Garcia, as opposed to the “mind.”  
Despite the richness of Garcia’s view, it has received significant criticism from various 
philosophers of race such as Charles Mills and Tommie Shelby.13 According to this camp, there are 
two major, somewhat interlocking, problems with Garcia’s account: (1) that it is non-doxastic and 
(2) that it is centrally about the individual. I will look at each in a little more detail to show the major 
disagreement between the two camps. 
First off, consider Garcia’s view that racism is non-doxastic. Charles Mills argues that even 
to fulfill Garcia’s definition of racism as being ill-will toward people of a certain race, you need to have 
doxastic states. According to Mills, ‘race’ as a concept was created for political reasons and ends, 
making racism prior to the construction of races.14 So, determining someone’s race, which is 
necessary in order to have ill-will of Garcia’s kind, involves beliefs about races that are already 
integral to racism.15  
 
11 Ibid., p. 11. Additionally, Garcia also leaves room for beliefs that cultivate ill-will and disregard to count as racist, p. 
13. 
12 Ibid., 13. 
13 See, Mills’ ““Heart” Attack” and Shelby’s “Is Racism in the Heart?” 
14 See, Mills’ “But What Are You Really?”  
15 Mills, ““Heart” Attack”, p. 37-41. Mills also argues that the rational vs. emotional (or “head” vs. “heart”) distinction 
Garcia is operating with is a bad, outdating model of moral psychology.  
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It is not only by way of their role in determining one’s race that beliefs complicate Garcia’s 
picture. Consider the case of a Southern white slaveholder who believes Black people are mentally 
inferior. They will likely also believe not only that it is morally permissible to enslave Blacks, but that 
being enslaved is actually better for them given their limited mental capacities. In some cases, we can 
imagine a kind of twisted paternalistic “love” for their slaves: that the slaveholder really wanted the 
best for them given their condition. These represent a whole constellation of beliefs held by the 
racist that seems central to their racism. Garcia wants to claim that while the beliefs are present, the 
ill-will and immoral disregard of the slaveholders is logically separable and prior to their beliefs.16 But 
the issue is not, so Mills argues, about what is logically distinguishable, but about what part of our 
actual moral psychology makes one racist. That is, what explains one’s racist behavior and 
disposition? Mills claims that it is this constellation of beliefs about the inferiority of Black slaves 
that explains it. The ill-will, in such cases, gives us no explanation whatsoever, unless we assume it is 
the cause of the beliefs.  
Notice that not only are beliefs, as opposed to attitudes, doing the work, but there is no ill-
will in this case at all. The Southern white slaveholder in this example actually has good-will toward 
their slaves—they want what’s best for them—but their ability to gauge what is best for their Black 
slaves is corrupted by their beliefs in the inferiority of Blacks.17 This good-will not only makes the 
doxastic component most important for determining the racist nature of the slaveholder, but also 
 
16 Garcia, p. 7; Mills, ibid., p. 39.  
17 Garcia does have a response to this concern (“The Heart of Racism”, p. 18-19). Garcia claims that such beliefs are 
motivated by an “instrumental ill-will” to gain advantage from other’s loss and, thus, motivated by racial disaffection. 
But Mills responds that people can often have good intentions and cause harm due to mistakes, which is a much more 
likely explanation of the case, than the slaveholder being motivated by racial disaffection while also believing they’re 
doing the best for their slaves. The slaveholder has good intentions with their slaves, but due to having mistaken beliefs 
about the inferiority of Blacks, causes significant harm (“Heart Attack”, p. 52-53). 
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shows the ill-will to be unnecessary. This leads to the second problem. In focusing on ill-will, 
Garcia’s account centers racism on the individual instead of on systemic or institutional structures. 
In focusing on ill-will, Garcia puts the explanatory focus on the individual, such that all 
explanation must flow through it. Remember, according to Garcia, institutional racism occurs 
because vicious people have corrupted the institutions. However, Mills finds this to be a “dubious 
sociology and political economy.”18 Mills argues that “the most important kind of racism, in terms of 
the numbers of people affected, and the level of oppression involved, is … social-systemic, and that 
many whites have historically been "innocent racists," in the sense that they have taken for granted 
the inferiority of people of color.”19 Racism, for the camp “opposite” Garcia, is centrally a socio-
systemic issue, not an individual vice. 
 This brings us to the second dominant approach to racism, which Charles Mills defends, the 
socio-systemic approach. For those like Mills, racism “is itself a political system, a particular power 
structure of formal and informal rule” where people of different races are slotted into different 
places on the hierarchy.20 Many specifically think that to talk about racism in Western society is to 
talk about White Supremacy specifically. Counterfactually, it could be the case that something else, 
like Japanese Supremacy,21 is what we’d be talking about when talking about racism. But given how 
history has developed, it is contingently White Supremacy that we are trying to understand. On this 
view, the Southern white slaveholder I sketched above is (at least, being) racist, given their role in 
perpetuating the structures that aid in the support of White Supremacy. 
 
18 Mills, ““Heart” Attack”, p. 59. 
19 Mills, ““Heart” Attack”, p. 61. See also, Mills, The Racial Contract and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s Racism Without Racists.  
20 The Racial Contract, p. 3, emphasis Mills’. 
21 See, Mills, The Racial Contract, p. #. 
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However, such views do not tell us much about how the perpetuation of racism occurs. 
Chris Lebron argues that while Mills is right to point out the fundamental way racial power affects 
our political institutions, “simply indicating background processes and describing them as ‘white’ or 
beneficial to whites is of marginal analytic usefulness.”22 At least in the U.S., the history of race 
relations is that of formal progress (e.g., signing the Civil Rights Act and electing a Black president) 
overtop a history of social stagnation (e.g., continued police killings of Black and Brown people of 
color with no repercussions, and widespread economic inequality).23 Lebron is not saying that Mills 
is wrong about racism being (at least in part) a socio-systemic issue, but that he “fails to specify the 
mechanics by which racial inequality evolves and reproduces itself.”24 Lebron’s response is to attend 
to how the socio-systemic influences the interpersonal by understanding the moral character of both 
political and social institutions and individual agents. Mills’ view may not foreclose this further work 
in moral philosophy, but it would benefit from revisions in order to lay the groundwork for this kind 
of inquiry.  
Lebron proposes we understand racism as a problem of social value where Blacks (and other 
people of color) are ranked as having less value and are not given adequate attention when political 
institutions distribute resources. This disparate social value is in place due to a history of Western 
colonization, slavery, and—in the U.S.—Jim Crow. While we have made some formal progress, the 
social, political, and economic institutions currently in place have evolved from the times of more 
explicit white power, and thus retain the bad character that perpetuates the inegalitarian social value. 
Importantly, this problem of social value and inadequate attention affects individuals’ moral character 
 
22 Lebron, The Color of Our Shame¸ p. 36. 
23 See, Lebron, The Color of Our Shame. 
24 P. 36. 
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as well, creating the social stagnation that marks America’s racism. Much of Lebron’s work, then, is 
concerned with specifying the mechanics by which racial inequality evolves and reproduces itself 
through institutions and individuals. 
At this point, the more pressing question is less, “What is racism?” and more, “How should 
we understand and theorize about racism?” I take it that Garcia and Mills are trying to answer the 
first question, to pinpoint the actual features of racism, while Lebron is more concerned with trying 
to figure out how we should understand racism such that we may make some progress toward 
dismantling it. Lebron’s project, though, is still largely a macro-scale project of political theory: 
exploring the perpetuation of racism from institution to institution and between institution and 
individual. My project, while also aimed at understanding how racism is maintained and reinforced, 
is a micro-scale project of moral psychology: arguing for how we should understand the 
perpetuation of interpersonal racism. If, as Lebron argues, individual racism manifests as inattention 
to people of color and bad white moral character, inherited from entrenched social institutions, then 
what can we say about this inattention? How does this manifest in one’s moral psychology?  
It is this dimension of racism that I want to start working toward understanding. I’m 
uninterested in defining racism, locating its essence in one particular sphere (here Lawrence Blum’s 
suggestion that there may not be a central feature of racism seems plausible). Instead, I am largely 
interested in presenting one possible answer to how we should understand one dimension of racism. 
That is, I am interested in how we should understand the morality of the interpersonal dimensions 
of racism and its moral psychology. Like Garcia and, to some extent, Lebron, I want to explore in 
what way racism affects one’s moral character and how certain preferences and actions are morally 
problematic. Much of the value in Garcia’s account of racism is his serious consideration of how 
racism affects one’s moral character and consideration of the ways in which racism is perpetuated 
among individuals in their interpersonal relationships. He takes seriously the idea that racism, when 
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found in the individual, is a significant moral vice that must be overcome. He worries about how 
white people’s preferences to help and commune with other white people over people of color can 
betray a further issue of character and moral prejudice.25 That is to say, the issues he concerns 
himself with are those that help explain how racial inequality evolves and reproduces itself on the 
interpersonal level. However, since Garcia’s account seems to fail as both a larger social theory of 
racism, and—in effect—as a plausible moral psychology and ethics of interpersonal racism, I want 
to return to his questions but with the resources from philosophers like Mills, Shelby, and Lebron 
on the socio-political dimensions of racism in order to answer them. Whether or not the socio-
political approach accurately answers the question of what racism is, this approach is currently the 
dominant understanding of racism. Thus, I believe there is value in providing answers that are 
consistent with our current understanding of systemic racism. An account that is consistent in this 
way will not imply that the individual comes before the systemic, or vice versa, but should show how 
both feed into each other with the possibility that either could have started the cycle. I want to 
acknowledge and use the work of the many social and political theorists of race who have come 
before me, but to return to the questions that Garcia attempted to answer, which have largely been 
left theoretically barren.26  
The view I will be articulating and defending is that much racism, on the interpersonal level, 
stems from how we perceive people of different races. This notion of “perceiving” follows Iris 
 
25 Garcia specifically contrasts a case where a white person decides to not give money to a homeless person of color but 
does give money to a white homeless person with a case where a person of color decides to give money to a homeless 
person of color over a white homeless person. He does not believe either person is racist, but that there is something 
suspicious about the white giver’s attitudes in a way he is not about the person of color.  
26 There are of course other moral views of racism, and while I will not be primarily focused on critiquing these views, I 
will reference them at times in relation to what I’m arguing. 
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Murdoch’s insight that moral vision is a central part of our moral lives.27 Murdoch, unsatisfied with 
much of the moral theory of her day, wanted philosophers to recognize that there was more to 
morality than our actions or the will that produced them. In addition, she argued there is an inner 
moral life of perception. She argued that a fundamental part of our moral lives is how we perceive 
the world, situations, and people around us: what we take to be morally salient, how we 
conceptualize others, and the way that this shapes what we take to be our choices. In order to be 
virtuous, then, one must perceive properly. When one becomes good at attending in this way, they 
have the virtue Murdoch calls loving attention. 
 There are, I take it, several forces preventing us from perceiving with loving attention. 
Murdoch, though, was concerned with the way our selfish, self-preoccupied nature kept us from 
engaging properly with the world. Instead of perceiving the world clearly, there is a veil which lays 
over our senses, distorting our perception, and organizing everything with reference to the self. The 
self-preoccupied nature of our perception and the possibility to overcome it makes it the case that 
the perception itself is morally evaluable, regardless of the actions it leads to. A significant part of my 
goal in this dissertation will be fleshing out a different way we are prevented from attending properly 
that is morally problematic: a separate, racist veil that distorts our perception of the world. 
 The first chapter, “The Inner Moral Life,” will provide a critical reading of Murdoch’s ideas 
in order to get at her central insight of the role perception plays in our moral lives. On this reading, 
Murdoch is not presenting a rival moral theory but revealing an often-overlooked area of morality. 
Her work, then, should be read as attempting to understand this area of the inner. I’ll accept much 
 
27 Murdoch uses the terms “moral vision”, I’ve decided to broaden the metaphor for the sake of skirting issues of 
reinforcing ableism that metaphors of vision often promote. At times I will quote Murdoch’s own words where she uses 
‘vision’ language without alteration, but my own discussion will be in terms of perception.  
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of what she argues but go on to adjust and supplement it to clarify how more than our self-
preoccupied nature gets in the way of perception.  
 On this reading, Murdoch believes the realm of perception has two levels, as it were. The 
first level is the level of perceiving people and the situations we find ourselves in with them. 
Perceiving well, at this first-order level, constitutes the virtue of loving attention. This virtue involves 
perceiving people on their own terms: understanding and interpreting them by reference to their 
own cares, concerns, needs, and desires as opposed to the cares, concerns, needs, and desires of the 
perceiver. The second level is that of orientation, the perception of ideals and value. At this level 
perception can take on as its object virtues such as loving attention itself. For Murdoch, our self-
preoccupied nature obstructs and distorts both forms of perception and constitutes what I will be 
calling the self-preoccupied veil.  
 The second chapter, “The Racial Veil,” lays out how racism constitutes a similar obstruction 
to our moral perception, the idea being that the racial veil functions in much the same way as the 
self-preoccupied veil Murdoch believes inhibits our moral perception. I believe we can make 
progress in understanding the moral dimensions of interpersonal racism by understanding the inner 
life of those who perceive people through a racial veil. I argue that just as the self-preoccupied veil 
arranges our perception around the self, the racial veil arranges our perception around race.  
 The racial veil, then, makes race salient where it should not be. This is the effect that 
internalizing the dominant stereotypes, stories, affect, and disparate value in a racist society has 
brought about. Just like the self-preoccupied perception Murdoch is worried about, this racialized 
perception is morally problematic. Furthermore, the internalization of said perception can lead to a 
damaged character, where one internalizes the disparate value inherent in the construction of races.  
 Chapter three, “Perceptual Responsibility and Racist Perception,” explores in what way we 
can be responsible for our moral perception. Moral responsibility often emphasizes the importance 
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of one having control over their actions, which is not the case with our perception. But our moral 
misperceptions still reveal something morally objectionable in us. We may not be blameworthy for 
our misperception, but we are not wholly innocent either. The first aim of this chapter is to 
articulate and provide an answer to the puzzle of how one can be responsible for their perception 
since it lies outside of one’s control. The second aim of this chapter is to apply this to the task of 
understanding our responsibility for perceiving through the racial veil. 
 The solution to this puzzle is to focus on the idea of taking responsibility rather than on the 
idea of being responsible. Taking responsibility involves acts or activities, it is a way an agent 
responds to a moral flaw via their actions. But taking responsibility involves more than taking action, 
it requires owning one’s perception. In the case of moral misperception, one must be committed to 
changing their perceptions by interrogating one’s own character for potential distortions. In owning 
one’s misperception, one will likely have an affective response as well, of either guilt or shame. It is 
this experience of affect that often leads to one taking on the commitment to “look again” and 
change one’s perception. Taking responsibility is involved with recognizing both self-preoccupied 
misperception and racist misperception, though there are subtle differences between the two that 
the second half of this chapter explores. 
 Finally, having argued that the way we perceive people of color is often distorted and 
morally problematic, something for which we should take responsibility for, I will address in chapter 
four, “Piercing the Veil”, the question, “What can we do about it?” How can we perceive people of 
color in a more just and loving way? While the issue with the racial veil is making race salient where 
it should not be, there is significant reason to doubt that trying to ignore race will improve our 
perception. Such “color-blind” approaches to overcoming racism have a history of failing, and 
instead we must develop a different kind of answer that recognizes race in a non-problematic way. 
In effect, we cannot answer the question, “How can we perceive people of color in a more just and 
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loving way?” without also answering the question, “How should we attend to race?” These are two 
separate but interconnected questions. A complete answer to the former requires answering the 
latter.   
 I argue that the key to correcting and improving our perception of people of color is to be 
attentive to the role race plays in their life. Loving attention, as articulated in the first chapter, 
provides us with a way of separating our self from our perceptions, and this particular distancing is 
also required in attending to race. But this must be done against a background of racial knowledge, 
so that we do not pull from the same dominant stereotypes and scripts we have in the past. It must 
also in some sense be personal, recognizing one’s own role in these racist mechanisms. I argue that 
this kind of attention to race will aid in our ability to attend to people of color better by allowing us 
to imagine what it is like to be a person of color in a racist society. This act of imagining is one way 
we can improve our perception of people of color, effectively piercing a hole in the racial veil.  
 I do not take it that I will provide completely satisfactory answers to all these issues. To 
utilize a different perceptual metaphor, I am engaging in what María Lugones called tantear en la 
oscuridad, the practice of exploring in the dark by using one’s hands to tactilely probe and gain first 
impressions.28 Lugones uses this notion to discuss one’s inclinations about a topic, and the (initial) 
exploration of that topic. There is a lot you can learn from poking and prodding around in the dark. 
It allows you to get a sense of what’s there and the structure of things, even if you don’t feel the full 
object. I’m hoping this process will serve as a starting point to understanding interpersonal aspects 



















When I took Introduction to Ethics as an undergraduate, my professor introduced us to 
ethical theory by describing it as a machine. Utilitarianism, Kantian Deontology, these things were 
machines that you could plug some quandary or moral dilemma into and get an output of an action. 
That is, the role of normative ethics was to supply you with a procedure for determining the right 
choice given your situation. Now, perhaps this is not the best way to explain normative ethics—to 
undergraduates or others—but it does illustrate a certain preoccupation moral theory has often had 
with choice and the action that issues from it. A preoccupation that is luckily, as time goes one, less 
and less influential but nonetheless still present. Whether recognized or not, the work of Iris 
Murdoch had much to do with why we have moved away from thinking almost solely about choice 
and action to also examining what she called the inner moral life.  
Focus on the inner moral life has increased since she originally published her work, with a 
revival of virtue ethics and a growing interest in moral attitudes. However, Murdoch’s own 
exploration of the inner life was focused on the role of perception.  She argued that this perception 
is perhaps more fundamental than choice. In order to make a choice, we must first perceive things a 
particular way and it’s in this perspective that choices are made available to us.  Furthermore, there 
are morally better and worse ways of perceiving: certain ways not only make it difficult to perceive 





deficiencies, we need a reorientation away from things that distort our perception toward ideals that 
both aim our attention and motivate our actions. 
 Moral perception, then, is the kind of perception that is morally evaluable, perception that is 
morally good or bad. This is what I find to be the central insight of Murdoch’s philosophy. In 
locating something morally important in perception is to expand our conception of what is morally 
important. Moral perception goes beyond moral philosophy’s typical focus on the will and 
deliberation as the source of morality, instead locating something morally significant in something 
much more immediate, without conscious judgment or inference and therefore may come into 
conflict with one’s consciously endorsed beliefs. Moral perception is significant because it reveals 
ways we may be morally evaluable that lies outside the elements (i.e., will, deliberation, belief) that 
moral philosophers focus on to explain our moral lives.  
My project is not to do straightforward Murdoch exegesis—determining exactly what 
Murdoch meant—but to articulate one reading of her philosophy that centralizes this insight and 
make it serviceable for my project of understanding the moral psychology of racism. On this view, 
moral perception is not an entirely new moral theory, but a dimension of our moral lives that is 
often overlooked by most theories. Therefore, Murdoch’s insight can be made consistent with other 
normative and metaethical theories. I will do my best to note where my view diverges from her 
philosophy throughout the chapter.  
 I aim to present this reading of Murdoch by articulating the relationship between these two 
senses of attention at play in Murdoch—what I call loving attention on the one hand, and 
orientation on the other. While Murdoch continuously uses the language of ‘attention’ when talking 
about moral perception, I believe there are two, though interrelated, senses of attention at play here. 
On the one hand, you need to perceive a situation or person properly in order to come to know 





discusses reorienting our attention toward the good. Understanding the relationship between these 
different sense of attention reveals the richness of Murdoch’s insight and its value in taking up this 
perspective when thinking through questions of moral psychology.  
2. Loving Attention 
 To begin, I’ll try and get clear on the first sense of attention, before moving on to the 
second. The first sense of attention has to do with what we perceive when faced with a situation or 
person and is specifically related to her arguments for the significance of an inner moral life in “The 
Idea of Perfection”. The place where her point is made clearest is in the example of M and D:  
A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, whom I shall call D. M 
finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and 
lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently 
ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does not like 
D’s accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath him. Let us 
assume for purposes of the example that the mother, who is a very ‘correct’ person, behaves 
beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to appear in any way. … 
 
Thus much for M’s first thoughts about D. Time passes, and it could be that M settles down 
with a hardened sense of grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned (if I may use a 
question-begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married a silly vulgar girl. However, 
the M of the example is an intelligent well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, 
capable of giving careful and just attention to an object, which confronts her. M tells herself: 
‘‘I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be 
snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.’’ Here I assume that M observes D or at 
least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters. …D is discovered to 
be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, 
not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on. And as I say, ex hypothesi, M’s 
outward behavior, beautiful from the start, in no way alters.29  
 
Murdoch’s claim is that there is an important moral change here that happens entirely in M, that 
isn’t ultimately cashed out in M’s behavior toward D. Typically, one might think the importance of 
M’s change of view is due to the resultant change of action. While it is no doubt at times true that 
 





changes in perspective lead to different actions, the inner change is not only existent but is itself 
important. That is, bettering one’s inner moral life is not solely instrumentally valuable (toward the 
end of better actions), but also good itself.  
 When Murdoch talks about the inner moral life, she is primarily concerned with people’s 
moral perception. The moral life is not just the life of right action but of proper attention. Murdoch 
argues that some philosophers’ focus on choice misses the fact that choice is limited by how we 
perceive a situation. Consider the following example of a wife upset with her husband after he 
injures himself playing tennis. Let’s say that prior to the incident the husband has had numerous 
issues with getting injured while working on repairing their house and is just coming off three weeks 
of significant back pain. During this time the wife has had to be extra attentive to him while he 
recovers, in addition to doing extra housework to pick up the slack. Now that he is feeling better, he 
decides to go out to play tennis with his friends. The wife warns that it may be unwise given his 
recent injuries, and that he should probably ease into activities. However, he rarely (if ever) takes his 
wife’s advice seriously, thinking he knows better. While he may at times be correct, in this particular 
instance he was not and, like his wife predicted, becomes reinjured.  
When faced with the decision to go play tennis or not, the husband and wife clearly perceive 
things differently—what is morally salient to the wife is not salient to the husband. From the wife’s 
view, her husband’s recent injuries and the extra labor she accrues due to it, plus the needs of their 
house are all salient factors in whether he should play tennis or stay home and perhaps find less 
rigorous exercise. From the husband’s view, none of this is salient, only his growing frustration with 
inactivity and his desire to play tennis with his friends. Had he been more aware and attentive to the 
moral factors present in his wife’s view, he may have found other available choices that could ease 
his inactivity and frustration while being less likely to leave him injured and her overworked. While 





with regards to their wives—my primary point is how the husband’s perception dictates what he 
took to be his options, not that he is especially selfish and immoral. One’s choices are shaped by 
what they perceive. 
In any given situation, like the one in the example above, there are multiple ways to flesh out 
the details, depending on which perspective you take. First, there are all the features of the situation, 
some which may not be in view to anyone or only to a proper subset of agents. Second, there are the 
features a person “takes in”—what one perceives. Finally, third, there are those things that are salient 
to us in what we perceive—what we are attending to. The wife and husband are clearly perceiving 
different things: the wife is perceiving the potentiality for increased workload again, whereas the 
husband is oblivious to these details. But they are attending to different things as well. The husband’s 
potential to reinjury was well within his perception, as his wife brought these concerns into his view 
by telling him as much, but he did not attend to this feature (that is, count it as salient).  The problem, 
then, is not solely that he acted wrongly, jumping foolishly into strenuous activities all too quickly; 
but that he also failed to fully attend to the situation—leaving important features unattended. His 
choice was limited by how he perceived and attended to the situation. Good action, then, is made 
more difficult without proper attention. 
However, at this point, all we can say of moral perception is its instrumental value due to its 
effect on our actions. What is of importance for Murdoch, and my own view, is the further problem 
that our moral perception has moral value itself. According to Murdoch we can perceive well with 
loving attention, or we can have morally problematic perception that is self-preoccupied and unjust. 
Murdoch argues that our perception is often naturally selfish, or self-preoccupied, in 
nature.30 She states: 
 
30 In “On the sovereignty of good over other concepts”, Murdoch states that one of her assumptions moving forward is 





The psyche is a historically determined individual relentlessly looking after itself. …it is 
predisposed to certain patterns of activity. The area of its vaunted freedom of choice is not 
usually very great. One of its main pastimes is daydreaming. It is reluctant to face unpleasant 
realities. Its consciousness is not normally a transparent glass through which it views the 
world, but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to protect the psyche from pain. 
It constantly seeks consolation… Even its loving is more often than not an assertion of self. 
…by opening our eyes we do not necessarily see what confronts us. We are anxiety-ridden 
animals. Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, 
often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world.31  
 
The way our self-preoccupation is vicious is two-fold. First, it directly inhibits our ability to perceive 
the world properly: accurately, lovingly, and justly. It is not that we need to alter our perception for 
the sake of altering our perception, but that we need to alter our perception for the sake of 
perceiving with a just and loving attention. Left on our own, our anxious, self-preoccupied 
tendencies will likely misrepresent and misconceptualize the world around us. Second, our self-
preoccupation is vicious because it inhibits our willingness to look again—to alter our perception of 
the world. “Why should I change my outlook?” Thus, we fall into a kind of arrogance where we 
assume our perception is fine and beyond reproach. We must realize our own deficiencies in order 
to attend to the world properly. Returning to the above example of the husband and wife, the issue 
is not (only) that the husband, in failing to attend fully, goes out and injures himself, but that his very 
way of perceiving the situation was self-preoccupied and therefore morally problematic. Even if he 
had played tennis and remained perfectly healthy, he still could have perceived the situation in a 
better way.  
Murdoch is solely concerned with how our self-preoccupation distorts our perception of 
others. It is what leads M initially to perceive D as a “silly vulgar girl.” Murdoch states that M is 
snobbish, jealous, and likely prejudicial against D. M’s “anxious” and “self-preoccupied” psyche has 
 





distorted her perception of D. M’s snobbery and prejudice, we may suppose, causes her to perceive 
D as vulgar and undignified as opposed to refreshingly simple and spontaneous or her jealousy 
causes her to perceive D as noisy and tiresomely juvenile as opposed to gay and delightfully 
youthful. And, ultimately, it is due to M’s ability to be self-critical that she can “look again” with 
proper attention.  
One’s tendency to be self-preoccupied is not the only thing that distorts our moral 
perception. As Lawrence Blum has noted, “often there is a social or cultural source of distorted 
images of others.”32 Blum is particularly interested in the way race and class in America distorts our 
moral perception and “may block a true appreciation of the reality of another person.”33 But, of 
course, gender, sexuality, age, disability, and other parts of a person’s identity that lead to 
marginalization are all sites of likely distorted perception. Here is an instance where we need to make 
an addition to Murdoch’s own view—to account for ways our perception gets distorted that she left 
unattended.  
Return to the case of the husband’s inattention. There is a self-preoccupied element here—
he wants to be active without taking proper precautions—but there is also a gendered aspect: 
women’s labor in marriages is often invisible due to men being socialized to expect it from their 
wives and mothers. So, it’s not solely an issue of self-preoccupation, but also an issue of gendered 
expectations and assumptions that may be getting in the way of proper attention. Even Murdoch’s 
example of M’s snobbery and prejudice, though she did not recognize this, seems to be largely class 
based, as is clear when she states that M believes her son to have married “beneath him”.34 Thus, 
 
32 “Visual metaphors in Murdoch’s moral philosophy” in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, p. 316-317.  
33 Ibid, p. 316 





there are two ways that our perception can be distorted—to perceive things in a morally problematic 
way—by (1) our personal self-preoccupation and by (2) oppressive societal norms, stereotypes, or 
expectations.35  
Feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye, in articulating a contrast well-suited to Murdoch’s 
framework, has introduced the concepts of the “arrogant eye” and the “loving eye.”36 The person 
who perceives with the arrogant eye believes “that everything exists and happens for some purpose, 
and he tends to animate things, imagining attitudes toward himself as the animating motives.”37 He 
believes everything is acting for him or against him and doesn’t consider the possibility that one is 
indifferent to his situation. Furthermore, the arrogant eye falsifies what the seer perceives in order to 
conform the object of his perception to his own desires. Importantly for Frye, this is possible given 
a backdrop of male privilege—though this is not the only way one can perceive arrogantly. Thus, 
Frye’s notion of the arrogant eye brings together the two aforementioned distortions: the personal 
self-preoccupied sort and the cultural and social sort, specifically sexist norms and expectations.  
In contrast, Frye believes one can also perceive with the loving eye:  
The loving eye knows the independence of the other. …It is the eye of one who knows that 
to know the seen, one must consult something other than one’s own will and interests and 




35 There is a testimonial dimension to this issue. One of the reasons why the husband can’t perceive what his wife 
perveices is because he’s not giving her testimony proper consideration, but this is related to the relevant domain: 
exercise and the use of his time. If one of the relevant pieces of information were, say, their child’s schedule, then he’d 
be more likely to attend and accept her testimony.  
36 See, “In and out of harm’s way” in The Politics of Reality. 
37 “In and out of harm’s way”, p. 67 





One who perceives with the loving eye “does not blend the seer and the seen.”39 This description, I 
take it, is an articulation of the virtue of loving attention.  
 If the features of a situation or person that one takes in constitutes what they perceive, then 
the term ‘attend’ best stands in as what happens when we decide to focus in or make sense of an 
interaction, relationship, or person. We are trying to figure something out or perceive something 
specific. Loving attention is the moral virtue of being able to attend properly.40 
In order to have the virtue of loving attention, one must overcome various kinds of 
distortion, both the personal self-preoccupied sort and the cultural and social sort. One’s perception 
cannot be distorted by one’s own cares, concerns, needs, or desires.41 Nor can one’s perception be 
distorted by one’s society’s tropes and stereotypes. Instead, the person needs to be perceived on 
their own terms: their cares, concerns, needs, desires, and self-conception need to be salient, not the 
cares, concerns, needs and desires of the perceiver, nor the “cares, concerns, needs, and desires” (as 
it were) of a system of oppression. 
We can imagine Murdoch’s D not to care much for the societal expectations that run much 
of M’s life. She has little concern for being always and wholly proper. Perhaps instead D believes 
these things get in the way of enjoying life and appreciating what life has to offer. In realizing D is 
not immature and ignorant of being proper, but reflectively flouting such norms, M is able to 
 
39 “In and out of harm’s way”, p. 74-5.  
40 These distinctions are largely thanks to Lawrence Blum’s work in “Visual metaphors in Murdoch’s moral philosophy.” 
While Blum is somewhat more critical of Murdoch’s inconsistent use of these terms, I believe they’re helpful stipulations 
for talking about moral perception.  
41 In some cases, when one is marginalized, it may be that one is failing to notice the saliency of one’s own cares, 
concerns, needs, or desires, due to the overriding pressure to perceive things from the dominant, oppressive point of 
view. However, in that case letting more of your own cares, concerns, needs, and desires is not being self-preoccupied, 





perceive D on her own terms.42 Similarly, we may think the husband in my example needs to 
suspend his own cares, concerns, needs, and desires about being active, damn the consequences, and 
think about the cares, concerns, needs, and desires of his wife.43 
When one is attempting to perceive someone on their own terms, one is directly attempting 
to overcome particular distortions. The “self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil” is made up primarily 
of our own cares, concerns, needs, and desires, which when suspended helps move toward accuracy 
because the objects of our perception are no longer being distorted by our own. (A similar, though 
perhaps more complicated, story can be said for overcoming the “cares, concerns, needs, and 
desires” of systems of oppression.)44  
Let us consider all of this by analogy. Murdoch’s notion of loving attention is meant to apply 
to art in addition to morals.45 So, take for example lovingly attending to a film; that is, attending to it 
on its own terms. What kind of movie is it trying to be? A thought-provoking drama, light-hearted 
comedy, or escapist, fanciful action flick? Not all movies, or all art, are trying to do the same thing, 
and in seeing the movie on its own terms, we get a better chance of appreciating what it does well. If 
you go into the latest Marvel movie expecting deep reflections on philosophical ideas, you are likely 
 
42 Of course, if D is ignorant of these norms that doesn’t immediately make her immature and improper, nor does it 
make M anymore justified in thinking of D immature if she is in fact not. The point here is that In attempting to attend 
to D on her own terms, M is in a better position to understand D’s behavior. The way I’ve fleshed out the explanation 
for D’s behavior here is just one of many ways D could conceive of herself that would make M incorrect in thinking her 
immature.  
43 There is a possible asymmetry here. It is not hard to imagine that many people who are marginalized are used to 
constantly having to take on a more dominant point of view, and so we could imagine the wife in some cases thinking, 
“I’ve done enough and don’t need to do more work trying to understand the point of view of men in my life.” In some 
cases, this would be true, and be dependent on what work gender roles and privilege were playing in the case. But notice, 
that this asymmetry is in part due to the compulsory view shifting that many marginalized people must perform to 
survive. For more on this, see Maria Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception.” 
44 I will return to this later. 





to be disappointed. The same if you go into an Ingmar Bergman film expecting escapism. What the 
movie is trying to be and do is important for how you see it.  
That said, it is possible for a film to try and do something and fail. There are many Sci-Fi 
movies that aim to be deep and philosophical but end up being shallow and naïve. In seeing such a 
movie this way though, you’re still evaluating it on its own terms. The film has just failed to live up 
to its own ideals. A similar thing is true for how we view people and situations. It is important to 
perceive people on their own terms, even if they fail to attain the ideals they believe themselves to 
achieve. The important second step, then, is to critically assess the person on their own terms. So, in 
order to lovingly attend, one must not solely look, but also, as Marilyn Frye noted, check and question. 
As I stated before, what I take to be the combination of personal self-preoccupation and 
oppressive societal norms roughly, and in part, constitutes what Frye calls the “arrogant eye”: 
perception that organizes everything around the perceiver’s interests. Frye argues that the existence 
of the arrogant eye leads to a world in which we acquire a “great wanting”. She states, “The wanting 
doesn’t care about truth: it simplifies, where the truth is complex; it invents, when it should be 
investigating; it expects, when it should be waiting to find out; it would turn everything to its 
satisfaction; and what it finally thinks it cannot thus maneuver it hates.”46  According to Frye, the job 
is not to deny this wanting, but to recognize and know it. In order to overcome its distorting effect, 
we must identify it, claim it, know its scope, and thus, know its distance from the truth.47 Thus, Frye 
states that when one perceives with the loving eye, one does not “…make the object of perception 
into something edible, does not try to assimilate it, does not reduce it to the size of the perceiver’s 
desire, fear and imagination, and hence does not have to simplify. It knows the complexity of the 
 
46 “In and out of harm’s way”, p. 75.  





other as something which will forever present new things to be known.”48 The loving eye for Frye is 
one that seeks the truth through critical checking and questioning, not suppressing the perceiver’s 
wants and desires but recognizing how they lead one astray. Furthermore, such a task “will forever 
present new things to be known.”  
Similarly, Murdoch states that loving attention is an endlessly perfectible task.49 So, while we 
aim for accurate perception, we will never fully obtain a completely accurate and complete picture, 
but only continually improve our perception in that direction. When one is lovingly attending, one is 
critical, not just of their own faults and flaws, but of others as well, but in such a way that is loving: 
on the person’s own terms and with care, recognizing that the truth is often complex and difficult to 
fully perceive.  
 Here one might think we have merely pushed the problem back: what if one’s own terms are 
problematic? That is, what if it is not merely that the person is failing to live up to their values, but 
the values themselves are immoral? But notice that one can rarely come to such a conclusion if one 
is not first attending to someone on their own terms. Part of what Frye helps us realize is that 
human complexity is such that when viewing another we may disapprove of what we perceive and 
that we cannot know if that disapproval comes from our self-preoccupation and societal distortions 
or a legitimate moral shortcoming without first attending carefully. So, perceiving someone on their 
own terms is important for criticizing or disapproving of those terms.50  
 
48 Ibid, p. 76. 
49 “The idea of perfection”, p. 23. 
50 There are some potential exceptions to this procedure. Consider extreme ideologies like Nazism or Men’s Rights 
Activists. You may find yourself unable to even find their terms comprehensible, much less take them on in order to 
reject them. Such ideologies may be immediately recognizable as morally corrupt given background moral beliefs. There 
could be something like what Tamar Szabó Gendler calls imaginative resistance: Nazism and Men’s Rights Activists 





 The critical checking and questioning that is present in Frye’s “loving eye” is related to 
Murdoch’s claim that attention must not only be loving but also just. The way loving attention needs 
to be just is brought out by a similar, though slightly different, concern to the one I was just 
considering: do we always need to perceive, or perhaps, focus on the good in people? One might 
legitimately wonder, “what if D actually is vulgar, noisy, and tiresomely juvenile?” Would Murdoch 
want us then to perceive D as refreshingly simple, gay, and delightfully youthful? There is a sense in 
Murdoch’s work that if you attend lovingly, you will recognize the good in everyone. But given the 
need for accuracy, I think if D truly is vulgar, as opposed to refreshingly simple, then you ought to 
perceive her as such.51 However, given human complexity, it is rare that anyone possesses only bad 
character traits just as it is rare that anyone possesses only good character traits. It is likely that both 
are there, and both should be recognized. The question then becomes, which ought to be most 
salient to you? Answering this question reveals how checking and questioning are related to justice. 
What becomes salient depends on what is both just and loving, not only accurate. One can 
easily attend lovingly without attending justly, just consider how a loving friend or parent would 
highlight the good traits of a murderous crime boss.52 When considering individuals who have done 
such things as commit murder, such acts of injustice ought to be salient. Furthermore, one may 
think that the larger the injustice the less it matters what good qualities the person has. For example, 
given the serial abuse and predatory behavior of R. Kelly, it doesn’t matter, in most contexts, that his 
song “Ignition (Remix)” slaps.53 The creative talent Kelly possesses cannot be justly salient (again, in 
 
51 It is unclear to me if this is what Murdoch believes based on her discussion of a need for accuracy, there are some 
possible interpretations of Murdoch that we must always conceptualize people with positive thick concepts. However, I 
think there are some good, though not decisive, reasons to doubt this. See Nancy Snow’s, “” 
52 Susan Wolf makes this point in “Loving attention: Lessons in love from The Philadelphia Story”, p. 380. 






most contexts) given his significantly unjust behavior. Cases other than murders and serial abusers 
may be more difficult in trying to determine what is justly salient. Perhaps in more ambiguous and 
difficult cases, where the person has a more complex mix of traits, what matters most is the loving in 
loving attention.  
Being loving is, of course, built into the central concept of loving attention. This need not be 
a deep or necessarily romantic love. The philosophical tradition is filled with distinctions between 
different kinds of love, some of which are nearly impersonal. It seems what is most important is that 
one care about others for their own sakes, as opposed to being wholly misanthropic or wholly 
egoistic. One additional notion of love is that of grace. Murdoch’s own position on grace is a 
“supernatural assistance” to overcome our personal limitations.54 Traditionally, grace is a religious 
concept, but I think it can be easily secularized here. When faced with the person of mixed bad and 
good traits, but not bad to the point of grave injustice, and not good to the point of nearing an ideal, 
we may look on that person with a certain kind of grace: recognizing them for their all too human 
situation.55 This notion of grace can even be extended to the extremely bad, but if properly just, it 
would not seek to highlight good traits and ignore the bad ones.  
Love of this sort does not need to carry with it strong feelings or be focused on a particular 
individual as the beloved. This is captured in what Susan Wolf calls “loving humanity”: being 
interested in every part of humanity, without actually loving each individual human being.56 She 
notes that to be interested in humanity in this way is to be interested in the reality of humans, which 
is contrary to self-preoccupation—in Murdoch’s words, a way of transcending the self. This sense of 
 
54 “On god and good”, p. 54. 
55 See, Vida Yao, “Grace and Alienation.” 





“loving humanity” allows us to have grace towards others and recognize their all too human 
situation. This kind of impersonal love that lacks strong feelings is also captured in some discussions 
of agape love. Myisha Cherry argues that Martin Luther King Jr’s conception of agape love is “not an 
affectionate feeling nor does it require ‘liking’ the beloved”, nor is it primarily aimed at individuals.57 
Instead, agape love is aimed more widely at one’s entire moral community and involves 
understanding and active interest.58 
The loving quality of attention may take on a range of different affects to fulfill what is 
morally required. The kind of romantic love between partners is certainly one, as is the rich platonic 
love of close friends. But it may also be a kind of grace, “loving humanity,” or King’s agape love that 
does the right work for those people in our lives who are not particularly close to us or even 
complete strangers. This loving quality of attention is important because it creates distance from our 
self but need not always have that strong affective component we associate with love we have for 
those closest to us.  
Here I should pause to sum up what I have said so far. Loving attention is the virtue of 
perceiving or attending well, and as such it involves overcoming various kinds of personal self-
preoccupied and societal distortions. The aim is to attend to another person on their own terms, not 
unquestioningly, but critically to check if that person lives up to their own ideals and to question if 
those ideals are good ones to have. Thus, the endless task is for accuracy of perception, recognizing 
the full complexity of the other. We do this with a sense of justice, to recognize what should be 
morally salient, and with a loving quality. However, so far I have only spoken of what is involved 
 
57 “Love, anger, and racial injustice”, p. #.  
58 All this said, I think sometimes loving attention does involve a more active and compassionate love, as is the case with 






when loving attention has to do with how we perceive others; but, as with the example of the 
husband and wife that I stated earlier, we also need to understand how loving attention is involved 
in perceiving situations and what is morally salient in them.   
Let us return to my previous example and remember what is different in how the husband 
and wife perceive the situation. From the wife’s view, her husband’s recent injuries and the extra 
labor she accrues due to it, plus the needs of their house are all salient factors in whether he should 
play tennis or stay home and perhaps find less rigorous exercise. From the husband’s view, none of 
this is salient, only his growing frustration with inactivity and his desire to play tennis with his 
friends. He was inattentive to his potential reinjury, and more importantly the costs of his activities 
on his wife. The husband’s self-preoccupation is affecting what he perceives. He is concerned with 
his growing inactivity and his desire to play tennis. In order to attend successfully, he needs to 
overcome these gaps in perception.59  
Unlike with people, and various forms of art, the situations life presents us with do not have 
“their own terms”. Thus, we must see how loving attention, as I have articulated it, can help us 
overcome these particular instances of self-preoccupation and societal framings, and do so in a 
critical, just, and loving way. The husband’s view of the situation is defective since he is too 
concerned about his own inactivity and desires. How does he remove this self-preoccupation? By 
reorienting himself to perceive how others may view the situation, namely, to take on his wife’s 
view. He may stop and think, “I know I care about being active again after being immobile for so 
long, but what are my wife’s interests in this situation?” He is, after all, not the only person affected 
 
59 There is arguably another kind of patriarchal distortion affecting the husband: as a man he has not been conditioned 
to notice the labor of his wife. This seems like an important part of the case, but for the sake of more cleanly analyzing 
how his perception is morally evaluable I will leave it to the side since I have not given a full account of how sexism 





by his actions. Thus, when looking at a situation, we should not only register our cares, concerns, 
and desires, but the cares, concerns, and desires of others who are involved.  
In attempting to overcome these distortions, to pierce the veils, loving attention must still be 
critical. It is not only the husband, or you, or me, who perceives with a self-preoccupied gaze, but 
everyone must overcome this distortion. Imagine if the wife in this scenario does not really care 
about the extra work, or that the couple have a housekeeper so there is no extra labor on the wife. 
Instead, the wife simply doesn’t like her husband’s friends; she is jealous of them in part due to her 
own insecurities as a person and partner. Now, it may be the case that the husband is still prone to 
injury, but perhaps in bringing that up the wife is trying to weaponize his fragility in order to keep 
him at home, thus boosting her own security and self-esteem.  
The husband, in taking up his wife’s view, may realize this and be somewhat critical of her 
self-absorbed motives. However, notice too how this changes his options for action and makes 
apparent things that would have gone unnoticed if he had not attended with loving attention. He 
now perceives that perhaps what is most urgent is spending time with his wife and talking with her 
in an attempt to relieve her insecurities. Perhaps he can find an activity that will allow his wife to get 
to know his friends better and in perceiving them more accurately, she overcomes the jealousy. The 
point is that the husband need not passively accept his wife’s view over his own, but that in 
attending to it lovingly, he can perceive important, morally salient features of the situation relevant 
to how he should act.  
Through clarifying and elaborating on these details of loving attention, I hope I have shown 
why the way we perceive has moral value in itself beyond any instrumental value it holds for 
changing our actions. That is, the person with loving attention is not merely setting themselves up 
for doing the right thing but is doing something morally admirable due to the way they are 





actions but engages in a morally worse way of perceiving. Perceiving, which includes how one 
attends, is an activity that can be morally evaluated. 
When I began the discussion of how our moral perception is distorted, I said the way self-
preoccupation is vicious is two-fold. First, it directly inhibits our ability to perceive the world 
properly. Second, our self-preoccupation is vicious because it inhibits our ability to reattend—to 
alter our perception of the world. Pretty much all of what I have said so far has to do with 
correcting the first way self-preoccupation is vicious. Loving attention involves perceiving the world 
properly. In order to understand how to get over the second way self-preoccupation is vicious; we 
must understand Murdoch’s other sense of attention.  
3. Orientation 
Murdoch believes moral philosophy should be attempting to answer questions such as, 
“What is a good [person]? How can we make ourselves morally better? Can we make ourselves 
morally better?”60 So far, everything I’ve discussed has to do with the first question: what is a good 
person? (Or rather, how does a good person perceive?) An important part of the answer is someone 
who has the virtue of loving attention. The second question, which concerns the second sense of 
attention, is can we make ourselves morally better and if so, how? Murdoch does not focus on the 
traditional categories of morally good (or bad) intentions, choices, and actions, but instead on moral 
perception. Murdoch is skeptical that willing alone—as others had argued in the past—can bring 
about change or betterment. She invites her readers to imagine being in love and needing to check 
that love, or any other strong emotion like resentment. She writes that it is “small use telling oneself 
 





‘Stop being in love, stop feeling resentment, be just.’”61 Instead, Murdoch argues that what one 
needs is a kind of attention that I call one’s orientation.  
The primary difference between loving attention (the first sense of attention) and orientation 
(her second sense) is that loving attention is a first-order attention. When one lovingly attends, one 
is doing so with the aim of understanding that person or situation. Orientation, on the other hand, is 
second-order attention: it is aimed at guiding our character and moral perception in general. Its 
objects are ideals that orient the direction of our development and motivate us to be better. Thus, 
one of the objects of orientation (second-order attention) is the virtue of loving attention (first-order 
attention). 
Consider Bernard Williams’ example of the abusive husband whom you try to reason with to 
stop being mean to his wife.62 You say, as Williams imagines himself doing, “you really ought to be 
nicer to your wife.” When he asks for a reason you say, “well because she’s your wife!” And he 
replies, “I don’t care. Don’t you understand? I really don’t care.” As Williams claims, there is nothing 
you can say to him—he has no reason to act differently. It is no good for you to say, “be just!” to 
the man. What the man needs is a reorientation. It is not until he perceives his wife’s cares, 
concerns, needs, and desires as valuable and important that he will be any better. Now, Williams 
intended this as a case of a particularly hardened man; it may be impossible to get him to reorient 
himself. What is important to note is that you cannot get him to be better by arguing with him about 
what he has reason to do. If he is going to change, it is going to be due to a reorientation. 
Similarly, the other husband in the example I used above may think to himself, “I really have 
been useless lately, I need to be better and more considerate.” But he cannot merely will himself into 
 
61 “On god and good”, p. 54 





being less useless. It is not hard to imagine, as people sometimes do this, that he may think, “I’m 
going to be better from now on” and then proceed to do the same things he has always done.63 In 
order to do things better, he must perceive things better. Recognizing a shortcoming cannot lead to 
revised action if one’s orientation stays the same, there must be a new ideal to be oriented to. He 
must reorient himself to the situations he is presented with and recognize the downstream 
consequences of his physical health on his wife’s workload.64  
But how does one orient oneself properly toward a morally better ideal? Murdoch attempts 
to illustrate this via analogies to other activities:  
A deep understanding of any field of human activity (painting, for instance) involves an 
increasing revelation of degrees of excellence and often a revelation of there being in fact 
little that is very good and nothing that is perfect. Increasing understanding of human 
conduct operates in a similar way. We come to perceive scales, distances, standards, and may 
incline to see as less than excellent what previously we were prepared to ‘let by’. …The idea 
of perfection works thus within a field of study, producing an increasing sense of direction. 
…It seems to me that the idea of love arises necessarily in this context. The idea of 
perfection moves, and possibly changes, us (as artist, worker, agent) because it inspires love 
in the part of us that is most worthy. One cannot feel unmixed love for a mediocre moral 
standard any more than one can for the work of a mediocre artist.65  
 
There seems to be two important things going on in this passage. The first is a kind of genealogy of 
how we form personal moral ideals. The second is how those ideals guide and reorient us. I will 
elaborate on both in turn. 
 
63 This relates to what William Frankfurt called ‘volitional necessity’ (“The Importance of What We Care About”, p. 
264). Volitional necessity is when one cannot will oneself to act differently, their actions are in a sense necessary given 
their character. My suggestion, then, is that it is in reorienting one’s second-order attention that one can will otherwise. 
One’s orientation underlies this kind of necessity. A full exploration and defense of this suggestion is beyond the scope 
of this chapter and dissertation. 
64 As I’ve described the example, the husband has an issue of orientation. It is possible that someone with similar 
problem to the husband may have a weakness of will problem, such that they are properly oriented, but are failing to 
attend with loving attention due to a weakness to put in the moral work. However, that would be a separate issue, which 
has been adequately covered in that weakness of will literature, loving attention is merely another opportunity to have a 
weak will.  





 In attempting to present a kind of genealogy of personal ideals, Murdoch compares the area 
of human conduct to any other field of human activity, with her example being painting. To flesh 
out this comparison, I will use a different artistic enterprise, composing music, since I know it much 
better. A deep understanding of music begins with recognizing various degrees of excellence. One 
might first learn about orchestral composition by hearing film scores and greatly admire John 
Williams, Howard Shore, or Alexandre Desplat. While all fine composers in their own right, it is 
quite another thing when one moves from movie scores to the more complex and intricate 
compositions of Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms. You begin to realize, as Murdoch says, there is little 
that is very good and nothing that is perfect (except perhaps Bach). One starts, after enough study, 
to perceive what makes a great piece of music great. You get a sense of “scales, distances, standards”. 
Furthermore, some composers may make you realize certain things you never would have thought 
possible: the openness in Sibelius, the innovative use of instruments in Stravinsky, or the dissonant 
tonal structures in Schoenberg. It is in the deep understanding of excellence, and the focus on what 
appeals to you most in other composers that shapes or your work as a composer and gives you 
direction.  
 Just as it is with music, or any other activity, so too with human conduct, according to 
Murdoch. What is required of us is a deep understanding of human excellence and learning what 
values we identify with such that it shapes our life and gives us direction. As it is likely that not 
everyone is wholly good or truly excellent, different individuals may give us different aspects of good 
that help us develop standards. We may attend to our friend’s loyalty, our neighbor’s generosity, our 
mother’s patience, or our partner’s kindness. (Notice, too, how this process is also how we come by 
ideals of non-moral virtues; attending to the comedian’s wit, the athlete’s high compete level, or the 
professor’s insight.) By engaging in this process of determining “scales, distances and standards”, we 





thus the “revelation of there being in fact little that is very good and nothing that is perfect”—just as 
one may initially be drawn to Hans Zimmer and then discover Gustav Mahler. Furthermore, some 
people in our lives might make us realize there are entire other ways of being that had never 
occurred to us before.  
 It is important to note that one need not be aware of all this, actively reflecting on whom 
one’s models are and what one values. In most cases, we are going about this process without much 
thought and to better and worse degrees. Furthermore, following John McDowell, I don’t think it’s 
important that one is actively reflecting on this process in order to be virtuous.66 Sometimes there 
are good people who have not actively reflected, but have gained this orientation in some other way. 
However, if one is directly engaged in the process of bettering oneself, then what one needs to do is 
make a conscious effort to reflect and orient oneself. What is required is attention. One cannot 
come by a deep understanding of any activity passively. It takes effort and learning what to focus on, 
to notice what’s important, what’s unique.  
Think about this again in comparison to learning how to compose or even appreciate music. 
The kind of listening required is not a passive listening when you put music on in the background 
while doing chores. You must be attentive to the musical objects and really trying to learn what the 
composers are doing to create the sound that appeals to you. Moreover, you cannot listen to merely 
one piece or merely one composer but experience a variety that give you the notions of distances 
and scales. It’s with focused, attentive study that one comes to an idea of perfection, abstracted from 
all the examples that have been attended to. But as in the case of virtue, there are those composers 
and songwriters who have done this with less conscious effort, perhaps without learning music 
 





theory, who produce great and complex work. For the rest of us, there is more work and conscious 
effort that is required.  
 It is here that we see how the first-order attention is related to second-order attention, 
which I have been calling orientation. If one is attempting to make oneself better, one needs to 
carefully attend to others, in order to accurately perceive the ideal one wishes to orient oneself 
toward.67 At times, this level of effort will be unnecessary. We will just be immediately drawn to a 
person’s particular virtues and be immediately motivated to do better in ways that resemble the 
person. But in instances where we want to take on the project of bettering ourselves, this will require 
more attentive engagement. Consider if one were to look upon others with jealousy, like M at the 
beginning of Murdoch’s example. There may not be much motivation to do any better. One’s 
anxious preoccupation could make a virtuous trait seem like an annoyance or shortcoming. So, there 
is a certain level of openness and attentiveness necessary. However, when we attend to truly good 
traits in people a little, we are often drawn to those characteristics without much effort. It is then, 
that we can be inspired to do or be better—we gain an ideal we can orient ourselves toward.   
 Let’s say I go to a conference, and a colleague introduces me to a friend Elle. Elle is 
incredibly considerate and thoughtful. Immediately, I’m drawn to their thoughtfulness and 
consideration for others. Later, perhaps after I come home from the conference, I think, “I can be 
really wrapped up in my own world sometimes, and I really wish I was much more considerate of 
others.” I’ve been reoriented toward an ideal. What has happened in that scenario is that I first 
perceived Elle. Perhaps I was attending somewhat more carefully than normal, or perhaps their 
 
67 Here it may seem like we’ve found ourselves in a vicious circle: in order to develop loving attention we need to orient 
ourselves toward it, and in order to orient ourselves toward loving attention we need to have it. I’m not making that 
strong of a claim. The idea is that we need to figure out what ideals we care about, which is an act of reflection and first-
order attention. People who have the virtue of loving attention will have an easier time engaging in this process, but even 
generally those who have not achieved some virtue can engage partially with acts that reflect that virtue. The non-
courageous person can sometimes act in such a way that the courageous person would act, the not-so-humble-but-not-





moral character just jumped out at me, making it impossible to not appreciate. I then was drawn to 
that characteristic in Elle with a kind of impassioned love for the trait. Notice, the love is not for 
Elle—we can even stipulate that I spent all of a few hours with Elle and have no basis for strong 
feelings for them as a whole, but just that particular traits shone through in our short interaction. 
Finally, my being drawn to the traits then makes me attentive of those traits as an example of an 
ideal, and with that example I can then orient myself toward that ideal. So, while the genealogy, as 
given by Murdoch, traces back to individuals’ characters, those characters are not the final object of 
this second sense of attention, the ideals are instead. It is the virtues in people that one abstracts 
from to form one’s ideals. 
To some extent, it is easier to notice the good in good people than to recognize the good in 
more complicated individuals in this way. This is because the good traits come through more clearly: 
there’s little complexity getting in the way and forcing you to be more critical. The traits are almost 
given to you as objects of appreciation. Further, it is easier because it is an incomplete engagement: 
one need not perceive a person fully but appreciate a side of a person. Remember in the example 
above that I don’t learn much about Elle or really get to know them. It is Elle’s considerateness, 
specifically, that stands out and is the object of my attention.  
The way one develops first-order virtue of loving attention, then, seems to be two-fold. 
First, loving attention is a virtue to which one can orient oneself. It seems to me that Elle’s 
consideration and thoughtfulness would be in part constituted by having the virtue of loving 
attention. What I’m drawn to in them is their ability to perceive people properly. That forms an ideal 
to which I then want to move toward. Second, the easy cases of recognizing the good in people who 
are actually good gives me practice in attending. Given that loving attention is the virtue of a 





cases, until one can then move on to more difficult cases. The way in which we form ideals gives us 
practice in attending.  
I began this section on orientation as a way of answering how this sense of attention can 
help us overcome our self-preoccupation and unwillingness to look again. We might imagine that 
the M of Murdoch’s example hadn’t stopped and thought, “let me look again,” but instead thought, 
“Others often need to check and recheck in order to perceive clearly, but my perception is fine as it 
is.”  So far, the answer to this question is simply that M, or whomever, needs to reorient themselves 
to the good—however metaethicists will flesh out what that constitutes. However, this is of little (or 
potentially even no) practical use. There remains the further question how anyone, especially those 
like the hardened husband in Williams’ example, can go about reorienting themselves.  
A further difficulty may present itself with regards to cases of societal distortions. It is 
particularly hard for many people to accept that their perception has been shaped by racist and sexist 
norms, stereotypes, and concepts.68 Often when such people are confronted with a moral 
disagreement about the role race plays in a particular situation, they are quick to deflect, “but I’m not 
a racist,” as if to imply that therefore they cannot be perceiving things wrong. They are perhaps 
unwilling to reattend given their own insecurity with being perceived as a racist or as a sexist. This 
points to the potential need for consciousness raising in order to overcome these kinds of 
distortions. Such people need to accept the possibility that they have become flawed due to no fault 
of their own. 
Unfortunately, I do not know how to get someone to reorient their perception—it is likely a 
question better suited to a clinical psychologist or therapist than a philosopher—but there is at least 
one thing I believe will be requisite for reorientation when one’s perception is self-preoccupied or 
 
68 Educator Robin DiAngelo has researched this specifically with regards to race. See her book, White Fragility: Why It’s So 





societally distorted. One necessary requisite would be that one needs to have an accurate conception 
of oneself in order to move forward. To appreciate where one can improve, one must be able to 
accurately perceive their own shortcomings. There is a kind of self-criticalness that comes with 
focusing one’s attention inward that helps us realize that our orientation is poorly directed. But given 
our anxious, self-preoccupied nature this may seem like a difficult task: who wants to be self-critical 
and gain self-knowledge that might undermine one’s own security?  
The answer may very well be few. At least some people are happy with being blissfully 
ignorant about their own character, satisfied with a lack of accurate self-knowledge. However, given 
that self-knowledge is often useful for developing loving attention, it may be that self-knowledge 
constitutes part of attractive characters. 69 Thus, it may be something that we find ourselves attracted 
to and wanting to emulate. That is, it may be a trait that we can orient ourselves toward. We might 
imagine someone thinking, “I want to know myself that well, to be secure and confident in who I 
am.” This kind of engagement with oneself necessitates a certain level of self-criticalness which 
opens the possibility to orient oneself to the good for the sake of overall self-betterment.  
4. Concluding Thoughts 
In this chapter, I have attempted to get clearer on Murdoch’s insight about the inner moral 
life and its relation to moral perception, particularly what she means by ‘attention’. I have pointed 
out two different kinds of attention at play in her work, a first-order attention that I have called 
loving attention, and a second-order attention that I have called orientation. These two senses of 
attention interact with each other to help develop our moral character and improve our (first-order) 
 
69 There is good reason to think that self-knowledge is part of a desirable character. In “Knowing yourself and being 
worth knowing,” Jordan MacKenzie has argued that this kind of self-knowledge is not only instrumentally valuable, but 
an end in itself. She argues that we are in an inescapable relationship with ourselves that requires self-love and self-
respect. Thus, one might think, everyone has a certain desire to have this self-knowledge, even if it challenges our 





moral perception. I take it that much of what I have said is carving out a specific area of ethics that 
could be consistent with many moral and metaethical theories but gives some guidance for how to 
move forward with my project of understanding interpersonal racism. The presence of societal 
distortions shows how systemic oppression affects our moral lives and is one of the largest obstacles 
we need to overcome in order to be virtuous.  
To overcome that obstacle, significantly more needs to be said specifically on how societal 
norms, stereotypes, and so on, distort our moral perception. This chapter has been an attempt to get 
the general insight on the table so that I can explore racism’s interpersonal dimensions and the 
various moral evaluations of those dimensions. Unfortunately, this means I have not been able to 
focus on many of the subtler details and some of the potential worries that arise from these ideas. 
However, I do want to conclude with briefly discussing one concern that might arise (albeit all too 
briefly).  
It should be clear that being virtuous is very difficult. Murdoch claimed that to develop 
loving attention requires significant moral effort and imagination. Given this difficulty, one may be 
concerned that the virtue of loving attention is far too demanding to be correct. There is, I believe, 
much more to life than just being moral. One of the things I tried to hint at in this chapter is that 
orientation is also relevant for those non-moral goods we decide to fill our lives with as well, and 
thus help us cultivate what Bernard Williams’ referred to as our “ground projects”.70  
If we take the idea of our orientation being aimed at ideals, including non-moral ideals, I 
believe we are nudged into recognizing that a purely moral ideal of how we should live could not be 
the object of proper attention. The ideal person is not necessarily the person whose loving attention 
gets in the way of living their life but complements and adds to it. Furthermore, when trying to flesh 
 





out and explain any virtue, we are likely to get overwhelmed with the details and complexity. But the 
key to many virtues is that once you develop them you do not have to continually think about them. 
The person who has the virtue of loving attention is not engaged in this rigorous mental task of 
trying to figure out another’s terms and checking and questioning those terms 24/7, but to some 
extent is doing it automatically. This is in part why I believe Murdoch uses the metaphor of perception: 
to get across the immediacy of the virtue when it has been developed.  
Virtue is of course demanding, and as I will go on to argue, it is particularly difficult in the 
non-ideal world of oppression in which we live that sews extra veils to drape over our senses. But it 
is not unrealistically demanding. Part of the comfort in an endlessly perfectible task is that one need 



































CHAPTER TWO: THE RACIAL VEIL 
Sick venom in men and women overcome with pride 
…Race barriers make inferior you and I  
-Kendrick Lamar, PRIDE. 
1. Introduction 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some 
through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, 
nevertheless, flutter round it… instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? 
they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do 
not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or 
reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question, How does 
it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word. 
 And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has 
never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood… It is in the early days of rollicking 
boyhood that the revelation first bursts upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember well 
when the shadow swept across me… In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into 
the boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—ten cents a package—and 
exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card… Then it 
dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, 
mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter 
no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, 
and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows.71 
 
So wrote W.E.B. Du Bois in his seminal The Souls of Black Folk. This veil that separates Black people 
from the rest of the world is a major theme of the work: a metaphor that helps explore his concept 
of double-consciousness. Du Bois states that Black people were “born” with this veil, which forces 
them to see themselves “through the eyes of others, of measuring [their] souls by the tape of a world 
 





that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”72 The world is thus divided, with white and Black 
people being divided by the veil, keeping Black people from success and keeping whites from 
perceiving Black people clearly. This distorted view of Black people is then presented back to them, 
as the way the world is, despite their seeing the veil that inhibits the whites’ perception. They thus 
have “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body.”73 
One comes from the distorted view presented back to them and the other comes from their 
recognition of the veil. This is the double-consciousness, having two views of the same world.   
Du Bois’ use of a ‘veil’ helps him articulate this noteworthy concept of double-
consciousness, a kind of consciousness that impedes Black and other people of color. Du Bois’ veil 
also helps illustrate a kind of separation between white, or more racially privileged people in general, 
and people of color. A separation that philosopher Charles Mills connects with his idea of white 
ignorance74: “an ignorance, a non-knowing …in which race—white racism and/or white racial 
domination and their ramifications—plays a crucial causal role.”75 This veil in Du Bois also resonates 
with something that Murdoch is doing when she talks about a “veil which partially conceals the 
world.”76 Murdoch’s veil, which I will call “the self-preoccupied veil”, illustrates how we misperceive 
others due to our self-preoccupied nature. Beyond Du Bois’ discussion of misperception, Murdoch 
argues that such perception is moral perception: perception that is morally evaluable in itself.  
 
72 The Souls of Black Folk p. 7. 
73 The Souls of Black Folk, p. 7. 
74 While Mills primarily focuses on the kind of factual non-knowings that result from white ignorance, he also believes 
this concept extends to moral non-knowings. White ignorance affects one’s moral cognition and leads one to have 
incorrect judgments about who is owed what rights and about the moral properties of various situations. Despite Mills’ 
acknowledgment that white ignorance extends to moral non-knowings, neither he nor others have done much to 
develop this idea.  
75 Mills, “White Ignorance”, p. 20.  





My aim is to introduce a different veil. A racial veil that, like Du Bois’, is attentive to the way 
race divides us and leads to misperception, but also like Murdoch’s in that it is morally loaded, that is 
morally evaluable in itself due to the very way race is being unreflectively recognized. I believe this 
understanding of a racial veil can help us explore how racially privileged people misperceive people 
of color and shed light on the kind of mistaken moral cognition that Mills does not develop in his 
discussion of white ignorance. In understanding this “inner moral life of racism” (to play on 
Murdoch’s words), I believe we can make progress in understanding the moral dimensions of 
interpersonal racism.  
 Much of the chapter will be spent doing two things. First, I articulate the various details of 
the racial veil as I understand it, specifically pointing out how stereotypes and misvaluing distort our 
moral perception. Second, I will argue that this form of perception is morally problematic due to the 
way it draws one’s attention to race in a way that reinforces racial oppression. To conclude this 
chapter, I will briefly explore how the idea of moral perception can help us understand, analyze, and 
address situations where someone acts in a racist way and attempts to excuse their behavior by 
claiming it wasn’t their intention to be racist. I will begin with a few preliminaries. Specifically, I will 
explain how I am understanding moral perception in cases of perceiving through the racial veil.   
2. Preliminaries 
 On June 16th, 2015, Donald Trump announced that he would be running for President of 
the United States. In his announcement, he made the following statement: 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best… They're sending people that 
have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with [them]. They're bringing 








Trump’s statements immediately garnered media attention, with many asking for him to apologize 
for what they took to be racist remarks. To most, these remarks are clearly racist. However, when 
articulating why the remarks are racist, some found difficulty. Trump supporters would argue that he 
didn’t say all Mexicans were bad people, nor is he wrong in saying some Mexican immigrants do 
bring drugs and crime. Engaging with Trump supporters over whether these statements were facts 
would be to already lose the argument and, I believe, miss the racist element.  
 There are many ways these remarks are racist, but one of the key ways is how Trump 
expresses and thereby reinforces a perception of Mexican, and other Latin American, immigrants. This 
point is not a statistical one about the likelihood that they are criminals. Trump reinforces being a 
drug dealer, a criminal, or a rapist as the dominant way of perceiving these immigrants—while still 
allowing for exceptions in case one ever happens to meet a “good” immigrant. But what does it 
mean to have racist perception—to perceive through the racial veil? In order to understand this 
point, let us return to Murdoch’s self-preoccupied veil. 
 Murdoch states that “…by opening our eyes we do not necessarily see what confronts us. 
We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-
preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world.”78 The veil here is a metaphor for 
the way in which all of our anxieties, cares, concerns, worries, and desires get in the way of our truly 
attending to the person or situation in front of us. All of these features function together and then 
get in the way of apt and accurate perception. The veil then is a metaphor for the complex way our 
view from here is constructed by interweaving and compounding multiple mental features. A way to 
articulate how perception is shaped by person’s own anxieties, cares, concerns, worries, and desires—
that is, to the self. 
 





 What I want to call the racial veil has a similar story. The veil is a metaphor for the way in 
which all the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs about race in our society get in the 
way of our truly attending to the person or situation in front of us. An important, if obvious, feature 
of the concept of the racial veil is how these different elements work together and are organized 
around the concept of race. Perceiving through the racial veil always involves making race relevant in 
a way it should not be.79 That’s because race is connected to a constellation of information, 
misinformation, and affect that leads us into error.80  
 We regularly talk about literal misperceptions when talking about race, for example, cops’ 
testimony of seeing Black boys as full-grown men (as was the case with Tamir Rice) or mistaking a 
cellphone for a gun. Such literal misperceptions are likely connected to what I am calling the racial 
“veil,” but these are not the only cases. It would be a mistake to understand perception here as 
always literal perception for two reasons. First, a lot of what is at interest for my project is the 
relationship between perception and thick concepts, which have descriptive content but also 
evaluative content. Second, you do not need to be in front of the person, perceiving them directly, in 
order to “perceive” them through the racial “veil.” I will explore each of these two points in a little 
more detail.  
Imagine someone watching CNN during a segment with author Ijeoma Oluo where she 
argues that school lunches need to be free, especially to low-income students. Oluo has regularly 
discussed her family’s experiences with homelessness, food insecurity, and how that affected her and 
her brother’s schoolwork, so it would be easy to imagine her making such arguments. It is equally 
 
79 I use the language “in a way it should not be” to note that there is a way of perceiving one’s race that is not morally 
problematic. My own argument for how to overcome the racial veil will involve perceiving one’s race in a way consistent 
with loving attention. I will develop this in a later chapter, “Piercing the Veil”. 
80 Chris Lebron in The Color of Our Shame argues that race is a “loaded concept” such that it brings in all this extra 





easy to imagine that someone who has never heard of Oluo could watch this segment, seeing it as 
“the ramblings of a welfare queen.” The concept of a ‘welfare queen’ is a common racist trope to 
dismiss welfare programs in the U.S. and is specifically associated with Black women. If one watches 
Oluo’s segment through the lens of this stereotype, it will inhibit one’s ability to adequately judge her 
arguments. The (mis)perception immediately gets in the way.  
This concept of a “welfare queen” is an instance of what philosophers have called a thick 
concept. The concept is not only descriptive, but evaluative. Thick concepts are central to moral 
perception due to their role in not only making sense of what is before one’s senses, but in 
simultaneously evaluating it.81 It is in these cases, where thick concepts are present, that it is clearest 
how one’s perceptions can be morally better or worse. When someone’s perception is distorted by 
self-preoccupied cares and concerns or racist stereotypes, which manifest in perceiving the person as 
“cruel” or a “welfare queen,” it is easy to recognize how one could be more loving or more just 
toward the person in view.82 Attending to a Black woman and perceiving her as a welfare queen is a 
kind of failure, a perception one should struggle with to attend more justly. Notice that one need not 
take any stand on debates in philosophy of perception or epistemology to recognize the morally 
relevant qualities here.83 All one needs to recognize is that one could be perceiving in a more just or 
loving way, that is, in a way that avoids either self-preoccupation or unreflective attention to race. 
Now, the second point I want to make is that you do not even need to be literally perceiving 
Oluo for this kind of misperception to occur. Imagine instead of the person watching a CNN 
 
81See Murdoch’s discussion of concepts and “secondary value words” in The Sovereignty of Good¸ p. 17-33.  
82 Imagine in this case that the person being observed is not cruel, but your own anxieties make you perceive them that 
way. More generally, the point is that thick concepts with negative evaluations are not always unjust—some people really 
are cruel—but that perceiving people to be cruel, when they are not, is one way a person can fail to be just and loving in 
their perception of a person.  
83 For example, one need not commit to a view like John McDowell’s that values are secondary-qualities to recognize 





segment, that Ijeoma Oluo wrote an op-ed in the New York Times. In this case, the same problem 
is occurring: the person is perceiving it as “the ramblings of a welfare queen.” One would be 
perceiving Oluo’s arguments through the lens of this stereotype, inhibiting one’s ability to adequately 
judge her arguments. The (mis)perception immediately gets in the way, even though Oluo is not in 
front of one’s literal eyes. Just as with the CNN case, we would still want to say here that perceiving 
her as a welfare queen is a kind of failure, a perception one should struggle with to attend more 
justly. The same moral problem occurs, despite there being no literal perception, with one’s eyes or 
ears, of Oluo occurring. This example echoes Murdoch’s own example of a mother-in-law attending 
to her daughter-in-law, even though the daughter-in-law is not present before her.84 
 Finally, I want to consider the immediacy, or non-inferential nature of perception. 
Standardly, epistemologists have taken perception to be the strongest evidence one can rely on given 
the direct causal connection between the external world and one’s senses, various forms of 
skepticism notwithstanding. But one can err in one’s perception (i.e., one can misperceive), despite 
the direct connection with the external world. Furthermore, as Murdoch has shown, perception can 
limit or determine what options we take ourselves to have for action. Importantly, such options and 
resultant action reveal our valuing in ways we may not consciously, reflectively endorse. 
Consider an example of two brothers, José and Rogelio. José has always struggled with his 
finances. He gets paid a living wage, but he does freelance work such that he does not have a steady 
income but random bursts of significant amounts of money. As a result, José often finds himself in a 
difficult position with regard to paying bills and providing for his wife and kids. His brother Rogelio, 
on the other hand, has a more stable pay, better fiscal planning, and is financially better off—though 
 
84“We might underline this aspect of the example by supposing that the young couple have emigrated or that D is now 
dead: the point being to ensure that whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in M’s mind.” The Sovereignty of 





not significantly. They both were raised to value family above all else and to make sacrifices for each 
other.  
 For whatever reason, whether due to erratic finances or some other detail of his biography, 
José is fairly self-preoccupied and often anxious about his status (both socially and financially). He 
feels a lot of pressure to be the provider for his family, and when he is unable to do so, he questions 
his worth. He sees what his other friends do for their own families and wishes he could deliver the 
same stability and prosperity for his wife and kids. But he struggles. He only makes so much money, 
and it comes at irregular intervals. Because of this, and due to a bad cycle of choices, he has acquired 
a growing debt to his brother Rogelio. 
 When José is incapable of making bill payments, or struggling to put food on the table, he 
goes to Rogelio asking for help. Rogelio, who loves his brother and wants to see him and his family 
succeed, happily agrees. Rogelio knows José can make up the money and pay him back. He doesn’t 
want José to stress any more about money, so he calls it an open-ended loan: José can pay Rogelio 
back when he feels like he has the financial stability to do so. But when José starts getting work, and 
increased money flow, he saves very little and, relieved with the new surplus, takes his family on 
vacation, or buys them new electronics, or gives his kids spending money, and so on. As work starts 
to dry up again, his savings quickly depletes and he once again is asking Rogelio for help, which 
Rogelio gives.  
 What I think is particularly noteworthy about José’s behavior and thought process is that he 
does not even consider paying back Rogelio when he finds himself with a surplus of income. He does 
consider saving, and acts on this choice (though minimally). But the other option is to spend it, so 
that he can be the kind of husband and father that he wants to be, the kind that provides for his 





 José does not mean to take advantage of his brother, and he would probably have a hard 
time recognizing his actions as doing so if someone pointed them out to him. In fact, José would 
likely get defensive. “But I value family more than anything! Look at how hard I work to provide for 
my wife and kids!” His conscious, reflectively endorsed values are that of family. But his actions 
speak differently (for his brother is family, too, after all), and they are actions that flow from his 
perception. He does not notice the option of paying back his brother before indulging in extra 
luxuries like vacation, electronics, or gifts for his kids. He is too self-preoccupied and anxious about 
his own ability to be (or appear) like the man he wants to be, to perceive that it is coming at the cost 
of his brother’s generosity.  
Moral perception is immediate and not consciously inferential. It colors the way we view a 
situation or moral debate and explains how one can act on values or desires that one has not 
reflectively endorsed. These two points are important for understanding implicit racial bias since 
such bias is immediate and involves acting on values that one may not reflectively endorse.85 While 
there is debate about the relationship between immediate, implicit bias and more explicit bias, 
understanding bias as involving moral perception identifies a way people can move about the world 
without recognizing it.86 
 
85 Chris Lebron argues that often when whites engage in morally problematic behavior toward other races they are acting 
against moral principles they reflectively endorse (The Color of Our Shame, p. 105-109). 
86 The empirical literature on implicit bias takes such bias to be the rapid association between concepts or between some 
concept and a valence (positive or negative). This technical use of ‘implicit bias’ is consistent with someone who is 
explicitly biased as well. In fact, one would expect everyone who is explicitly biased to also be implicitly biased. The 
more controversial claim is whether there are people who are solely implicitly biased and not also explicitly biased. The 
standard interpretation of the research holds that many people are implicitly biased, in the technical sense, but not 
explicitly biased. A recent paper challenges this interpretation given skepticism about how psychologists have controlled 
for explicit bias, arguing that the bias tested for is best explained by explicit bias (see, “‘I Love Women’: A Non-Implicit 
Explanation of Implicit Bias Test Results”). I believe what I have to say in this chapter can capture either interpretation 
of the results. If the former interpretation is correct, moral perception tracks implicit bias, and one’s reflectively 
endorsed beliefs are one’s explicit belief set that is either biased or not. If the latter interpretation is correct, moral 





In these preliminary remarks, I have been concerned to bring out the fact that what I am 
calling moral perception can include metaphorical as well as literal ways of perceiving, and to stress 
the immediacy of these (metaphorical and literal) perceptions as relevant to racial bias. I will now 
turn to some of the more substantial elements of how the racial veil distorts and impedes our 
attending to people of color. First, I will argue that stereotypes and misvaluing can distort our 
perception—to create a kind of ignorance. Second, I will argue that such perception is morally 
problematic in itself.  
3. The Racial Veil 
3.1 Stereotypes 
 The racial veil is a product of the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs about 
race in our society that get in the way of our truly attending to the person or situation in front of us. 
This tapestry of (mis)information organizes itself around the concept of race, constantly drawing our 
attention toward their presumed race (much like the self-preoccupied veil draws our attention 
toward ourselves), which results in misperceiving the person or situation. Among the most 
pernicious elements in this tapestry are stereotypes, which often affect how we perceive the 
character of a person of color.  
 Imagine that you are walking with a friend through the park. As you are walking, you notice 
a Latinx family walking through the park as well. Ahead of them is a police officer. Your friend 
points out that once the Latinx family notices the officer, they take a path that leads them away from 
the officer and deeper into the park. Your friend then remarks, “Look at those illegals, they are 
trying to avoid that police officer!” You are struck by this remark because to you they are simply a 
Latinx family walking in the park. In response, you question your friend, “why do you think they are 
even immigrants?” Your friend responds, “well, why else would people who look like that want to 





seeing a brown-skinned family (potentially) trying to avoid the officer. One can perceive this 
behavior in several ways, however. Perhaps that was their planned route the whole time, or perhaps, 
since they are Latinx, they have experienced harassment from police in the past, so they would 
rather not interact with them.87  
The family is being perceived in two different ways, much like Murdoch’s example of a 
mother-in-law who first perceives her daughter-in-law as “tiresomely juvenile” and then, after 
attending more closely, as “delightfully youthful.” Unlike the mother-in-law from Murdoch’s 
example, it is not your friend’s self-preoccupation and anxiety getting in the way of perceiving the 
family properly; it is a racial stereotype that is distorting their perception. You and your friend are 
not making two separate, conscious inferences from some initial observation to arrive at the 
judgment—you are perceiving the family in fundamentally different ways. Your friend, due to racist 
socialization, is perceiving the family as “illegals”, whereas your perception of them is simply as a 
Latinx family walking in the park.  
Charles Mills remarks that stereotypes (such as those like “illegals”) are “concepts [that] 
orient us to the world, and it is a rare individual who can resist this inherited orientation.”88 This 
orientation occurs in part because our racial socialization involves learning when and where these 
kinds of stereotypes apply. For example, that brown immigrants from Latin America count as 
“illegals” but white immigrants from Europe do not, regardless of their immigration status. While it 
might be the thought that the friend who perceives the Latinx family as “illegals” is making an 
inference from their appearance to their legal status, in fact he is not,  because part of our 
 
87 Notice that the second interpretation here turns on recognizing the family as Latinx, in this case the family’s race is 
salient in your perception, but the notion of race being recognized here is different.  





socialization is in developing our perceptual capacities to apply these kinds of stereotypes to the 
races targeted by that stereotype.89 
Most racial stereotypes distort our moral perception by drawing our attention to a person’s 
racial features and building that into our perception of their actions and character. Consider again 
the reader who perceives Ijeoma Oluo as a “welfare queen”. One perceives as salient her being a 
Black woman, and this, in conjunction with the stereotype, shapes the way we interpret her writing. 
In effect, the reader perceives Oluo as a welfare queen. Again, the reader is not making a series of 
conscious inferences based on all the information, and there may be no conscious judgment at all—
it is an immediate perception. In this case, it’s not only making sense of her actions (arguing for a 
position) but her character as well.  
Racial stereotypes often alter our perception of the character of the person being perceived. 
Racial stereotypes may factor in to how the perceiver acts, but, just as importantly, these stereotypes 
color the object of perception in the perceiver’s senses. While it makes sense, from the racist point 
of view, that an “illegal” would avoid the police or a “welfare queen” would want free school 
lunches, perceiving someone in one of these two ways involves more than that. It involves a view 
about what kind of person the object of perception fundamentally is. For example, take the 
stereotype of Black or Indigenous people of color as “savages”. The conceptual content of ‘savage’ 
is designated as the opposite of ‘civilized’ where the former marks out specific Indigenous groups 
and the latter tends to mark people of European ancestry. 90 But in ordinary use we think of 
“savages” as people with certain kinds of moral failing, or as people with lower status than the 
 
89 Someone without the relevant socialization, say someone born in a culture where race is constructed in a different way 
and thus has a different set of stereotypes, may not be revealing the same kind of perception through their words or 
actions. 





“civilized”. Many racial stereotypes carry with them embedded judgments about a person’s 
character.   
All the stereotypes discussed so far— “illegals”, “welfare queen”, “savage”—are distorting. 
Negative racist evaluative content is built into the concepts. But not all racial stereotypes work like 
this. It is important to look at how some racial stereotypes are context sensitive or do not have 
negative content yet still make race salient when it should not be.  
First consider context-sensitive stereotypes. In April of 2017, NBC Sportscaster Mike 
Millbury made these comments about Black NHL defenseman P.K. Subban, who dances on the ice 
during pre-game warmups: 
When I see this [Subban dancing] I start to think maybe [Subban’s coach] Peter Laviolette 
ought to give him a rap on the head and say, ‘Hey P.K. focus in, we’ve got a game tonight 
and you don’t have to be a clown out there.’ And he will. He’s been a clown in the past and 
we’ve seen him act like a clown...”91 
Millbury is criticizing Subban’s actions as evidence of him being a “clown” and thus not taking the 
game seriously enough. It is worthwhile to note that other sports analysts have commented on 
Subban’s behavior in warmups as a guy having a good time or as evidence for Subban’s “infectious 
personality”—something they believe we need more of in hockey.92 Subban’s single action—dancing 
during warmups—is perceived in different ways. While stereotypes like ‘savage’ always carry racist 
baggage, ‘clown’ reveals racial bias in some contexts but may apply non-problematically in other 
contexts. For example, if one were to perceive a white person as a ‘savage’, the racist content of the 
concept is being leveraged to mark that person as lower than other whites, whereas one can non-
 
91 Hemal Jhaveri, “NBC’s Mike Milbury goes on unwarranted rant against P.K. Subban, calls him a “clown”,” For The 
Win, USA Today, April 18, 2017, https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/04/mike-milbury-calls-p-k-subban-a-clown-says-
peter-laviolette-ought-to-give-him-a-rap-on-the-head. 






problematically, or even positively, perceive a white person as a ‘clown’.93 Thus, we have 
descriptions that are always negatively distortive stereotypes (like ‘savage’ or ‘welfare queen’) and 
descriptions that expresses a racist stereotype in particular contexts (like ‘clown’). Despite this 
difference, ‘clown’ still reflects a distortion in Millbury’s perception given the racist history and 
context of that concept and the way it is being deployed. 
Second, there are racial stereotypes that do not have negative content, but still make one’s 
race problematically salient. Consider the case where a non-Black teenager brings over his Black 
friend for dinner.94 His mom is unsure of what to make for dinner, but once she is introduced to 
him and realizes he’s Black she decides to make fried chicken. The son, arriving at the dinner table, 
is mortified by his mom’s decision, but his friend shrugs it off and they enjoy dinner together. The 
stereotype of Black Americans liking fried chicken has a sordid past going back to slavery which was 
solidified in its depiction in the movie Birth of a Nation.95 The fried chicken stereotype has been 
sustained, even though its use as a vehicle for more pernicious racist sentiments has been forgotten. 
This stereotype is in some sense vestigial: at one point it was used to paint a picture of Black 
Americans, as a whole, as primitive but that use of the stereotype is now overlooked or unknown by 
most. But notice that the stereotype still draws attention to a person’s race, even if the content of the 
stereotype doesn’t communicate any negative attributes. That an individual is being attended to via 
this stereotype still creates a distortion; a distortion reminiscent of the unasked question that Du 
Bois believed to separate him from the rest of the world. While the mother may have the purest of 
intentions, she could have just as easily asked ahead of time what they might want to eat—imagine if 
 
93 For example, students often perceive one student as the ‘class clown’ and often appreciate their humor.  
94 Based on a real story one of my students shared with me. 







the friend had a gluten allergy or was vegetarian—and doing so would have been attending to him. 
The stereotype of Black people liking fried chicken is getting in the way of perceiving him, due to the 
way his race is being made salient.  
There are also cases of racial stereotypes with seemingly positive content, but that also carry 
negative implications. Consider the stereotype of being ‘exotic’. While men of color are sometimes 
referred to as ‘exotic’, it is much more common for Latinas and other women of color to be 
described in this way. It is at this intersection of identities—being both non-white and a woman—
that it is clear how seemingly positive stereotypes may carry negative content, like that of 
objectification. Even though being sexually attractive may involve positive content about a person, 
its ascription in the context of cultural stereotypes is apt to reduce that person to their sexual 
attractiveness. Making one’s sexual attractiveness salient in this way is demeaning and subordinating.  
A similar explanation can be given for positive stereotypes such as people of certain races 
being good at math, football, dancing, or what-have-you. If someone is good at one of those things, 
and thus fulfills the stereotype, then the actual work or ability may be discounted. If someone is not 
good at one of those things, and thus does not fulfill the stereotype, then they may be seen as 
defective. Stereotypes are often ways of giving people of color a certain station or purpose. Like the 
case of being ‘exotic,’ this can be objectifying. One’s value may be reduced to fulfilling this role, for 
the pleasure or ease of the racially privileged. While this is certainly not always the case, such 
stereotypes are not completely harmless. Positive as they may appear at first glance, these stereotypes 
often involve measuring people against that stereotype.  
Section four will explore how such perception is morally problematic in addition to 
distorting, but it is important to note now how such stereotypes often essentialize these traits to 
specific races. The distorting effects of perceiving through the racial veil is clearly epistemically 





one is being inaccurately perceived but the way in which they are being misperceived. The 
stereotypes discussed in this section all, in some way, reflect and reinforce racist ideology by 
essentializing these characterizations to races. This is part of the explanation for what makes racial 
stereotypes of this kind different from other stereotypes that may be similarly inaccurate in their 
generalization but not morally problematic.96 Again, more will be said in section four about how this 
perception is morally problematic, and this section has primarily been about how such stereotypes 
are distortive.  
3.2 Misvaluing  
 All the racial information in the form of stories and stereotypes also leads to another way in 
which one’s perception can be distorted: through misvaluing. While misvaluing sometimes interacts 
with more explicit stereotyping, this is not always the case. The role misvaluing often plays in our 
moral perception is in shaping what actions the misvaluer takes to be owed to people of color, or to 
what extent they appear to deserve our care and attention. Consider the following example.97  
Yessenia is a Latina woman who regularly enjoys pick-up basketball with a group of friends. 
One day when playing, an opposing player runs into Yessenia, knocking her over and injuring her 
arm. Only her teammates notice (at first) since she is no longer able to play, but once she subs out 
everyone forgets and continues as if nothing happened. However, there have been numerous 
instances when white players in this pick-up league have been similarly knocked over and people 
have stopped the game to make sure they’re okay, and then follow up with them after the game. 
When Yessenia was injured, they quickly resumed the game, and no one followed up with her.  
 
96 See, Erin Beeghly, “What is a stereotype? What is stereotyping?” for a defense of what she calls the “descriptive view” 
of stereotypes which holds that stereotypes are not always morally or epistemologically objectionable.  





 Here, her fellow basketball players do not seem to be perceiving her in accordance with any 
particular substantive stereotype, or at least not one that is clearly relevant to their actions. But there 
is still a difference in behavior due to her race—being ignored in this way happens to women of 
color constantly. The players’ perception of the situation leaves out the imperative to be helpful and 
attentive to Yessenia’s injuries that they have when their white friends are hurt. They do not perceive 
her injury as to-be-attended to. The racial veil, in this case, inhibits their ability to determine what 
actions are appropriate, making them not only act differently but fail to recognize how they are 
acting differently. After all, these players are her friends and would likely not claim to value her any 
differently (or recognize that they value her differently) than the other players who are white. Their 
actions do not reflect their endorsed values but reveal a discrepancy between their actions and 
endorsed values that can be explained by their distorted perception. They perceive her differently 
due to her race—more specifically, they perceive her value as less.  
In this example, Yessenia is being morally misvalued. The white athletes are given a sort of 
moral care and concern that Yessenia is not receiving, even though the circumstances are the same. 
One way to make sense of this discrepancy is to say that the white athletes are perceived as needing 
or deserving care in those circumstances where Yessenia is not perceived as needing or deserving 
that care. Insofar as Yessenia is perceived as needing or deserving less care she is being undervalued. 
And since it is moral care she is being perceived to not need or deserve, she is being morally under, 
or mis-, valued. Since moral value is not the kind of thing people have varying levels of—no one is 
morally more important than any other person—being undervalued in this way is being misvalued. It 
is important to note that not all cases of misvaluing are cases of moral misvaluing, but the relevant 
kind for Yessenia’s case is moral misvaluing. 98  
 
98 There are other ways one may be misvalued, such as aesthetic misvaluing (where people of color are consider less 





One of the results of racism is that we end up with a socially constructed racial hierarchy 
where people of color are perceived as having less value than whites.99 While the truth of the matter 
is that everyone is equal, society may still construct a sense of moral value that conflicts with this 
moral reality. In the case of the racial hierarchy, whites are placed on the top with people of color 
distributed throughout the lower ranks: whites are taken to have greater moral value than people of 
color.  
That we can misperceive by misvaluing people of color is consistent with one of the 
dominant explanations of racial prejudice in sociological research, according to which the object of 
racial prejudice is a group relational ranking of certain races over others.100  
The attitude object, or perceptual focus, is not really the social category "blacks" or "whites." 
It is not neighborhoods or schools of varying degrees of racial mixture. Instead, as Herbert 
Blumer (1958) argued, the real object of "prejudice"--what we really tap with attitude 
questions in surveys--is beliefs about the proper relation between groups. The real attitude 
object is relative group positions. This attitude of sense of group position is historically and 
culturally rooted, socially learned, and modifiable in response to new information, events, or 
structural conditions so long as these factors contribute to or shape contexts for social 
interaction among members of different groups. Attitudes toward "integration" or toward 
"blacks" are, fundamentally, statements about preferred positional relations among racial 
groups.101 
On this view, racial prejudice turns on positional rankings of whites, as a group, over people of 
color. Note that such “rankings” need not be consciously assented to as beliefs about the superiority 
of certain races or justified by a pseudo-science like phrenology. It is just that when people having 
racial prejudice, it can be understood as ranking their racial group over other racial groups. More 
commonly, with people of color being undervalued in relation to whites.  
 
or other instances of what has been called “epistemic injustice”). These other instances of misvaluing go beyond the 
scope of this particular point. 
99 Some people seemingly argue that racism just is this racial hierarchy, which in that case makes my point stronger, but 
even the weaker point I argue for here establishes that we misperceive people of color by undervaluing them.  
100 Lawrence Bobo, et al. “Laissez-Faire Racism.” 





 That racial prejudice turns on positional ranking helps to explain the affective component to 
misvaluing and the racial veil more generally.102 When someone perceives themselves as having a 
place over another person emotions and attitudes like disgust, pity, contempt, or superiority will 
manifest. The way these emotions play out in any particular situation will be different depending on 
the context. In the case of Yessenia’s pick-up basketball game, the white players attitudes when 
perceiving fellow white players fall is probably different from their attitudes when Yessenia falls. 
White players are looked on with compassion and concern when they fall, and this affective 
manifestation is largely absent when Yessenia falls. We are largely socialized not to look on women 
of color with the same compassion and concern, but to instead perceive them with other attitudes 
and emotions or, in this case, with apathy. This difference in affect largely has to do with where 
Yessenia “ranks” among her white peers. 
Part of what is going on in the case is that Yessenia’s injuries do not seem to warrant 
stopping their game to continue to care for her due to her implicitly holding a lower relative 
position, whereas the white players’ injuries do warrant these actions since they hold a higher social 
position. The racial veil, then, does not just distort our perception of the character or actions of 
people of color, but also of their moral value, and of situations where people of color are involved. 
The lack of moral value extended to people of color can make their needs, desires, cares, and 
concerns be counted as less significant or not be counted as morally salient at all. When a person of 
color’s race is recognized, or registers to a perceiver, it may signal that further attention to the 
 
102 Shannon Sullivan argues in her “The Hearts and Guts of White People” that there is an important affective 
component (which she understands in embodied biological terms, i.e. “guts”) to Mills’ white ignorance. That white 
ignorance, and thus the racial veil, involves more than merely cognitive phenomena, but emotional and attitudinal 
phenomena as well seems right, particularly in the cases of misvaluing. This affective component is present in 
stereotyping as well. Sullivan’s primary example is that of a white woman student who interjects in a discussion of racism 
that she is afraid of Black men and finds them threatening. The stereotype of Black men being dangerous or threatening 






person is not necessary or morally relevant. A feeling of invisibility is common in both the 
philosophical literature on race, as well as memoirs and novels presenting the perspectives of people 
of color, and even in social media campaigns such as the #SayHerName campaign meant to bring 
awareness to police violence against Black women and girls.103 This is a paradoxical result that occurs 
due to lower moral value manifesting as a lack of attention and moral concern for that person.104  
Misvaluing, like stereotyping, can often be manifested in superficially positive remarks or 
judgments. An example of this is when then presidential candidate Joe Biden described Barack 
Obama as “the first mainstream African-American [candidate] who is articulate and bright and clean 
and a nice-looking guy.”105 Biden’s statement implies that most African-Americans, at least those 
who run for presidential office, are not articulate, bright, clean, and nice-looking guys. Furthermore, 
in many contexts in which positive traits are problematically applied to people of color, such 
“compliments” understate their qualities—they reveal misvaluing. One expects the person of color 
to be lower, and then is surprised when they recognize good qualities in them. Their typical way of 
viewing people of color prime them to not expect much, taking those they find “articulate”, for 
example, as exceptional—just as Biden took Obama as being exceptional in this way.  
Misvaluing, like stereotyping, organizes itself around the perception of race. It is because 
one’s race is being recognized in another’s moral perception that misvaluing can occur. Importantly, 
no aspect of this perception (race, stereotypes, or lower moral value) seems to come first. These 
various ways of misperceiving are bound up with one another. What binds them together is the 
concept of race.  
 
103 Charles Mills discusses this kind of invisibility in his paper “White Ignorance”, p. 18-19. For more on the 
#SayHerName campaign see, “#SayHerName Campaign”, AAPF, https://aapf.org/sayhername. 
104 For more on how this might occur, albeit in an epistemological and not moral context, see Kristie Dotson’s  and 






To see how this plays out, consider how different stereotypes communicate a person’s lower 
moral value. Many of the stereotypes I discussed in the previous section carry with them notions of 
inferiority, like that of a “savage”; of evaluative fault, like that of “welfare queen”; or of maintaining 
a lower social station, like that of “exotic”. The stereotypes can both communicate this lower moral 
value and can justify the misvaluing.  
When the racial veil distorts our perception, it colors our everyday interactions and affects 
our actions without our noticing. It is immediate and is difficult to undo. The values that we 
reflectively endorse (e.g., equality) often fail to come into play due to how the racial veil distorts 
individuals and situations. In this section I have tried to articulate how stereotypes and misvaluing 
interaction with each other and jointly contribute to distorted perceptions of people of color, 
shaping the perceivers’ emotional reactions, beliefs and behavior. That we are prone to error is not 
solely what is at issue here. The Murdochian insight is not solely that our perception shapes the way 
we move about the world, but also that such perception is morally evaluable in itself.  
4. Moral Dimensions of the Racial Veil 
 For Murdoch, seeing through the self-preoccupied veil is morally problematic because the 
tendency to misrepresent and misconceptualize the world around us paints others in an improper 
way. We are not only misperceiving those around us but misperceiving them in a self-preoccupied 
way—a perception that revolves around our self. The racial veil, on the other hand, is morally 
problematic due to how it draws our attention to what I call the dominant conception of race. The 
dominant conception of race contributes to ongoing racial oppression, and this makes perception 
that organizes itself around race morally problematic.106  
 
106 I specifically refer to perception of this kind as ‘morally problematic’ as opposed to ‘immoral’ to mark a difference in 
the moral badness of the perception. For something to be immoral, I take it that one needs to have wronged another or 





 In Between the World and Me, Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, “But race is the child of racism, not the 
father. And the process of naming “the people” has never been a matter of genealogy and 
physiognomy so much as one of hierarchy.”107 Race is, at least in part, a social construct.108 That is to 
say, biology does not fully determine nor fully capture the concept of race and the functions of the 
category. What race is, and why it matters, are due to our social world. This is not to say that race 
does not exist; the mere fact that one’s perception of people can be organized around race shows 
that it exists. But it exists as part of our social fabric. More importantly, race was constructed, not as 
an end goal, but for the sake of enforcing certain social, political, and economic ends.109 
 Race, on the dominant conception, can be thought of as a tool to delineate who deserves 
what treatment or how to understand someone. It has been a tool for creating social cohesion, 
economic prosperity, or political mastery.110 Race has been a cog in the machinery of oppression, to 
not merely separate people intro groups, but also to give those groups roles in an overall society so 
that some in that society may benefit.111 Ultimately, constructing races in this way rationalizes a racial 
hierarchy, it creates disparate moral value. Charles Mills refers to such constructions as “vertical 
racial” systems where some are privileged, and others are subordinated. It is in reference to these 
 
way wrong, objectionable, or lousy, while still not being strictly speaking morally impermissible. I will return to this 
distinction in more detail in the next chapter.   
107 Between the World and Me, p. 9. 
108 The dominant view in the metaphysics of race is that race is a social construct. However, philosophers like 
Quayshawn Spencer have argued for race also being a biological construct in a more pluralistic metaphysical conception 
of race. All that matters for my arguments is that race is used as a tool of racism, even if, as Spencer argues, race as a 
concept can be utilized in a productive biological research project. For more see, Spencer “A Radical Solution to the 
Race Problem.”  
109 I use the past-tense here to note that historically, the construction of race has been for enforcing social, political, and 
economic ends. This is the legacy of race we have in our society. Of course, the construction of race is ever-evolving and 
can be changed.  
110 Camisha Russell, The Assisted Reproduction of Race, p. 53.  





systems of privilege and subordination that the question “but what race are you really?” gets its 
ontological oomph.112 Arguably, disparate moral value along lines of race is a side- or residual- effect 
of the other aforementioned political goals of social cohesion, economic prosperity, and political 
mastery. With that said, the disparate moral value embedded in the dominant conception of race 
plays a large role in how racism is perpetuated today.113 It is often hiding in the background, 
functioning subliminally, whenever race is invoked.   
The unreflective salience of race in one’s perception of another brings in this racial ideology, 
which is oppressive. Racial oppression, specifically, has to do with the barriers, pressures, and limits 
that people of color face due to their race. For people of color to live in a world where others 
perceive them through a racial veil is such a pressure and can even be a barrier. It is a barrier because 
the concept of race being used is not about one’s biology or genealogy, as just argued, but tied up 
with stereotypes, misvaluing, and political use in a racist society. Being perceived in this way 
constitutes a form of oppression due to how it limits and diminishes people of color’s ability to live 
their lives. It limits their opportunities to work when people systematically misperceive them as less 
competent, it limits their opportunities to build special relationships when people systematically 
perceive them to be less desirable,114 and it limits their opportunities to live when people 
systematically perceive them to be dangerous. That perceiving through the racial veil limits and 
diminishes people of color in this way makes such perception morally bad in itself. Perceiving 
through a racial veil, then, is not only morally objectionable because of its role in perpetuating 
downstream actions—reinforcing oppressive barriers—it is an instance of racial oppression.  
 
112 “But what are you really?”, p. 44. 
113 See, Chris Lebron’s discussion of the problem of social value in The Color of Our Shame, p. 43-71. 






In order to make the morally problematic nature of this perception clearer, consider a 
contrasting case where a false theory or ideology leads to misperception that is not morally 
problematic. One of the most common, but scientifically empty, ways of understanding personality 
is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). There are numerous problems with the MBTI. Among 
them is the fact that the results are not replicable: the same person can take the test at two different 
times and get different answers. One reason why is because some of the “types” it categorizes 
people into are conceptually confused. For example, the MBTI places people in either the “thinker” 
or the “feeler” categories, meant to mark out two ends of a continuum where people can lie. 
However, significant scientific evidence shows that these categories are not opposites but distinct 
aspects of one’s personality. In fact, people who test as being good reasoners tend to also test well 
on understanding and managing emotions.115  
Despite all the MBTI’s issues, many businesses still use it as a way of understanding their 
employees. So, it is not hard to believe that we could have a situation where a boss perceives their 
employee through the lens of the MBTI. Perhaps their employee, at the time of testing, was marked 
as a “feeler”, and knowing this their boss often ignores their suggestions about procedure or about 
ways of structuring projects and only considers their input when it comes to human relations. 
Inadvertently, the boss is now treating their employee in a morally problematic way, given the way 
the boss perceives them. The employee’s assigned Myers-Briggs type is altering the boss’s treatment, 
leading to morally objectionable behavior downstream. Of course, there are probably many times 
where having the MBTI in mind might also lead to morally neutral, or morally good results.116 That’s 
 
115 See Cote and Miners, “Emotional Intelligence, Cognitive Intelligence, and Job Performance”.  
116 Consider a woman employee who scores high on the ‘thinker’ end of the continuum. Perhaps this would lead a boss 
to weighing her opinions and arguments highly, counteracting the sexist norms and dismissal she is often subject to. 





part of what happens when you have a nonreliable guide to understanding another person: results 
can be good, bad or neutral.   
So, while the misperception leads to morally harmful actions, the perception is not in itself 
morally problematic. It is certainly epistemically problematic, and that can lead to moral problems, 
but in the case of the racial “veil” something more significant is happening. It is not only that 
perceiving through the racial “veil” leads to morally objectionable actions, it is that the very 
perceiving of people of color through the “veil” is morally problematic because the very way of 
perceiving them involves a morally problematic ideology.  
The racial “veil,” while morally problematic on its own, is not separate from the self-
preoccupied “veil” that Murdoch discusses but often intertwined with it. The interaction between 
the self-preoccupied “veil” and the racial “veil” helps explain how many often retreat to their (good) 
intentions or character to excuse racist behavior.117 Sarah Hoagland has argued that many whites are 
“enormously unself-conscious about whiteness as a cultural and political phenomenon much as the 
middle class seems enormously unself-conscious about middle classness.”118 Since those with racial 
privilege often fail to recognize the role race plays in society, they hardly ever perceive their actions 
as nodes in a network of pressures and barriers of racial oppression. Instead, they perceive their 
actions as isolated and autonomous, resulting solely from their will or character. To them, their 
actions result solely from their self, as opposed to being influenced by their socialization in a racist 
society. In effect, they misunderstand the nature of their own moral failing and miss how their 
actions contribute to more systemic forms of harm. Conceiving of oneself as being autonomous in 
this way, is a way in which one can be self-preoccupied: focusing solely on their own individuality in 
 
117 This insight comes from Sarah Hoagland in “Denying Relationality” in Sullivan’s and Tuana’s Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance, p. 103.  





acting as opposed to how their actions are influenced and affect societal pressures around them. 
With that said, some may successfully remove most of their self-preoccupied anxieties to perceive 
others, but still fail to remove their racist socialization. Such people can be (at least partially) 
successful at attending to people of color while still being inhibited by the racial “veil.” They may 
show racist behavior (i.e., engaging in microaggressions or saying racist things) but are nonetheless 
kind and caring to people of different races than themselves. The existence of such people helps 
explain much of the tension between people being of “good character” and yet still being racist. The 
relationship between the self-preoccupied “veil” and the racial “veil” shows us how one’s cultivation 
of loving attention can be incomplete: one might remove some of their self-preoccupied cares and 
anxieties, but not their racial socialization.  
This self-preoccupation can also affect one’s second-order moral perception, or what I call 
‘orientation,’ when dealing with matters of race. As I explained in the previous chapter, one’s 
orientation involves the way they attend to virtues/vices, character traits, and “the good”. Self-
preoccupation is vicious because it inhibits our willingness to look again—to change our orientation 
toward virtuous traits or “the good”. Self-preoccupation often leads to a kind of arrogance where we 
assume our vision is fine and beyond reproach. This unwillingness to examine our own perceptions 
in light of racial misperception would fall under what Robin DeAngelo has called white fragility.119  
White fragility refers to the tendency (or disposition) of whites to avoid or reject 
uncomfortable discussions or reflections on systemic racism and the way they often inadvertently 
harm people of color and benefit as a result. While DeAngelo talks about this in descriptive terms, 
there is also a moral element here. Refusing to recognize moral problems and injustice and in effect 
failing to engage in moral betterment is a problem of moral character. In order to have a good moral 
 





character, one must (to some extent) be engaged in the endlessly perfectible task of orienting oneself 
to the good. Being open to criticism and reflecting on our own shortcomings are part of such a 
process. Racism, insofar as it supports a sense of white superiority, encourages a kind of arrogance 
that gets in the way of this task by making it less likely that one will think that one needs to correct 
one’s views and character. This difficulty comes from how the racial veil blurs and hides whites’ 
perception of the world, which conflicts with the reflectively held egalitarian beliefs that most of us 
assent to.  
Since the racial veil organizes perception around race, and race as a construct carries with it 
an ideology of some people being worth more than others, perceiving through the racial veil is in 
direct conflict with our reflectively held belief that all people are equal. To help illustrate this point, 
let us return to the example of José and Rogelio. José had the reflectively held belief that family is 
more important than money or status, but regularly acted in ways that conflicted with these values. 
Much of what was going wrong was that he was so self-preoccupied that he did not perceive how he 
was failing his brother. Most of us reflectively endorse egalitarian values, but still perceive in ways 
that betray an inegalitarian way of conceptualizing the world.  This conflict needs to be resolved (to 
make our way of conceiving the world less inegalitarian) if one wants to improve their character. But 
the conflict cannot be noticed unless one is willing to look again on one’s perceptions. 
Of course, the racial veil can damage our character in other ways as well. Consider an out-
and-out racist like Dylann Roof who reflectively endorses the principle that people of color are 
inferior, leading him to commit mass murder in the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal 
Church in Charleston, South Carolina. There are those like Roof who perceive through the racial veil 
and consciously endorses the principles inherent in it as an accurate representation of moral reality. 
When one endorses the values integrated in the racial veil, one’s character become corrupted instead 





present in society and has taken it on as a moral fact. Any belief system, reflectively endorsed, that 
ranks some people as lower than others constitutes a moral vice of superiority. In this case, the vice 
is racial superiority, which undergirds the more explicit forms of white supremacy of the past, like 
slavery, and of which we have started to see a resurgence, like Roof.  
5. Concluding Thoughts on the Role of Intentions 
In this chapter I have set out to articulate and defend the idea that a racial “veil” distorts our 
way of perceiving and inhibits our ability to properly attend to people of color and the situations we 
find ourselves in with them. The general goal was to help us understand white moral ignorance. That 
kind of white ignorance where the ignorance not only leads to downstream moral harms but 
involves mistaken moral cognition. One way a person can have mistaken moral cognition regarding 
race, as I have argued, is via the way one perceives people of color, which can be morally 
problematic itself independently of any bad actions that are executed as a result. Understanding the 
role of racist perception lays a foundation for understanding the moral dimensions of interpersonal 
(as opposed to structural) racism. When looking at instances of microaggressions or other racially 
loaded interactions between individuals, if we focus solely on the intentions of the agents or the 
consequences of the actions, then we will not get the full moral picture. Attending to moral 
perception, then, helps us better understand the moral dimensions of interpersonal racism. One 
place these insights can be applied is to the set of situations in which people make the oft-utilized 
excuse: “But I didn’t intend it that way.” I would like to conclude with some thoughts about this 
excuse, and in particular note how looking solely at the intentions or consequences misses 





When Joe Biden was criticized for calling Obama “articulate” he was quick to say that he did 
not have racist intent.120 Similarly, it would be easy to imagine any of the characters in my examples 
bringing up their intentions when being criticized for behaving or speaking in racist ways. Appealing 
to intentions is regularly employed to excuse racist behavior or speech. The idea is that, while 
someone unwittingly did something racist, their motivations for the behavior or statement were 
based in something they take to be clearly non-racist. The standard response by anti-racism activists 
to this excuse is to shift focus away from intentions to that of consequences: to draw attention to 
how the morally problematic behavior caused actual harm to people of color. Various terms and 
actions have long histories, including long personal histories with individual people of color who 
have likely experienced such incidents multiple times. So, the standard response insists, whether one 
intends to harm or not, the harm is still done and that needs to be accounted for—especially when 
the people being harmed are members of marginalized groups. 
The standard response certainly gets something right: our focus should, to some extent, be 
on the consequences of the actions and on the people that are harmed, especially when they are 
being systematically harmed. But I suspect this shift from intentions to consequences is rarely 
satisfying to those who behaved in racist ways. Some people may find it is easy to recognize that 
harm was done and to be sorry about causing it but will still want to know if they are individually at 
fault or if their actions are being too easily misinterpreted. They may further wonder what they could 
do differently next time to avoid this mistake. Perhaps it feels like a lose-lose situation, that no 
matter how one acts, they are likely to fail. After all, when it comes to being blamed and criticized, 
one wants their actions to be understood in terms of how those actions resonate with their 
character, motivations, and reasons. Intentions matter because of the role they play in making sense 
 






of an agent’s actions to themself. Intentions are an important feature of how agents understand their 
movement in the world. When one is criticized for consequences that seem out of harmony with 
their motivations and reasons, it can be confusing and disorienting.  
I would like to suggest a different response to the agent who excuses their behavior due to 
their intentions, a response that connects with the agent as opposed to focusing entirely on the 
victims. As Murdoch argued, too much weight is put on the will, which is connected to one’s 
motivations, reasons, and intentions.121 Simply put, the will is not the source of all morality. The way 
intentions are often appealed to in excusing racist behavior is a place where overemphasis on the will 
as the locus of moral activity is at play. Since one’s behavior is often taken to be a product of one’s 
will alone, this agent mistakes their lack of bad intentions as an exonerating excuse.122 But to make 
this about one’s willing is to ignore the role of one’s perception. While one may not have intended 
harm, one’s perception of the situation or person may already have been corrupted. When one’s 
actions are viewed as a product not only of their will, but also of their perception, it is much easier 
to recognize how an agent may have morally failed. What is required of them, then, is not necessarily 
to do something different in their moral reasoning or decision-making procedure, but to improve 
their perception of people of color. Shifting our focus from the will to one’s perception gives us an 
opportunity for growth that is absent if we restrict the possible explanations of moral shortcomings 
to the intentions of the agent and the consequences of victims.  
Attending to the way racism invades the inner moral life of agents through a distorting moral 
“veil” helps us not only get clear on the moral ramifications of living in a racist society, but it also 
 
121 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 51-54 and 76. 
122 Lack of bad intentions may, at times, be a partial excuse. Not intending to cause harm is part of the explanation Chris 






helps us understand multiple interactions whose interpretations and assessments rely overly on the 
standard suspects of quality of will and consequences. Focusing on moral perception brings 






























CHAPTER THREE: PERCEPTUAL RESPONSIBILITY & RACIST PERCEPTION 
1. Introduction 
So far, my arguments have been about the moral psychology of racism. I fleshed out what I 
take to be a central insight in Iris Murdoch, that there is an inner dimension of our moral lives that 
has to do with how we perceive the world around us, and demonstrated how this moral perception 
can be distorted by racism. A consequence we can draw from these observations is that the very way 
that we perceive people of color can be morally problematic. When one perceives people of color in 
a particular way, by unreflectively making race salient, one has engaged in an objectionable way of 
perceiving. This conclusion immediately raises a new question that will be the focus of this chapter: 
in what way, or to what extent, is one morally responsible for racist perception?  
This question presumes that moral perception, in general, is something that one can be 
responsible for, which may not be immediately obvious. Accounts of moral responsibility often 
emphasize the importance of an agent having control over their actions. For someone to be 
responsible for some action it must be a result of some decision-making process involving choice or 
desire. While we can adjust and alter our perception, perception is not the direct result of our 
choices and desires—it is not something directly in our control.  
The first aim of this chapter is to further articulate and provide an answer to this puzzle: 
how can one be responsible for moral perception since it seems to lie outside of one’s control? I will 
argue that while one may not be responsible for one’s perception in the traditional sense, one can 
take responsibility for one’s perception. I will argue that taking responsibility for one’s perception 





manifests as an affective response upon realizing the misperception. The second aim of this chapter 
is to apply this way of understanding perceptual responsibility to perceiving through the racial veil. 
Again, due to the lack of control, how is one responsible for racist perception? My answer is the 
same: that one ought to take responsibility. But the way taking responsibility manifests in one’s 
affect and actions will be different. In particular, recognizing one’s racist perception should lead one 
to recognizing the role one plays in racial oppression more generally. 
2. The Puzzle of Perceptual Responsibility 
 Imagine that you go see a magician with a friend. To close their set, the magician does the 
traditional saw-a-lady-in-half trick. You watch carefully as the magician leads an assistant into the 
box and begins sawing the box in half. Before your very eyes the magician moves the two box pieces 
away from each other and you watch as the woman’s legs move in one box while her head is turning 
in the second box. The magician draws the two boxes back together, opens it, and the assistant 
walks out as if nothing happened.  
 On your way home from the show, you remark to your friend just how incredible that final 
trick was, that you perceived, close up, someone saw a person in half then be put back together. 
Your friend then responds, “no you didn’t!” (Of course, in one sense your friend is correct, that is 
part of the point of magic tricks.) But your friend continues, “you should not have perceived that at 
all!” This further statement seems odd. Of course, the woman was not actually sawed in half, but the 
whole point was for you to perceive that as what happened. Your friend goes even further, “you 
perceiving the woman being sawed in half, when she clearly was not, is an insult to science and 
critical thinking!” Your friend has not only said you should have perceived some other way, but now 
(in a way) blames you for perceiving that way.  
 At this point, you would likely be at least a little annoyed with your friend—at least in part 





you think happened. But you might also be annoyed that your friend made normative claims about 
your perception and blames you for having those perceptions. You may think something has gone 
terribly wrong. You have no control over what you perceived, even if you (intellectually) may know 
better. For your friend to blame you for perceiving in this way is to make a mistake, to 
misunderstand how to apply blame.  
 This problem of being responsible for one’s perception equally applies to cases of moral 
perception. So far, I have argued, following Iris Murdoch, that our way of perceiving others can be 
morally evaluated—that there are morally good and bad ways of perceiving others. This naturally 
leads to the question, “Are we responsible for our moral perception?” But as illustrated with the case 
of the magician sawing the lady in half, our lack of control would make blaming one for one’s moral 
misperceptions odd. How can my moral perception be something I am blamed for? If I fail to 
perceive someone with loving attention is that something adequately in my control so that I am 
worthy of praise or blame? Moral perception (relevantly morally bad perception) differs, however, 
from the case of misperceiving the magician’s trick since there is a legitimate evaluative claim that 
can be made on it: there is something morally objectionable about perceiving someone in a self-
preoccupied way. Instances of moral perception, though, are the same as the magician case when it 
comes to responsibility: it would be a mistake to apply blame for morally bad perception.  
 It is a mistake to blame someone for their moral perception for the same reasons as it would 
be to blame someone for their inaccurate perception in the magician case: we do not have (complete 
or direct) control over our moral perception. The way in which we perceive is not something we can 
deliberate over. It is in some sense the raw information with which we deliberate. Thus, we are not 
blameworthy (or praiseworthy) for how we perceive. But our lack of control does not simply wipe 
the slate clean. There is still something morally objectionable about self-preoccupied perception or 





does not mean we can simply move on with our lives, failing to address the moral problems 
interwoven in that perception. Even though we are not strictly guilty of any wrongdoing in 
perceiving things in a morally objectionable way, we are not purely innocent either, for such 
misperception reveals something morally objectionable in us.  Thus, moral (mis-)perception presents 
us with a puzzle: As responsible agents, how should we think about our relationship to the moral 
quality of our perceptions if we are neither so responsible for it as to be blameworthy nor so non-
responsible for it as to be innocent? 
 The solution to this puzzle, I will argue, is to shift from thinking about being responsible to 
the idea of taking responsibility. Taking responsibility is an activity, it is a way an agent responds to a 
moral flaw with their actions. In the case of moral misperception, to take responsibility for one’s 
moral misperceptions, one must be committed to changing one’s perceptions by interrogating one’s 
own character for potential distortions with the aim being to change the way one perceives. But 
taking responsibility is not solely about action. To truly take on the responsibility, one must own 
one’s misperception: to recognize the non-innocence in perceiving this way. In addition to one’s 
trying to do better in the future, this owning of misperception often manifests itself as an affective 
response. I will argue that depending on the situation the affective response will be of either shame 
or guilt, which leads to one taking on the commitment to “look again” and change one’s perception. 
I will begin by focusing on the active component of taking responsibility, so as to draw out the 
difference between being responsible and taking responsibility, before moving on to the way affect 
manifests in ownership of the perception.  
One way to understand the difference between being responsible and taking responsibility, at 
least initially, is to make a distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking orientations 
on responsibility. One place this distinction sometimes comes up is in discussions of moral luck—





discussion of moral luck, she distinguishes between backward-looking and forward-looking 
orientations toward responsibility:  
The orientation I have in mind [is]… basically forward-looking …that of acceptance, 
commitment, care, and concern. By contrast, most essays on responsibility in contemporary 
Anglo-American moral philosophy look backward. They are preoccupied with punishment 
and reward, praise or blame, excuses, mitigation, and so on.123 
They look back on the details of an event to check for control and deliberation. To determine 
whether one is punishable, or blameworthy, or whether one has a mitigating or excusing reason for 
one’s behavior, you must look back on the events to determine one’s responsibility. Let us look at a 
case of this in a little more detail. 
 Imagine that a friend invites you to a party. They decide to do this because the person 
throwing the party has a lot of similar interests to you and they think you two will get along. 
However, it turns out that the person throwing the party is your ex-partner whom you have not 
talked to since college. In this case, it seems perfectly acceptable to look back on this circumstance 
and be upset with your friend, and even blame them, for inviting you to the party. Your friend could 
have done otherwise, and they consciously made the decision to invite you. They seem blameworthy. 
Backward-looking responsibility does not only make appropriate the possibility of blame though, it 
also allows for the possibility of excuses and mitigation. Imagine your friend saying that they did not 
know the person was your ex. They remind you that you two have never discussed your lives prior 
to graduate school, and if they had known the person was your ex, they would not have invited you 
to the party. This would at the very least mitigate their responsibility, if not excuse them from blame 
entirely.  
 Determining responsibility with a backward-looking orientation, then, involves tracking 
one’s control and deliberation. Not only for determining whether the agent is responsible, but also 
 





for determining what the agent should do—or what should be done to the agent (such as, be 
blamed). The backward-looking orientation leads us to pointing back to the agent’s actions and 
saying you are responsible for those actions, those actions were under your control, and you need to 
atone for those actions. It is this kind of classic approach to responsibility that makes blame appear 
ill-fitting for moral perception. Perception does not involve actions that are clearly under one’s 
control, and thus it is unclear how one can be held responsible for such perception, or why one 
must atone for it. 
 Taking responsibility, as opposed to being held responsible, has much more to do with the 
forward-looking orientation. While one may still be concerned with perceptions that happened in 
the past, when it comes to determining what one should do about one’s misperception, one looks 
forward. Looking forward leads one to take responsibility, unconcerned with whether one was 
blameworthy. In the case of moral misperception, taking responsibility involves taking care and 
concern for one’s perceptions and making a commitment to question those perceptions and try to 
alter them if necessary. When one takes responsibility, one accepts that one has misperceived, that 
there is something morally regrettable about this, and shows concern, care, and commitment to 
reforming one’s behavior to be better next time. For example, your friend who invited you to your 
ex’s party, who is non-culpably ignorant of your prior relationship and thus not blameworthy, may 
still seek to take responsibility for their actions. They may accept that they, even unwittingly, caused 
you pain and show concern, care, and commitment to not cause you pain in a similar way in the 
future.  
Let us consider how this plays out in the case of moral perception by returning to Murdoch’s 
example of M and D. In Murdoch’s example, M initially perceives her daughter-in-law D as 
unpolished, lacking in dignity, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, and 





due to her own old-fashioned character and tendency toward jealousy. Thus, M decides to “look 
again.” However, we may imagine an alternate scenario in which M does not initiate her self-
reflection. While Murdoch stipulates that M never reveals her true perception of D in her actions, 
imagine instead that M sometimes is curt and contemptuous with D, leading to her son—whom I 
will call S—criticizing her. S may blame his mother for perceiving his wife in an unjust way. He may 
tell M that she is being jealous and old-fashioned. M may argue back that she is not responsible for 
how she perceives D. M may say it is completely out of her control: when she interacts with D she 
just perceives a juvenile, brusque young woman. S may accept this—to an extent. He may agree that 
the way M perceives D is out of her control, and so, understanding this, he is not blaming her for the 
perception. But he may also insist that while she is not technically responsible for her perceptions of 
D, she can take responsibility for this perception. S may point out that M is an intelligent and well-
intentioned person who is capable of giving careful and just attention to an object. S’s criticism of M 
being old-fashioned and jealous are things she should be concerned about and take care to alter. 
Here she can either accept this criticism or reject it. Upon accepting it, she may recognize that her 
initial perceptions were beyond her control, but that she has some control over her future 
perceptions. She can be committed to perceiving D without jealousy or snobbery (or at least, to 
trying to perceive D this way). That is, she can reflect on how she perceives to determine how she 
may be going wrong, and how to attend to D in a just and loving way. Upon making these 
adjustments, M’s perception alters, as it did in Murdoch’s original example, and M begins to see D as 
refreshingly simple and delightfully youthful.  
 Note that in Murdoch’s original example, M can be understood as taking responsibility 
without needing to be morally criticized by anyone else for her perception. It is her own self-
criticism that recognizes her snobbery and jealousy, which leads to her owning up to those traits, 





us to self-reflect on our characters and aim to always improve who we are as a person, our loved 
ones are frequently our best critics. They perceive us lovingly and can inform us of our vices. Moral 
criticism, beyond blame, then plays an important role in the discovery of our misperceptions and 
invites an opportunity for us to take responsibility for them. 
Another way of thinking about the difference between the backward-looking and forward-
looking orientations on responsibility is to examine the roles of autonomy (of having control over 
our actions) and integrity (our moral character and who we are as people) in responsibility. This 
distinction between integrity and autonomy is largely a device Claudia Card uses to get clear on 
different ways of understanding responsibility in the face of bad moral luck. She argues that Thomas 
Nagel is largely focused on autonomy, the lack of one’s control, and that Bernard Williams is largely 
focused on integrity. Thus, Nagel has a generally backward-looking orientation whereas Williams has 
more of a forward-looking orientation. Card’s own position is that bad moral luck presents us with 
an opportunity to take responsibility, which involves maintaining and developing one’s integrity. 
Card argues that,  
In taking responsibility for ourselves, we do participate in constructing our identities and 
thus in constructing some of the conditions of our own integrity. On Lynne McFall’s 
analysis, however, integrity (without qualification) is not simply a matter of internal 
consistency or even coherence. It requires an identity to which certain basic moral values and 
commitments are central. It is thus consistency or coherence with an identity that includes a 
certain content. She points out that we cannot betray commitments central to our identities 
without feeling that we are not the persons we had thought we were. …To develop and 
maintain integrity, we need to discover, assess, and sometimes make changes in our values, 
traits, and capacities.124  
When taking responsibility, one develops one’s moral character. This approach is different from 
looking back to be sure one was acting with autonomy. M recognizes how she could be old-
fashioned, snobby, and jealous and in recognizing those features of herself she recognizes that she is 
 





not the person she wishes to be—there are central moral values and commitments that she has 
failed to live up to in her perception of D. The response of looking again involves cultivating that 
loving attention she failed to perceive D with when first attending to her. When she takes 
responsibility by cultivating this loving attention, it is not an act of demonstrating her autonomy, but 
of demonstrating her integrity.  
 I have spoken so far about what acts or activities are involved in taking responsibility for 
one’s perceptions. But as Elinor Mason argues, taking responsibility means something more: it 
means we should own the things we are taking responsibility for.125 So, while the actions (e.g., 
reflecting on one’s perception, looking again, cultivating loving attention) I have been describing 
play an important role in taking responsibility it is not the entire story, one must own one’s 
perceptions.126 It is only through owning one’s misperception that one recognizes how one was not 
purely innocent, it is the way one recognizes that such misperception reveals something morally 
objectionable in oneself. This ownership of perceptions often manifests itself as an affective response. 
If you understand the misperception as coming from you, and recognize that it is a moral 
misperception, then you will likely feel something. The feeling will differ depending on the 
circumstances of the misperception and how it is brought to your attention, but oftentimes the 
feeling will be a kind of shame: that the way you misperceived does not match up with the personal 
standards you wish to hold yourself to.  
 Imagine that you are having lunch with your friends, and you find the waiter serving you a 
bit juvenile and, frankly speaking, dumb. After your lunch, your friends remark that you were being 
 
125 Mason, “Respecting Each Other and Taking Responsibility for Our Biases” 
126 Mason is arguing specifically for taking responsibility to involve extending the realm of what the agent is blameworthy 
for, that one should feel the same kind of guilt as if they had done something with a bad will. I do not believe this holds 
consistently for owning one’s perceptions—I believe an array of attitudes can fulfill this role that Mason is pointing out. 





slightly condescending to the waiter. They thought you were being a little snobbish. While, at first, 
you do not know what your friends are talking about, you still feel some shame that your perception 
of the waiter may have been off. Perhaps you know you can be a bit snobby sometimes, but really 
wish to get better, recognizing that you tend to perceive some people as simple or crude. In realizing 
you likely did misperceive the waiter as simple or crude, you begin to feel shame for that 
misperception. You are ashamed because misperceiving the waiter in that way does not match up 
with your personal standards. This shame leads you to reflect on the case and attend to the waiter 
(or future waiters) a little more carefully. In recognizing your misperception, you are owning it.  The 
shame you feel reflects your recognition that the misperception is yours.  
 Shame is fitting because in recognizing the misperception as yours, you realize you have 
fallen short of the moral norms or standards that you wish to hold yourself to. What is salient when 
reflecting on your perceptions is your integrity, whether the way you perceive aligns with the values 
you endorse. It is when your perception and values clash that the shame arises. This does not mean 
that you may not also feel guilty for any behavior that resulted from your misperception. Afterall, 
your friends did notice your snobbishness, so you may, in addition, feel guilty for some of your 
actions that originated in your perception. Recognizing your misperception may manifest feelings of 
shame; recognizing your subsequent actions may manifest feelings of guilt.  
There are cases, though, where you may also feel guilt for your misperceptions themselves. 
Return to the original case of M and D, where M misperceives D but no bad actions result from that 
misperception. But unlike in the original, assume that M and D are in a special, loving kind of 
relationship. The kind of relationship where loving attention is not only something wished for, but 
something expected. When M misperceives D, and S brings it up to her, M will likely feel ashamed 
that her jealousy is getting in the way of attending to D but that might not be all that she feels. In 





We not only want our loved ones to attend to us with care, but we expect it from them. It is part of 
what is involved in loving another that we lovingly attend.127 M, then, has not only failed some moral 
standards of character, she has also failed D. In taking responsibility for those failings, her attention 
may not only be on adjusting her perception but also on making it up to her daughter-in-law.  
Furthermore, in these cases of interpersonal relationships, it may also be important to reveal 
or show these affective responses to the person being misperceived. Elinor Mason puts the point 
nicely when she says that what is important here is “what we want from our loved ones, and the 
attitudes that we take as evidence that they are committed to us in the right sort of way.”128 In typical 
cases, like in the example where you misperceive the waiter as simple or crude, reflecting your 
feelings of shame to the waiter may be inappropriate. It is easy to imagine that the waiter thought 
nothing of your behavior and while your friends could recognize your snobbery, the waiter 
interpreted it as business as usual. While you plausibly could go back to the restaurant and apologize 
to the waiter, this may seem even more self-preoccupied than the initial misperception since they 
have likely moved on. This is not the case with closer interpersonal relationships. Reflecting our 
feelings becomes important because it is evidence that we take that relationship seriously, that we are 
committed to attending to them in a careful and loving way.  
So far, I have argued that while one is not responsible for one’s perception in the traditional 
sense that makes one a proper object of blame, there is an important way that one can take 
responsibility for one’s perception. Taking responsibility involves both the activity of examining 
one’s own perception and attempting to correct one’s errors as well as owning that initial 
misperception, which will often manifest in feelings of shame. In the next section, I will look at how 
 
127 See, Susan Wolf, “Loving Attention: Lessons in love from The Philadelphia Story”.  





this answer extends to perceiving through the racial veil. Similarly, one is not responsible for such 
racist perception in the traditional sense of responsibility. Still, one ought to take responsibility for 
one’s perceptions, owning that misperception, and work to correct one’s perception. However, 
taking ownership of racist misperceptions129 will look different due to the role perceiving through 
the racial veil plays in racial oppression.  
3. Perceptual Responsibility for Racist Perceptions 
In this section, I will explore how taking responsibility for perceiving through the racial veil 
differs from the kinds of cases already discussed in this chapter. First, I will discuss how taking 
ownership differs from cases of self-preoccupied misperception, arguing that in addition to 
recognizing that one has failed some moral standard one identifies with, one should also recognize 
that one is part of the problem of racial oppression. This recognition will still manifest as shame, but 
unlike in some cases of self-preoccupied misperception, one should not communicate those feelings 
of shame or guilt. Second, I will discuss how the activity of taking responsibility differs from cases 
of self-preoccupied misperception. Given the role such misperception plays in racial oppression, 
taking responsibility for that perception can create a feeling in one that reforming one’s perception is 
not enough, that one must do more in order to fully take responsibility for one’s racist 
misperceptions.  
Let us begin with a case to refer to in this section. Imagine that someone mistakes a Latinx 
professor at a university as a member of the janitorial staff, and this misperception is due to 
perceiving through the racial veil. The person mistakes this professor as a janitor due to the 
professor’s race and to the attached idea that if you see a Latinx person in a University setting they 
 
129 Throughout this chapter I will be using the locution ‘racist misperception’ despite it being redundant—my previous 
arguments show that all racist perception is misperception. But due to wanting to keep a stylistic parallel between other 
cases of moral misperception and perceiving through the racial veil, I will use ‘racist misperception’ to stand in for the 





are likely to be part of the working-class staff. This person may merely have the thought, only to 
later realize their mistake—perhaps their next meeting with a faculty member from the history 
department happens to be this individual—or they may say or do something that reveals their 
misperception such as telling the professor-mistaken-as-janitor, “this restroom could use more toilet 
paper.”  
 The answer to how one should respond to one’s racist misperception, like in the case above, 
is the same as self-preoccupied misperception: one should take responsibility for the misperception, 
which involves both the activity of trying to alter one’s perception but also taking ownership of that 
perception. In the case of self-preoccupied misperception, when a person takes ownership, they are 
likely to recognize how they have failed a moral standard they identify with. That they are, in some 
way, not the person they want to be. Taking ownership, then, manifests as a kind of shame. The 
same is true, at least in part, with taking ownership of racist misperception.  
Christopher Lebron has argued that shame is particularly appropriate with respect to racial 
inequality because shame is a kind of moral reaction “in which a person becomes aware of a 
discrepancy between the person one takes oneself to be and the person one is at a given moment.”130 
For Lebron, racial inequality largely has to do with a conflict between one’s reflectively endorsed 
beliefs about racial equality and ways in which society values people of color differently, which gets 
in the way of one’s attentiveness to people of color.131 When one is faced with how one perpetuates 
this misvaluing, one becomes aware of the discrepancy between the person one took oneself to be 
and who one is when acting. One might say the same about who one is when perceiving. Most 
 
130 The Color of Our Shame, p. 21. 





people endorse racial egalitarianism as a value, and when they realize that their misperception does 
not bear this value out, they are apt to feel shame.  
Recognizing that one is perceiving through the racial veil and owning that misperception will 
also involve a further realization: that one is part of the problem (of racism). This further realization 
is due to the fact, which I argued for in the previous chapter, that perceiving through the racial veil 
is morally problematic because it is an instance of racial oppression. Racial oppression has to do 
with the barriers, pressures, and limits that people of color face due to their race. For people of 
color to live in a world where others perceive them through a racial veil is such a pressure and can 
even be a barrier. It is a barrier because the concept of race being used is not about one’s biology or 
genealogy but tied up with stereotypes, misvaluing, and political use in a racist society. Being 
perceived in this way constitutes a form of oppression due to how it limits and diminishes people of 
color’s ability to live their lives. It limits their opportunities to work when people systematically 
misperceive them as less competent, it limits their opportunities to build special relationships when 
people systematically perceive them to be less desirable,132 and it limits their opportunities to live 
when people systematically perceive them to be dangerous. Perceiving through a racial veil not only 
perpetuates downstream actions—reinforcing oppressive barriers—it is an oppressive barrier.  
Return to the example of misperceiving the Latinx professor. Perhaps the misperceiver 
immediately recognizes the faulty perception and on second look realize they are not a janitor 
(maybe they are not wearing the university regulated outfit for on duty janitors). Or the professor-
mistaken-as-janitor may simply tell the misperceiver, “I’m not the janitor” or more implicitly roll 
their eyes at them or say, “go fuck yourself.” Once the misperceiver recognizes their mistake and 
takes ownership of it, their first thought will be that they have failed to live up to the person they 
 






thought they were. But the realization is unlikely to stop there. Once someone realizes that they have 
misperceived in this case, they will further realize that they have probably misperceived in many 
other cases as well. It is upon recognizing that their perceiving through the racial veil is a consistent 
pattern, as opposed to an isolated incident, that they will likely have the further realization: “I am 
part of the problem.” 
In her essay, “Oppression,” Marilyn Frye gives what has become a well-recognized metaphor 
for how to understand the actions that make up oppression.133 She argues that oppression is like a 
birdcage. When you look at a single instance or dimension of oppression, it will be hard to recognize 
how that harm constitutes oppression. It would be like looking at a single bar of a birdcage and 
wondering how that bar could impede a bird’s freedom. The bird could easily just fly to either side 
of it. It is only when we take a wider view of the cage that we see how that bar is just one of many 
that constitute an entire structure that keeps the bird trapped. The problem of oppression is not 
exhausted by any single practice, trend, or norm, instead we must look at “the whole cage” as it 
were. Realizing that one is not the person one thought one was is important for owning one’s 
misperception, but this realization only captures part of what is wrong with racist misperception. To 
truly take ownership of perceiving through the racial veil, one must also recognize its place in the 
structure of racism.  
Just as in cases of self-preoccupied misperception, the affect that manifests from this 
ownership will likely be shame. My discussion of shame, so far, has been when one falls short of a 
moral ideal. In the case of racist misperception one has fallen short of an egalitarian ideal, that all 
people are morally equal. But falling short of an ideal is not the only cause for shame. So, while one 
may certainly feel shame at realizing one has fallen short of the egalitarian ideal, that will not be the 
 





sole cause of shame. The shame that they experience also involves realizing that they, themselves, 
have been part of the problem. It would also be intelligible for a person to feel guilt at the realization 
that they are part of the problem. Guilt often arises when someone has done something immoral, 
and while they may recognize that their perception is beyond their control—and so strictly speaking 
is not something they have done—they may still feel that, insofar as their perception contributes to 
or reinforces racial oppression, they have failed. Whether one feels shame or guilt is less important 
than recognizing the role such emotions have in our moral lives. Having such affective reactions is 
often an important part of our moral and emotional lives. These affects reveal the commitment we 
have to our values and that we take our actions, perception, and character seriously. How we 
manage these emotional responses, though, matters significantly in the case of racial misperceptions 
and shortcomings.  
Imagine that when our misperceiver realizes their mistake when perceiving the Latinx 
professor as a janitor, they are overwhelmed with guilt. Maybe they begin to apologize, remarking 
that they cannot believe they made that mistake. We can imagine the professor, attempting to move 
on with their day, says, “it’s okay,” to which the misperceiver just insists that it is not okay and that 
they have really, truly messed up. The misperceiver in this case would be showing, what has come to 
be called, “white guilt.” Judith Katz famously argues in her book White Awareness that white guilt is a 
self-indulgent, often distracting reaction from white people when made aware of their own privilege 
or racist reactions. This led her to moving away from organizing anti-racist workshops with 
participants of multiple races to workshops with only white participants. She even stopped using 
non-white educators in her workshops, since white participants would primarily focus on 
apologizing to the instructors of color instead of paying attention to the lessons of the workshops.134  
 





What is going wrong here is not the manifestation of shame or guilt, but the way whites 
often handle or manage their guilt. Perhaps someone believes that the case of racist misperception is 
like that of misperception of a loved one: that there is an expectation for them to perceive properly 
in this case and since they have now failed it is important to communicate those feelings to the 
person misperceived so that they can know how seriously the misperceiver is taking the 
misperception. But the case of racist misperception is importantly not like that of misperception of a 
loved one, specifically because of the importance not to put one’s guilt or shame on the person of 
color who is misperceived. In communicating one’s guilt or shame, one is being self-involved, one 
makes the situation about one’s own feelings and absolution rather than about the person of color 
who is harmed. In a way, they have traded one misperception for another. Having already 
misperceived the person of color due to the racial veil, they are now perceiving the person of color 
as their path to absolution from guilt, thus perceiving them through the self-preoccupied veil.135  
In cases like this, racist misperception mingles with self-preoccupied misperception. I argued 
previously that in many cases of self-preoccupied misperception, like the case where you misperceive 
the waiter as simple or crude, reflecting your feelings of shame to the person you misperceived may 
be inappropriate. While you could go back to the restaurant and apologize to the waiter, this may 
seem even more self-preoccupied than the initial misperception since they have likely moved on. 
The only difference here between the racist cases and the self-preoccupied ones is that the 
inappropriateness is clearer in the racist cases. Imagine the misperceiver apologizing to the 
professor-mistaken-as-janitor. If the misperceiver had not said anything to the professor, then in this 
case it would be odd to apologize to them. Bringing up that the misperception occurred may make 
 
135 There is a difficult case here, where someone who is white misperceives a close friend, partner, or child in a racist 
way. The nature of these relationships, and how people of color feel about such misperceptions, varies here to the extent 
that it is difficult to say anything that generalizes here. It is likely that the role one’s emotions play in such ownership is 





matters worse if the professor is unaware that it happened in the first place. In the case where the 
misperception did lead to some sort of action, like telling the professor that the restroom needs 
more toilet paper with the implication they ought to replenish it, an apology may be fitting for the 
microaggression of expecting the professor, due to being Latinx, to replenish the toilet paper. 
However, something would seem at least a little off if the person apologized to the professor for the 
misperception—mistaking them as a janitor—after all, there is nothing wrong with being a janitor. 
Exactly what’s going wrong in mistaking the professor as a janitor is complicated and messy, but at 
least part of the answer has to do with the overall stereotype that pervades dominant culture and the 
way its implementation in our perception limits the lives of people of color. Furthermore, as stated 
earlier, when someone recognizes their racist misperception, they ought to recognize that it is not an 
isolated instance of their own perception, but the way in which they perceive all the time. When 
looking at both the magnitude of the issue and the extent of one’s own misperception, it becomes 
unclear what a single apology is supposed to accomplish. An apology to one individual cannot 
absolve one of all that is going on.  
What acts or what activities does one engage in, then, to take responsibility for racist 
perception? Part of the answer is the same as the answer for self-preoccupied misperception: one 
must reflect on one’s own perceptual habits, question the way one perceives things, and try to alter 
those perceptions. (How one goes about doing this will be the subject of the next chapter.) Altering 
one’s misperception, especially culturally inculcated perception, is no small task. When taking 
responsibility for racist misperception, one owns such perception by recognizing oneself to be part 
of the problem. The problem, as argued, is racial oppression more generally—beyond just racist 
perception. Recognizing oneself to be a part of this much larger problem raises the question about 





Imagine that our misperceiver of the Latinx professor is a professor themself. Upon realizing 
their tendency to misperceive people of color, and thus recognizing that they are part of the problem 
of racial oppression, they reflect on all their Black, Latinx, and other students of color over the years. 
Engaging in the work of reflecting on their own perceptual habits, questioning the way they perceive 
things, and trying to alter those perceptions, the professor may still feel like they have not quite done 
enough. Just how many students did they improperly judge the work of? How many were penalized 
when they acted no differently than their white peers? What about those people of color who were 
not in their classes to begin with because previous teachers improperly judged their work or 
penalized them unfairly? With greater reflection, the magnitude of the problem comes into focus 
and one might, properly, feel compelled to reform not only their perception, but perhaps classroom, 
department, or educational policy.  
This example points to another difference between self-preoccupied misperception and 
racist misperception. In cases of self-preoccupied misperception, the responsibility in question is 
individualistic. This individuality is built into the very problem: one is misperceiving due to one’s 
own preoccupation with one’s self. It does not involve more systemic issues. It is due to the 
individual nature of self-preoccupied misperception that reforming one’s perception fulfills the 
activity of taking responsibility for said misperception. But this is starkly different than racist 
misperception, since racist misperception is wrong in part due to the way it contributes to and 
reinforces racial oppression. Put another way, perceiving through the racial veil is part of a system, it 
is culturally inculcated, and the moral problem involves larger, systemic wrongs.136 There is a kind of 
finality or assurance that one has fulfilled one’s responsibility with taking responsibility for self-
 
136 This idea here comes from Barbara Applebaum’s discussion of how one’s individual position is connected to the more 
systemic problems of racism, leading to white complicity. See, her chapter “White Ignorance and Denials of Complicity: 





preoccupied misperception that is not as immediately available with taking responsibility for racist 
misperception due to the latter’s systemic nature. 
I do not wish to claim that one must engage in broader advocacy and reforms to fully take 
responsibility for racist misperception. Racism is, of course, not our only social ill. We live in a 
society shot through with oppression, where people of not only different races, but different 
genders, gender modalities, sexual orientations, abilities, ages, socio-economic status are limited—
and most of us are complicit in, if not contributing to, these harms as well. The world presents many 
opportunities for us to engage in moral actions, and to suggest that racism is the largest or most-
central oppression may be myopic on the part of people of color.137 But it would still be sensible to 
worry that in solely reforming one’s perception one has strengthened one’s moral character and 
integrity while leaving people of color to still suffer injustice. Perhaps the best way to put the point is 
this: if someone believes themselves to have fulfilled their responsibility by solely reforming their 
perception then it is hard to take that reformation seriously. As Claudia Card stated, and which I 
quoted previously, “To develop and maintain integrity, we need to discover, assess, and sometimes 
make changes in our values, traits, and capacities.”138 With that said, the question about whether one 
has fulfilled one’s responsibility by solely reforming one’s perception may not even arise. One may 
recognize being part of the problem, and do one’s best to reform one’s perception, while, for the 
reasons stated earlier, not even consider whether one has done enough, because there are just so 
many other moral causes—in addition to other life projects—that one is committed to pursuing. But 
the very possibility of questioning whether one has done enough is something that arises with racist 
 
137 This point is put nicely by Audre Lorde in “Age, Race, Class, Sex” where she states, “Those of us who stand outside 
[privileged] power often identify one way in which we are different, and we assume that to be the primary cause of all 
oppression, forgetting other distortions around difference, some of which we ourselves may be practising,” p. 116. 





misperception that simply does not arise in cases of self-preoccupied misperception. As stated 
before, there is a kind of finality or assurance that one has fulfilled one’s responsibility with taking 
responsibility for self-preoccupied misperception that is not as immediately available with taking 
responsibility for racist misperception.  
4. Concluding Thoughts on Anger at Being Misperceived  
 My focus in this chapter has been on the responses appropriate to the perceiver involving 
responsibility for their own misperceptions, including both self-preoccupied misperceptions and 
racist misperceptions. I have argued that although one is not responsible in the traditional, 
backward-looking blame-oriented sense of responsibility, one should take responsibility for one’s 
misperceptions, nonetheless. There is also a question about what responses are appropriate to the 
people who witness or experience the perceptions from outside, which I have largely put aside. An 
in-depth discussion of the role of moral criticism, and I believe in extension, the reactive attitudes 
connected to them, must be saved for later. However, I want to briefly discuss one dimension of 
this topic, namely the appropriateness of anger in cases of racist misperception.  
In many discussions of the reactive attitudes, blame and anger are taken to be related to each 
other. That is, the attitudinal component of blame is a righteous anger, and appropriate anger is 
always an expression of blame. If I blame you for breaking a promise, then my reaction will likely be 
one of anger. Furthermore, this anger is completely justified so long as you really did fail to keep 
your promise. But due to this relationship between blame and anger, one might think that if it is 
unfitting to blame someone for misperceiving you, it is also unfitting to be angry at them, except 
perhaps in cases of loving, interpersonal relationships where proper perception is expected. One 
may suggest that is why people of color’s anger is often rejected as being unfitting or irrational, 
because it is unfitting due to the relationship between moral perception and moral responsibility. 





conclusion is worrisome. As has been explored in both the feminist philosophy literature and 
philosophy of race literature, someone failing to give uptake to marginalized people’s anger is itself a 
sign of oppression.139 It is likely the case that the rejection of people of color’s anger is a 
manifestation of perceiving through the racial veil. That the very way we perceive people of color 
makes their anger unintelligible to us. This creates a tension in my arguments: on one hand I want to 
understand the way we misperceive people of color that can accommodate concerns like the failed 
uptake of their anger, while on the other I argue that such misperception is not something for which 
one can be blameworthy. In order to relieve this tension, I think that anger at racist misperception 
requires discussion here.  
In the case of racist perception, I believe people of color are warranted in having a specific 
kind of anger, a kind of angry resentment that does not function like blame. Most discussions of 
resentment in philosophy take resentment to be a kind of blame. But, as Ulrika Carlsson points out, 
resentment may merely be a reaction to not being recognized as one wishes to be, or to not 
receiving a certain level of attention.140 One may not be blaming the other in this case. One may be 
angry and frustrated that the recognition one wants is not being fulfilled even if one fully 
acknowledges that recognition was not obligatory. Being misperceived is a way one can be denied a 
certain kind of recognition and can be the basis of such resentment. Given the way perceiving 
through the racial veil harms people of color, such resentment may come in two different forms 
based on the object of the attitude.  
 
139 See, Audre Lorde’s “The Uses of Anger”, Marilyn Frye’s “A Note On Anger” in The Politics of Reality, Maria Lugones’ 
“Hard-To-Handle Anger” in Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, to start.  
140 This conception of resentment is defended by Ulrika Carlsson in “Tragedy and Resentment”. My aim here is to alter 





To illustrate these different forms, let us return to the professor who is mistaken as a janitor. 
The professor may feel resentment at the perceiver that makes the mistake. If the perceiver, for 
example, asks the professor to replace the toilet paper in the restroom, then the professor may be 
angry at this person for the misperception. The perceiver in this case is the object of the professor’s 
anger and resentment. It is this specific instance of misperception that has brought about the 
reactive attitude. However, this is probably not the only time the professor is misperceived due to 
their race. The fact that they are being constantly misperceived might bring about a more significant 
form of anger and resentment.  
The professor may feel resentment at the society that constantly misperceives them.141 At any 
given instance of being misperceived, the professor may realize (or remember) that they live in a 
society that is systematically misperceiving them. That they, as opposed to their white colleagues 
perhaps, must keep dealing with this barrier may create a kind of resentment or anger at society in 
general or their place in society as someone marginalized. In this case, no individual person who 
misperceives them is the object, but the anger is in response to the systematic ways in which they are 
being misperceived.142 Such anger, when expressed in public, can bear witness to the systematic 
injustice that people of color face.143 It is through bearing witness that expressions of such 
resentment and anger can serve as a form of communicating to more racially privileged people that 
they are misperceiving and ought to take responsibility for it.144 
 
141 This is a form of what María Lugones calls “hard-to-handle” or second-order anger. See “Hard-To-Handle Anger” in 
Lugones’ Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes.  
142 Just as Lugones recognizes, one may not recognize that one’s anger is about their systematic disvaluing. Such anger 
can often be disorienting and “hard-to-handle” until one realizes why one is angry.  
143 The way “negative attitudes” like anger can bear witness to oppression has been discussed in feminist moral psychology. 
See, Macalester Bell, “A Woman’s Scorn.” 
144 Understanding this anger as a kind of resentment (whether directed at an individual or society at large) sheds some 
light on the inappropriateness of whites being angry about these occurrences on behalf of people of color—what is often 





That this kind of anger in the face of being misperceived is a form of non-blaming 
resentment resolves the tension I spoke of earlier. It is not the case that people of color’s anger is a 
sign of them blaming someone for misperceiving, which I have argued throughout this chapter is 
not something one deserves. Instead, people of color’s anger is a form of resentment at being 
misperceived, which is fitting and can play an important role in making one recognize how one may 
































light on the idea that this particular anger at being misperceived is “not their anger” (as in, not whites’ anger), since 
resentment has to do with a person of colors’ direct experience of being misperceived. A full explanation of the 
relationship between resentment at being misperceived and appropriated anger deserves much more attention, but lies 









CHAPTER FOUR: PIERCING THE VEIL 
 
I know the walls, they can listen, I wish they could talk back 
-Kendrick Lamar, PRIDE. 
 At this point, I have articulated a problem, that of perceiving through the racial veil. We 
have internalized a conception of race that perpetuates harm to people of color through our 
perceiving people of color via stereotypes and misvaluing. This unreflective salience of race in our 
perception, this prominence without recognition, contributes to racial oppression. It reveals 
something racist in us, something that we have hitherto not recognized. The question is, “What can 
we do about it?” How can we perceive people of color in a more just and loving way?  
 There is one common, though mistaken, answer that what we need to do is simply ignore 
race or regard race as irrelevant. If what is causing racist perception is the salience of race in that 
perception, then we should remove that factor. Once it is gone, we can perceive people of color 
properly.  What one must do then, is to simply, “no longer see race.” I hope my arguments in 
previous chapters show that such removal is not a feasible response. We are so deeply socialized to 
perceive the world through a racial veil and to behave in ways that reflect that, that one’s reflectively 
endorsed values of racial egalitarianism cannot override it. In addition, as has been noted by others 
about such “color-blind” approaches, this response is also not desirable. Ignoring race entirely will 
not move us toward racial egalitarianism because throwing race out of view will also throw the 
history of racial oppression out of view.145 The problem, then, is not that race is salient, but that it is 
unreflectively so, that the prominence of race is coupled with a lack of recognition or understanding. 
 
145 I take it that Charles Mills’ arguments in The Racial Contract and subsequent criticisms of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice are 





The attempted removal of race from attention will simply reinforce our failure to recognize the way 
race affects what we perceive and how we perceive it. Instead of ignoring race, we must be attentive 
to it.  
 To some, the idea of being attentive to race may seem odd. Race, in its dominant 
conception, has traditionally oppressed people of color, not aided them. But this dominant 
conception of race maintains itself through people’s unreflectively accepting it, by not questioning 
the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs that one has internalized. One may say that 
those who are racially privileged are recognizing race from the outside in. They are letting the 
dominant conception of race construct their narratives around people of color. Given this context, 
suggesting that we must be more attentive to race can be dangerous. It runs the risk of reifying those 
harmful conceptions of race we already carry around with us. Our attention to race then must avoid 
this pitfall. We must be attentive to how race oppresses and have that inform our understanding of 
others. In effect, one must see from the inside out, from the perspective of those who are affected 
by the way race shapes the world they live in. In effect, we cannot answer the question, “How can we 
perceive people of color in a more just and loving way?” without also answering the question, “How 
should we attend to race?” These are two separate but interconnected questions. A complete answer 
to the former requires answering the latter.   
 In this chapter, I argue that the key to correcting and improving our perception of people of 
color is to be attentive to the role race plays in their life. Loving attention, as articulated in the first 
chapter, provides us with a way of separating our self from our perceptions, and this particular 
distancing is also required in attending to race. This distancing is done against a background of racial 
knowledge, so that we do not pull from the same dominant stereotypes and scripts we have in the 





better by allowing us to imagine what it is like to be a person of color in a racist society. This act of 
imagining is one way we can improve our perception of people of color.  
First, I briefly look at the relationship between the two questions. “How can we perceive 
people of color in a more just and loving way?” and, “How should we attend to race?” and their 
relation to the ideal of perceiving in a just and loving manner. Second, I argue that to be more 
attentive to race without reifying dominant racial stereotypes and beliefs involves (1) a detailed and 
justice-oriented attention to race and (2) a loving attitude that creates the vulnerability necessary to 
attend to race well. And third, I explore how this attention to race helps us perceive people of color 
in a more just and loving way by giving us the proper context to imagine what it is like to be a 
person of color.  
1. Race and the Idea of Perfection 
 A central motivating thought behind this project is that we can perceive people in morally 
problematic ways, in ways that are distorted, unloving, unjust, and inaccurate. To perceive people in 
morally good ways, we must try to remove the distortions, and to be loving, just, and accurate in our 
attention to others. We must try to perceive them wholly and clearly, without influence from our 
self-preoccupied cares and concerns or from the racist ideology that we have internalized. But a 
perfectly just and loving perception is impossible. A perfect perception without any influence from 
our self or racist ideology is an ideal—not one that can be reached but one we aim for, that guides 
our attempts at bettering ourselves.146  
 In working toward this ideal, the context of our personal relationship to the object of 
perception obviously matters. While all people deserve to be attended to in a just and loving way 
that recognizes all their qualities in detail, not every person needs to attend to every other in this 
 





detailed way. It is likely that few people in our life, specifically those who are most important to us, 
will receive this level of attention. It is the kind of attention that supports those most meaningful 
relationships like the ones someone has with siblings, parents, children, best friends, or romantic 
partners. The people we work with will garner a less extensive attention, with less emotional 
investment, than our loved ones, while still deserving a significant amount of attention and care due 
to their steadiness in your life and regular interaction or responsibility for one another. These kinds 
of relationships are markedly different from our relationship with the man who bags our groceries, 
or the woman who fixes our car. Such strangers deserve to be perceived justly, but we are not 
required to give them the degree of attention that we give our friends and colleagues. A just and 
loving attention to strangers does not require a complete understanding of who they are, but a 
recognition of their personhood and individuality. The loving quality of attention to such strangers 
may be more accurately characterized as attending with good will or a benevolent attitude. There is a 
difference, then, between the quality of attention (whether it is just or unjust. loving or unloving), 
and the level or extensiveness of the attention one gives. Someone can attend in a just and loving way 
while still not attending closely, and it is this kind of attention that most people should receive from 
them.  
The level of detail by which we attend to others will vary no matter a person’s race. But just 
as one’s relationship, or rather lack of relationship, with you does not give you an excuse to be self-
preoccupied, it does not give you an excuse to be racist either. While most people we engage with 
will be perceived with a relatively low level of attention, they still deserve to be perceived in a non-
distorted way where the perceiver can help it. In most cases what needs to be altered, then, is not the 
level or degree of attention, but the quality of attention. What makes perceiving through the racial 
veil morally problematic is the way in which it alters the quality of our perception, it makes it unjust 





friends, or even our coworkers and colleagues, but strangers. Altering the quality of one’s attention, 
then will be the aim of perceiving in a more virtuous manner.  
That is not to assume that most people have no loved ones who are people of color. Such 
people, due to the intimacy of your relationship with them, will not only receive a more extensive, 
detailed attention, but likely a better quality of attention as well due to the loving nature of your 
relationship. In such cases, one’s perception may not be distorted by one’s self-preoccupation but 
may still be distorted by one’s race. In effect, you may still know and attend to this person fairly well 
despite racial distortions. People of color are, after all, more than their experiences of racism. They 
are full people with complex lives and values. In lovingly attending to them we aim to understand 
them as complete persons. Despite people of color’s lives being shot through with oppression, we 
can often have an adequate loving attention toward them while still missing these details.  
Imagine that your best friend is a Black woman who is incredibly calm, caring, and slow to 
anger. You know these details about her because you have grown up with her. You have had fights 
with her, consoled her when her exes have dumped her, and were there for her when she was upset. 
You would never perceive her as an “angry black woman,” as the trope goes, because your 
understanding of her is too clear and specific to ever be captured by such a stereotype. However, 
your ability to perceive her, unaffected in this respect by the racial veil, is a consequence not of your 
attention to race, but of your attention to her. You may still perceive other Black women with this 
trope, despite your relationship with your friend. That this can occur is why we are justified in being 
skeptical of the person who claims they cannot be racist because their best friend, or spouse, or child 
is Black/Brown. Even if the person is not mistaken about the quality of their relationship with the 
friend, spouse, or child for example, (though they can be), it does not guarantee an escape from 
racist perceiving in general. It is also possible that even though your knowledge of her emotional life 





some other way. We can never perceive someone in a complete and whole fashion, and the 
distortions from the racial veil are just one of the barriers to said perception.  
Attending to race, most of the time, is needed to perceive people of color in a more just and 
loving way. There are some exceptions to this claim. As with the example above, an individual 
person of color may be perceived with loving attention despite the perceiver not being attentive to 
race. However, this is not the situation we are in with most people of color. Attending to race will 
almost always be important when perceiving those who are not close to us. The Chicano who bags 
our groceries, or the Latina who fixes our car deserve care, and while it is not required that we give 
them the focused, detailed attention that our loved ones deserve, they do deserve to be seen for 
more than the color of their skin. Developing an attention to race to subvert one’s racist perceptions 
cultivates a kind of perception that aids in perceiving others, especially those who do not receive the 
kind of attention that our loved ones do. Our loved ones who are people of color benefit too from 
being more attentive to race. Cultivating such awareness can do nothing but strengthen the bonds 
between us. Attending to race, then, is incredibly important for improving our perception of people 
of color. This kind of attention to race involves two, related, aspects. First, one must know about 
race. Such knowledge must be fairly detailed and justice-oriented. Second, one must attend with a 
loving attitude. Given our self-preoccupied anxieties about race, one must not only be open to 
intellectually understanding race, but emotionally and empathetically understanding race.  This 
requires a kind of vulnerability associated with love. When one has this kind of attention to race aids 
one’s just and loving attention to people of color. 
2. Being Attentive to Race 
The racial veil, unlike the self-preoccupied veil, does not originate in us, but is internalized by 
us. It is a consequence of the internalization of the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs 





desirable in any case to ignore the importance of race in people’s experience and psychology, these 
elements must be replaced to perceive people of color in a more just and loving way. As I argued in 
an earlier chapter, lovingly attending to people involves perceiving the person on their own terms, 
understanding them in the context of their own cares, concerns, needs, and desires. One must 
remove and replace one’s own cares, concerns, needs, and desires, in order to perceive the other.  
Similarly, in attempting to remove the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs 
about race, one must have something to replace these pieces of misinformation with. Being attentive 
to race then involves having some knowledge about race that is not rooted in the dominate stories 
about race but in racial history and sociology which can serve as our guides in attending to race in 
our daily lives. In this way, being attentive to race involves a fairly detailed attention to issues of race 
and racism and a just attention that recognizes the moral dimensions of race and racism. While we 
may not need to give a significant amount of attention to each individual person of color, we do 
need to attend significantly to race and the varieties of ways it affects people. Attention to race 
should be extensive, careful, and detailed. Merely attending in a detailed way will not pierce the veil, 
however. In addition to this level of attention, it must be just—such perception must not only be 
epistemically accurate but morally accurate. An extensive and just attention to race gives us the 
information we need to remove the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs about race and 
replace them with relevant knowledge.  
As with attending to individuals, one can attend to race more or less extensively and 
carefully. When someone attends more extensively (and carefully), they look more closely, see more 
details, and are more aware of the complexity that the object presents them with. The level at which 
the racially privileged often attend, or more accurately, recognize race is minimal. For example, many 
well-intentioned whites are aware that racial oppression results in some benefiting from the loss of 





the phenomena of racism and another to understand the role race itself plays in everyday life. It is in 
part due to this minimal recognition that perceiving through the racial veil occurs without most 
people realizing that it distorts their perception of others.147 Even those who recognize the existence 
of racism may not be attending closely enough. We can easily imagine a person who recognizes 
racism as a moral wrong, who is fully supportive of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “dream” (in hindsight) 
and takes themselves to be extremely concerned about the “resurgence” of the KKK and neo-Nazis 
in the United States. However, their disavowal of racism is so abstract that they may not believe that 
(much less see how) racism currently pervades society. They may think that the election of President 
Obama marked a significant step forward, and while there are still a loud, hateful few, for the most 
part things are better. Such a person would be highly inattentive to race as it is in our current society. 
Furthermore, we can imagine another person who is a little more attentive to race, who even brands 
themselves an anti-racist. They may think it important to “check their privilege” or uncover their 
implicit bias. Such a person may not be doing much better. The issue ultimately with either of these 
ways of engaging with race is with the level of abstraction involved. One recognizes general claims, 
whether moral, historical, or sociological, without recognizing how this relates to the lived 
experience of people of color, or to their own lives. To attend to race is to not only recognize and 
regret that racism exists, but to see how race, as it is dominantly constructed, oppresses people of 
color. It requires attending to concrete, material differences in the lives of people of color on one 
hand, and the racially privileged on the other. A serious attention to race recognizes more than 
abstract claims about the immorality or history of racism; rather, it requires understanding, to some 
extent, the mechanisms that perpetuate racism and the relation between whiteness (the construction 
 
147 As noted in a previous chapter, Sarah Hoagland argues, many whites are “enormously unself-conscious about 
whiteness as a cultural and political phenomenon much as the middle class seems enormously unself-conscious 
about middle classness.” “Denying Relationality”, p. 99 in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. As will become 





of whiteness as the default, good, or pure existence) on one hand and racial oppression on the 
other.148  
In addition to attending to the details, one must attend to the details in the right way.  The 
right sort of attention to race is not just about epistemic accuracy, but moral accuracy. For example, 
one can recognize that imprisoned populations are disproportionally made up of Black and Latinx 
people. However, one can recognize this in two different ways. One may perceive it as merely 
evidence that for whatever reason, Blacks and Latinx individuals commit more and harsher crimes. 
Alternatively, one may perceive it as evidence of an injustice: disproportionate prison populations 
reflect a system of laws and policing that target (whether intentionally or not) people of color.149 A 
person who has a just attention to race is not always the person who perceives different things but 
perceives the same things differently.150 Having a just attention to race involves not only recognizing 
certain instances of racial disparity, but recognizes or at least considers that racial disparity as 
evidence of racial injustice. Perceiving something as racial injustice involves recognizing how things 
could be different. The person who recognizes that imprisoned populations are disproportionally 
made up of Black and Latinx people as a mere result of people of color committing more and 
harsher crimes in some sense takes this as a politically inescapable fact. For whatever reason, such 
individuals commit more and harsher crimes, and a change in racial disparity with regards to prison 
 
148 This reflects Murdoch’s arguments that recognition of the good involves increased attention to detail. She writes, 
“False conceptions [of the Good] are often generalized, stereotyped and unconnected. True conceptions combine just 
modes of judgment and ability to connect with an increased perception of detail.” The Sovereignty of Good, p. 93. 
149 See, Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, for her argument on how the United States’ system of laws and policing 
are intentionally designed to disenfranchise people of color. Even if one rejects her evidence, though, I believe one can 
think the system was not designed intentionally but still find the function of it in the United States as an instance of 
injustice.  
150 This point is influenced by a similar point from Sandra Bartky on feminist consciousness. She writes, “Women 
workers who are not feminists know that they receive unequal pay for equal work, but they may think that the 
arrangement is just; the feminist sees this situation as an instance of exploitation and an occasion for struggle. Feminists 
are no more aware of different things than other people; they are aware of the same things differently.” p. 14 in 





populations will be for people of color to solve and can only change with different behavior on their 
part. It is inescapable insofar as it is not something a society can change through political measures 
but only those individuals committing the crimes can change. However, perceiving racial disparity 
with regards to prison populations as unjust recognizes that there is something political that can be 
done (e.g., removing mandatory minimums, redistributing resources, decriminalizing drugs, and so 
on). In this way, perceiving justly involves perceiving the current state of affairs against a more 
idealized society without those injustices. It recognizes an ability for growth and change that is not 
recognized from the perspective which perceives that this is simply how things are.151  
We may imagine a person who, in order to attend in these ways, begins to try and educate 
themself. Such a person may attend an anti-racism workshop, or begin reading books aimed at 
giving white people, or people more generally, an understanding of racism’s history in the United 
States, or whatever country they are a citizen of. Such activities would surely aid in one’s ability to 
understand racism and the role race plays in its perpetuation (assuming that the workshop and the 
books are good), though they may not be wholly necessary. Perhaps one may just recognize the 
difference in treatment through listening to experience from friends of color, regular engagement 
with current events, or engaging with political art like books, movies, music, or memoirs. There is 
not one, single way to learn about race that promotes a detailed and just attention to it. Just as none 
of these actions are necessary, none of them are sufficient on their own to fully attend to race. One 
may know someone who has engaged in an anti-racism reading group and yet who still fails to “get 
 
151 Perceiving in this way tracks Sandra Bartky’s explanation of feminist consciousness as requires a genuine possibility 





it.” Their attention is detailed and just, but it is still not the right sort of attention necessary to pierce 
the veil.152  
One must perceive in detail, and must perceive justly, but there one can still fail to properly 
attend to people of collect if they have a purely intellectual understanding of race. It is perhaps not 
surprising then that many well-intentioned whites, even those who read the latest anti-racism books 
by Black authors or go see “Black movies,” fail to get it. That is, they fail to pierce the veil. Often, 
the reason why many people fail to attend properly, despite such efforts to educate themselves, is 
because their understanding is purely intellectual: all about abstract theories of oppression and 
injustice. Attending to race requires something more, it requires a more empathetic and emotional 
perspective on issues of race. How race affects the actual lives of people of color. Unfortunately, 
there is an obstacle that one hits when transitioning from an intellectual understanding of race to a 
more emotional and empathetic understanding of race: self-preoccupied racial anxieties. To pierce 
the racial veil, one must overcome these anxieties, which requires a loving attitude. 
 A racial anxiety gets in the way of many whites attending to race in this emotional and 
empathetic way because in order to attend in this way requires recognizing that one has previously 
failed to extend empathy to people of color. What is at stake with the loving quality of attention here 
is that there is a kind of benevolence that someone has hitherto thought they were extending 
universally, only to realize (or be told) that it was not being extended to people of color. As I argued 
in “The Racial Veil” one way our perception of people of color is by misvaluing them, which can 
include a moral misvaluing. If you do not perceive a person of color as warranting the same moral 
care and concern as white people, then you are failing to extend benevolence to them. In attempting 
to learn how to extend this benevolence, to attend in an empathetic and emotional way, one might 
 
152 This is reminiscent of Marianna Ortega’s arguments in “Loving, Knowing Ignorance” that at times one can be aware 





be forced to confront their own role and complicity in racial oppression, leading to racial anxiety. 
Philosophers and sociologists have proposed several ways of understanding this racial anxiety and 
what whites must do to overcome it.153 The general insights from these approaches to racial anxiety 
fits in the picture I have been articulating in this dissertation when we recognize that the racial veil is 
not some separate lens that overlies our self-preoccupied veil, but that, for whites in a racist society, 
these two sets of distortions are enmeshed.  
Let us return to Murdoch’s statement of what I have been calling the self-preoccupied veil. 
Murdoch’s moral psychology is based around us being “historically determined individuals” whose 
psyche is “predisposed to certain patterns of activity” for the sake of protecting our selves from 
facing “unpleasant realities.”154 So, when we perceive the world around us, we are not perceiving the 
world as it is, but perceiving through “a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to protect 
the psyche from pain.”155 Such perception is anxious, constantly seeking consolation, and is in this 
way self-preoccupied and often falsifying.156 Depending on who you are there may be a number of 
anxieties that flood your psyche, and create this “self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil.”157  
For whites, and other people of significant racial privilege, one “historically determined” 
anxiety will be one’s place in a racist society. As James Baldwin notes, “a vast amount of the energy 
that goes into what we call the Negro problem is produced by the white man’s profound desire not 
to be judged by those who are not white, not to be seen as he is.”158 This anxiety though is paired 
 
153 See, Godsil’s and Richardson’s “Racial Anxiety” and Robin DeAngelo’s White Fragility. 
154 “The sovereignty of good over other concepts”, p. 76-77 
155 “The sovereignty of good over other concepts”, p. 76-77 
156 “The sovereignty of good over other concepts”, p. 82 
157 “The sovereignty of good over other concepts”, p. 82 





with a kind of moral anguish. As Baldwin continues, “…and at the same time a vast amount of the 
white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is.”159 I call this 
moral anguish because a relevant dimension of this tension is based in the harm privilege does to 
one’s moral character.160 The patterns of activity our psyches lead us to engage in this case separate 
our self from other whites. This can be seen especially in the United States with northern, wealthier 
whites blaming racism on poor, “white trash.”161 Despite these attempts to “protect” themselves 
from criticism, to not be judged by people of color, as Baldwin states, whites also have a profound 
need to reckon with their damaged character. I take it that in most cases people want to be better, 
they do not want to be perceiving in racist ways, but they are also afraid to be recognized as racists 
or as complicit in racial oppression.  
Racial anxiety plays a significant role in inhibiting whites from attending to race. Attending 
to race requires one to attend in an emotional and empathetic way. But in attempting to cultivate 
these attitudes one is forced to confront their whiteness. What kind of power do they have? What 
opportunities do they block? How do they move about the world due to their own race? Answering 
these questions is difficult, but for the racially anxious, they become part of the process of 
developing a just and loving attention to race. They are also non-coincidentally the kinds of 
questions at the root of many moral criticisms a white person may receive from people of color. 
Such anxiety then inhibits attention to race because of one’s anxiety about confronting these difficult 
questions and criticisms. 
 
159 Baldwin, Collected Essays, p. 341. 
160 The tension Baldwin is articulating involves more than just this moral anguish, but for the moment I want to focus 
on the moral dimension. I will return, albeit briefly, to the other sources of tension in concluding my dissertation. 





The result of this anxiety is the kind of defensiveness we often see in the way people react to 
moral criticisms about racism. Self-preoccupation often inhibits one’s ability to recognize problems 
in oneself. As argued previously, self-preoccupation often gets in the way of attending justly to 
individuals, or in this case of attending to race more closely, because one thinks one’s perception 
and understanding of race is fine already. If someone then criticizes you for saying or acting in a way 
that is racist, you may immediately withdraw and defend yourself: I’m not racist, though. We can 
easily imagine such a person thinking, “many others probably need to attend to race more closely, 
but I already attend enough.”  
Self-preoccupation plays a significant role in inhibiting the kind of reflection necessary to 
properly attend to race. Just as it gets in the way of attending to others in other circumstances, self-
preoccupation keeps us focused on our own cares, concerns, needs, and desires, which can distort 
our perception of the world. When a person’s anxiety causes them to turn so inward that they 
believe something like, “many others probably need to attend to race more closely, but I already 
attend enough,” there is little one can do. Like the hardened husband, from Bernard William’s 
example, there is nothing you can say or do to get him to stop being mean to his wife. It requires 
something internal to the agent, a change of attention to get them to recognize the value that lies 
outside their own cares, concerns, needs, and desires. There is not, then, a practical upshot here 
about how to get people to care about attending to people of color better. To paraphrase Marilyn 
Frye, there are complexes of will that keep one from being persuaded.162  
What can be discussed is how attending in an emotional and empathetic way involves 
moving beyond one’s anxieties. That is we can provide an answer to the questions: “what does it 
look like when someone is attending correctly, and how is that different from when one gets bogged 
 





down in racial anxiety?” I have previously argued that a just and loving attention to others involves 
setting aside our own cares, concerns, needs and desires, to be more attentive to the cares, concerns, 
needs and desires of others. When one attends to something outside of oneself this can lead to 
recognizing what matters beyond one’s own concerns, to values beyond one’s own, and needs 
beyond one’s own needs.163 This redirection of attention requires a loving attitude to create the kind 
of vulnerability necessary to move beyond racial anxiety. 
Having a loving attitude does not involve loving race nor does it involve loving literally every 
person of color. In the case of those closest to us, we do love the object, but in the case of attending 
to strangers, the loving quality of attention may be more accurately described as benevolence. Just as 
the loving quality of attention to strangers is not about loving the stranger, so is this loving attitude 
not about loving race or every person of color, but instead involves having a loving attitude by 
extending the benevolence we may already give to white strangers.164  
What role does this loving quality play in overcoming or avoiding racial anxiety? Here, it may 
be useful to return to Marilyn Frye’s concept of the loving eye. Frye states that, “the loving eye knows 
the independence of the other… it is the eye of one who knows that to know the seen, one must 
consult something other than one’s own will and interests and fears and imagination.”165 Love has a 
way of making us vulnerable and open to accepting others. It involves putting aside our own cares, 
concerns, including our fears and imagination. The importance of the loving quality of attention is in 
its ability to create distance from our self and consult something else other than what concerns us. 
 
163 See Murdoch’s discussion of what she terms “unselfing” in The Sovereignty of Good, p. 82-91.  
164 This notion of a loving attitude that I am developing here is inspired by James Baldwin. In The Fire Next Time Baldwin 
remarks that he believes love ought to be “desperately sought,” but that his use of the word ‘love’ is not meant in the 
merely “personal sense but as a state of being, or a state of grace—not the infantile American sense of being made 
happy but in the tough and universal sense of quest and daring and growth.” See, Collected Essays, p. 341. 





Even in cases where the object of our attention can properly be called “our beloved,” love plays this 
role (or, perhaps, especially in these cases). A person’s family, spouse, partners, or closest friends are 
properly called a person’s “loved ones” because of the intense love that is shared between them, but 
even in these cases the moral importance of being attentive to another is not because of the bonds 
love creates—the way it grounds us to the world—but because of love’s ability to bring us outside 
of our self, and the necessity of that act for those close relationships. Similarly, when attending to 
race one needs to set aside one’s own cares and concerns in this way. White racial anxiety is rooted 
in the self; the person who lovingly attends can, in Frye’s words, “consult something other than 
one’s own will and interests and fears and imagination.”166 
So, while this loving quality is a kind of benevolent attitude toward humanity, extended to 
people of color, it also involves a love for oneself. This benevolent attitude involves a love and care 
for oneself in addition to loving others insofar as it needs to create the space for one to be 
vulnerable about their own place in racial systems. 167 The kind of attention to race necessary for 
piercing the racial veil is one that allows the perceiver to be vulnerable to the role of race in one’s 
own life. This kind of vulnerability is rooted in a kind of love for oneself and others. There is a 
certain intellectual distance one can have when attending to race, whether it is by excusing oneself as 
a “good white person” or by merely being ignorant that the harms directly relate to one’s privileges, 
that privilege inhibits one from fully “getting it” as it were. When one only intellectually recognizes 
racial oppression, then they are not fully engaging with what is at stake. There is something 
 
166 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality¸ p. 75. 
167 This relates to a point made by James Baldwin in The Fire Next Time. Baldwin writes that “white people in this country 
will have quite enough to do in learning how to accept and love themselves and each other, and when they have 
achieved this—which will not be tomorrow and may very well be never—the Negro problem will no longer exist, for it 
will no longer be needed.” Collected Essays, p. 299-300. Baldwin’s statement here connects the role of love much deeper 
to the solution of racial oppression than I intend to fully explore here, but it does attest to the fact that the kind of love 





important missing. However, when one does attend in an emotional and empathetic way, one gets 
the kind of understanding necessary for piercing the racial veil. Love allows people to be open to 
others as they are, in all their imperfections. Such a loving attitude then aids in one’s attention to 
race because it creates the space necessary for one to be vulnerable, avoiding or overcoming the 
racial anxieties that get in the way of one’s perception. 
3. Imagining What it is Like 
I began this chapter articulating the relationship between the questions “How can we 
perceive people of color in a more just and loving way?” and, “How should we attend to race?” At 
this point it may be unclear how having a detailed, just, and personal understanding of race can help 
us perceive people of color in a more just and loving way. The knowledge gained from attending to 
race helps us replace the dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs we may have about race, 
but perceiving a person in a just and loving way involves perceiving someone on their own terms, setting 
aside your own cares and concerns so you can recognize the other’s cares and concerns, needs and 
desires. As stated in the last section, the self-preoccupied veil and the racial veil are intermeshed. 
While attention to race is important for overturning parts of our distortions, these distortive features 
are enmeshed with our own cares, concerns, needs, and desires. Knowledge gained from attending 
to race helps in replacing some of the distortions, but it does not fully remove the complex of 
distortions of racial ideology and our own self-preoccupation. It is, for example, easy to imagine 
someone who “gets it” but still routinely fails to perceive people of color properly because while 
they may have a thorough attention to race, this does not mean it is always used when attending to 
others. There is a difference between having an empathetic attitude and actually empathizing. 
Something else is needed for one’s attention to race to inform one’s attention to people of color. At 
least one way to bridge this gap between attention to race and attention to individuals is via the act 





Specifically, many whites and other racially privileged people must imagine what it is like to be 
a person of color in a racist society.168 When one imagines what it is like to be a person of color, they 
are engaging in a kind of moral activity that brings them closer to the harms experienced by people 
of color due to their race. In effect, one is moving outside of one’s experiences and perspective on 
race. Perceiving through the racial veil is like recognizing race from the outside in. One is letting the 
dominant conception of race construct their narratives around people of color. Attending to 
individuals from this perspective can often fail to be just and loving. Instead, one must be attentive 
to how race oppresses and have that inform our understanding of others. In effect, one must see 
from the inside out, from the perspective of those who are affected by the way race shapes the 
world they live in. 
This notion of imagining what it’s like to be a person of color is importantly connected to 
María Lugones’ idea of “world”-traveling.169 Lugones developed the idea of “world”-traveling as an 
extension of Marilyn Frye’s loving eye for the purpose of creating feminist solidarity across racial 
difference.170 She argued that women of color regularly had to travel to the white/Anglo “worlds” of 
white women in order to survive, and that if there was going to be a multicultural feminist coalition, 
white women would have to learn to travel to the “worlds” of women of color.171 One gloss on this 
idea is that white women would need to imagine what it was like for women of color to move about 
the world with a different, racialized history, context, and culture. Importantly, this act of “world”-
 
168 Chris Lebron argues for the important of imagining what it is like to be a person of color in “Equality from a Human 
Point of View” and “Thoughts on Racial Democratic Education and Moral Virtue.” I do not believe I am making any 
significant alterations of his view so much as contextualizing this practice in a larger framework.  
169 Elizabeth Spelman has made the connection between imagining and “world”-travelling in the chapter “Now you see 
her, now you don’t” from Inessential Woman, p. 160-187. 
170 Frye’s idea of a Loving Eye, as I have previously noted, fits nicely with Murdoch’s idea of a just and loving attention.  





traveling for Lugones is necessary to have loving perception of others, particularly of women of 
color, because it helps provide the content for understanding women of color’s lives without losing 
track of one’s own self. Similarly, the kind of imagining what it is like to be Black or Brown may be 
necessary, or at least useful, for having a just and loving attention to all people of color.  
Here, one may be worried that such imagining would not get one very far away from the 
dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs of the racial veil. In context, the dominant 
conception of race may simply paint what they think people of color’s life is like, leading to an 
inaccurate image and reinforcing one’s harmful way of perceiving. In this case, one is still being self-
preoccupied, and not attending properly. Philosophers like Marianna Ortega and Shannon Sullivan 
have raised this concern about suggesting whites engaging in “world”-traveling to “worlds of 
color.”172 This is a significant concert, as racially privileged people do this all the time. However, this 
is where one’s attention to race aids in imagining what it is like. 
There are two attributes to such imagining that I find important which should put such 
concerns at ease, and in doing so make this notion of imagining clear. First, attending to race 
properly involves an extensive, detailed, and moral understanding of race. It is in this context of 
having more general knowledge about racism that one can then move into the act of imagining. 
Second, the act of imagining is involves recognizing one’s own position vis a vis race. While setting 
aside those cares and concerns that are related to the self, the good imaginer does not forget who 
they are or where they are coming from. Imagining then always takes place in a context that involves 
racial knowledge and one’s own position, and when it takes place in the proper context, it can aid in 
having a just and loving attention to people of color. 
 





The first attribute of the proper context is when one imagines while having an extensive, 
detailed, and moral understanding of race. Consider a person who has not attended to race in this 
way but tries to engage in the act of imagining. Perhaps what they try to imagine is what it is like to 
be a person of color who is pulled over by a cop. Now, they may know people of color 
disproportionately make up prison populations, but not recognize what is unjust about that. So, they 
may then imagine that if they do the right things or behave in the right way, then the cop should not 
be a threat to them. They may even imagine that the interaction is uncomfortable (perhaps the cop 
of their imagination is personally racist and therefore suspicious of them), but also believe they will 
easily make it out of the interaction unscathed given their proper behavior. Such imagining, 
however, would be a white fantasy. Not every interaction a person of color has with a cop will result 
in physical harm, but the looming possibility of it and how that results in not only being 
uncomfortable but in heightened feelings of danger, fear, and uncertainty do not enter the white 
person’s fantasy. Neither do the feelings of being shrunk or perceived as inferior that also often 
accompany such interactions.  
The person who instead imagines in the context of a more detailed and just attention to race, 
while not perhaps fully capturing these feelings, will be close enough to have the act of imagining aid 
in one’s attention to people of color in this situation. The proper context helps the person recognize 
the social and political mechanisms in place that make interactions with cops dangerous, and in 
imagining what it is like they might ask themself, “how would I feel if I could not be certain I would 
leave this interaction alive?”, a thought that would not normally occur to a white person when 
interacting with the police. In doing this, the white person is bringing before their imagination an 
experience not like one they would normally have. In this sense, they are moving outside of their 





pose a danger to their very existence. This activity of imagining puts them in a better place to attend 
to people of color in these kinds of situations. 
This shift in experience connects to the second attribute of imagining in a context: that they, 
qua imaginer, are engaging in this activity. Consider the case where someone imagines what it is like to 
be a person of color in a particular interaction, and then believes they have knowledge about that 
interaction. Perhaps the white person who imagines what it is like to be pulled over by a cop as a 
person of color, even the one who does it with a proper attention to race, then states later that they 
know what it is like to interact with cops as a person of color. This of course is absurd. Imagination 
alone cannot produce the kind of knowledge that the person is claiming in this case.173 When one 
loses their own perspective when imagining another’s perspective, one may delude oneself into 
thinking one has gained knowledge of some experience. In addition to being epistemically 
problematic, losing track of one’s own perspective makes it harder to bring the imagined perspective 
to bear on one’s own outlook.174 Imagining what it is like to be a person of color is not for the sake 
of imagining, but to be able to attend justly and lovingly to people of color. Someone aids their 
ability to attend to people of color better when they are able to recognize the difference race plays in 
each of their lives. The contrast between the white person’s perspective, for example of feeling safe 
interacting with the police, and the person of color’s perspective, of feeling in danger, uncertain, and 
shrunk, is what creates the opportunity for a just and loving attention in the imaginer. Making this 
contrast is how one personally learns what is at stake in racial oppression. It is in attention to these 
details that one can set aside their own cares and concerns and recognize what is at stake when one 
is a person of color. 
 
173 As Elizabeth Spelman has noted, while arguing for the importance of imagination, “imagining is not knowledge.” 
Inessential Woman, p. 184. 





When I began, I stated that piercing the veil involves removing the dominant stereotypes, 
scripts, affects and beliefs about race when attending to people of color. In attending to race with a 
just and loving attention, one can gain information about race that challenges and replaces the 
dominant stereotypes, scripts, affects, and beliefs about race with more accurate racial information 
that provides the proper context for imagining. The act of imagining is possible because the loving 
attitude one has in understanding race creates the necessary space to imagine in the proper context, 
and ultimately learn from it. And finally, imagining what it is like to be a person of color, allows one 
to perceive people of color in a different way, it allows them to not rely on the complex of dominant 
stereotypes and scripts that are mixed with one’s own fears and anxieties. As I noted before, Marilyn 
Frye teaches us that the person with a loving attitude knows that “one must consult something other 
than one’s own will and interests and fears and imagination.”175 One recognizes that there is 
something else that must be consulted, namely the details one gains when attending to race 
extensively and justly and the information gleaned from imagining.176 In doing this one does not 
completely remove the veil—as all moral improvement is an endless task—but helps us recognize 
the veil and see through the holes in its fabrication toward racial reality.  
With the relationship between attention to race and attending to people in hand, let us return 
to an example from an earlier chapter where you and your friend see a Latinx family walking 
through the park. Ahead of them is a police officer. Your friend points out that once the Latinx 
family notices the officer, they take a path that leads them away from the officer and deeper into the 
park. Your friend then remarks, “Look at those illegals, they are trying to avoid that police officer!” 
 
175 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality¸ p. 75. 
176 This I take it is a central insight of María Lugones, that Frye is not removing oneself entirely from the process of 
loving, but that what one must consult has to be outsides of one’s own will, interests, fears, and imagination, while still 
holding onto their own interests and needs. That is, one must hold onto their identity, but, in her words, travel to the 
“world” of the other for the sake of gaining the information that must be consulted to properly perceive them, 





You are struck by this remark because to you they are simply a Latinx family walking in the park. In 
response, you question your friend, “why do you think they are even immigrants?” Your friend 
responds, “well, why else would people who look like that want to avoid the officer?” Your friend’s 
perception of the Latinx family as “illegals” turns on your friend seeing a brown-skinned family 
(potentially) trying to avoid the officer. Your friend here likely does not have the proper attention to 
race. Perhaps they know Latinx people have more reason to fear police officers but does not 
recognize this as an injustice. In effect, the dominant stereotypes here inform your friend’s 
perception of the family. 
However, your perception is different. You simply see a Latinx family walking in the park. 
Perhaps their change in direction was their planned route the whole time, or perhaps, since they are 
Latinx, they have experienced harassment from police in the past, so they would rather not interact 
with them. This recognition of their being Latinx is markedly different from your friend’s 
recognition. This recognition is rooted in not only an understanding of why a Latinx family may 
want to avoid a police officer, but a moral understanding of how police often harass people of color. 
Furthermore, you may perceive this behavior as understandable or reasonable in this context. Maybe 
your friend suggests that if the Latinx family are not illegals, then they should not have changed their 
path because legal citizens have no reason to avoid cops. But your attention to them may yield a 
different conclusion. Perhaps you have engaged in the kind of imagining discussed above of what it 
is like to be a person of color interacting with the police and how these experiences often involve 
feelings of danger, uncertainty, and being shrunk. Given these experiences it is entirely reasonable to 
avoid interactions with the police, even if it means walking in a different direction than one 
otherwise would. The proper attention to race, here, alters the way you perceive the event and 
creates an opportunity to understand behavior in a way that is not distorted by racial stereotypes and 





Imagining what it is like is important because it presents one with a different set of 
experiences to compare with one’s own, so that one may better attend to people of color. However, 
knowledge about the history or sociology of racism is not the only thing that aids acts of imagining. 
As I have gestured at earlier, racial art can play a pivotal role in our ability to attend in a different 
way and help guide our imagination.  
 The stories and viewpoints expressed in Black, African, Latinx, Native American, and Asian 
literature and movies, as well as in pop music from many of these same traditions, give resources to 
the white imaginer to enter into the worlds of people of color. Artists of color have gifted a 
representation of such worlds to us so that we may understand one another better. Art of this kind 
gives us resources to imagine the lives of one another by showing how actions taken on by white 
people bring about a very different set of consequences for people of color. Certain genres like film 
can create, through the combination of sound and visuals, more extensive experiences of the 
feelings one can have when living in a different body. Furthermore, many stories not only help us 
see how things are but how things could be. Various forms of art can give us perception of ideals 
where things like racism, as we know it, is not present, which can also spark the imagination in 
important ways. In addition to giving us content to fill our imagination with, art can also play an 
important role in helping us attend to things beyond our self. 
 In the first chapter, I explored how watching movies, in particular, can be done with a loving 
attention. Not all movies, or all art, are trying to do the same thing, and in seeing the movie on its 
own terms, we get a better chance of appreciating what it does well. If you go into the latest Marvel 
movie expecting deep reflections on philosophical ideas, you are likely to be disappointed. The same 
is true if you go into an Ingmar Bergman film expecting escapism. What the movie is trying to be 
and do is important for how you see it. I propose that we should see a movie on its own terms to better 





concerns. Murdoch states that attending to beauty in art (or nature) can “clear our minds of selfish 
care.”177 Good art has the ability of taking us out of ourselves and provides us with an object of 
attention which stops us from engaging in our own self-preoccupation. Similarly, I think racial art 
can take us out of our racialized position and perceive the world on another’s terms. Art, then, not 
only aids in providing us with content for our imagining but presents us with important 
opportunities to imagine alongside it. 
4. Conclusion 
 The primary goal of this chapter has been to argue for how we should attend to and perceive 
people of color. That the way race invades and distorts our perception should not lead us to the aim 
of removing race from our perception but to be even more attentive to race. And that the proper 
kind of attention to race supplies us with the information necessary for attending to people of color 
in a more just and loving way. Throughout my discussion of attending to race, and further the 
imagining what it is like to be a person of color, I have focused on the way race causes harm via 
oppression. The focus is on these details because those are the details one often needs to be aware 
of in their own perception. If one is perceiving people of color through racist stereotypes, stories, 
and so on, knowing those stereotypes and stories will be invaluable for overcoming them.  
 There is, however, an important qualification to put on this suggestion. In explaining how 
one should attend to people of color, one is also, to some extent, giving an answer for how to 
overcome racist perception. An answer to the question, “how can people to stop being so racist?” 
But notice this is an empirical question—one that no one really has an answer to. My arguments in 
this chapter should be viewed as a way one may be able to improve one’s perception, given the 
 





previous arguments made in the dissertation, but not taken as the silver bullet for overcoming racial 
bias. 
There are many potential limitations to this way of going about improving one’s perception. 
The biggest concern might be that it is too atomistic—located solely on the individual level. The 
answer I give in this chapter is posed this way, in part, because it is trying to answer the question of 
what an individual can do to improve their attention. However, we may in fact want to deny the 
premise of the question and say there is nothing an individual can do on their own. Instead, one may 
argue that improving a person’s perception can only be done in a community. Where there are 
people from multiple backgrounds to keep others in check and make them notice what they are 
failing to notice. I am sympathetic to this perspective, but still find value in trying to articulate the 
individualistic answer since it might make clear the value of individual effort, even if it does not end 































The aim of this dissertation is to return to questions of the moral psychology of racism, 
originally raised by J.L.A. Garcia, that have been overlooked since the rejection of his view of racism 
as ill-will and moral disregard on the basis of race. Toward this end, I have aimed to explore how 
racism affects our perception of others, instead of presenting a view of what racism is. What I have 
called moral perception builds off a reading of Iris Murdoch’s arguments that our perception of others 
can be morally evaluable. That our perception, when centered around our own self-preoccupations, 
can be morally problematic. Along these lines, we also perceive people of color in a morally 
problematic way due to the distortive nature of race, and the dominant stereotypes, stories, beliefs, 
and affects that race carries with it. Despite the morally problematic nature of perceiving through 
the racial veil, people are not morally responsible for this perception, but are instead put in a 
position to take responsibility for this perception which involves owning said perception and 
resolving to perceive better. Perceiving better involves returning to Murdoch’s idea of a just and 
loving attention, which in the case of racist perceiving involves being more attentive to race and its 
role in our lives.  
 As I stated at the end of the introduction, this work could be seen as an exercise of what 
Lugones called tantear en la oscuridad, the practice of exploring in the dark by using one’s hands to 
tactilely probe and gain first impressions.178 This dissertation then marks my initial exploration of the 
topic and has some obvious limitations. Some of these limitations, I believe are worth noting and 
 





will give me an opportunity to further explain my approach to theorizing about race, without 
neglecting other ways in which people are oppressed.  
 My project is executed at a certain level of abstraction, most notably in chapter three The 
Racial Veil, where I am talking about the character of all racial distortions. I largely organized such 
distortions into two groups—stereotypes and misvaluing—but there may be others, and more 
importantly, how these different distortions manifest will be different due to several factors. First, 
there are more than two races (white and black) and second, that there are other dimensions to one’s 
identity that alters the way stereotypes and misvaluing apply.  
Regarding the first, that there are more than two races, many of my examples have 
attempted to reflect this. That is, I have used many examples with Latinx people, though remarkably 
few with Asian people. My intention in doing this is to focus on the particular harm darker-skinned 
people face. This, of course, does include many South East Asian people (among others), and many 
of what I have argued does apply to them. East Asian people, on the other hand, will still be 
misperceived but in a different way given the different way race has been constructed for them. 
Here, their misperception will likely be focused on the Model Minority Myth: that Asians are in 
some way a “model minority” that other racial minorities should aspire to if they want equality. This 
stereotype often puts extreme pressure on East Asians to uphold the myth or else be looked down 
upon or erased. Furthermore, South East Asians may be hit with both certain kinds of exoticism and 
devaluing given to other darker skinned people and the Model Minority Myth. My approach to 
theorizing about the racial veil has been to leave room for the different ways different races are 
stereotyped and misvalued but note that these things result in distortions of individual people. In 
effect, much of the work in the philosophy of race, critical race theory, and elsewhere done on how 
people of certain races are stereotyped and misvalued could apply to my account as ways people of 





phenomena of stereotyping and misvaluing constitute distortions in people’s perceptions for the 
purpose of revealing how this is morally problematic due to the organization around race. 
I should note that in using Latinx people in my examples I intend that they are not white and 
Latinx. Given the construction of Latinx as an ethno-racial identity, all Latinx people are to some 
extent racialized in the United States, but there may still be people who are clearly both white and 
Latinx, and thus will not experience the same kind of distorted perception.179 It is because of these 
kind of liminal cases where one’s racial identity is not straightforwardly white, but also not 
necessarily a person of color that I have also often used the language of “racially privileged.” 
Furthermore, I believe discussion of privilege should usually be total, that is an individual’s total 
privilege given not only their race, but gender, socio-economic class, ability, and so on. So, even if 
someone is a person of color, I do not want to exclude the possibility that, due to other privileges, 
they too are affected by the racial veil in similar ways.  
That brings us to the second way distortions may alter: people’s identities beyond race. 
Though not explicitly referenced, my work here has been guided by intersectional concerns and has 
not assumed that race is significantly separable from other identities. I do not believe explorations of 
race are additive. That is, I do not believe we can talk about race separately then just add those 
insights to our separate talk about gender, class, and so on. Instead, I have paid particular attention 
to how my claims about race, more abstractly, could be nullified when considering the way race 
manifests in the lives of different people. My approach is largely influenced by the pitfalls laid out by 
Kristie Dotson in her paper, “Word to the Wise: Notes on a Black Feminist Metaphilosophy of 
Race.” Dotson argues there are often three assumptions made by philosophers of race who claim to 
be talking about only race. One, the disaggregation assumption, where “‘race only’ investigations are 
 





analytically distinct from ‘race-and’ investigations,” effectively meaning we can ignore things like 
gender or socio-economic class as separate forms of race investigation.180  That ‘race only’ 
investigations are analytically distinct often leads to the second assumption which Dotson calls the 
fundamentality assumption. The fundamentality assumption is that “‘race only’ inquiries are more 
conceptually basic and, by virtue of being more basic, more central than ‘race and’ inquiries.”181 That 
is, those philosophers of race working on only race are doing something more fundamental than say 
those working on the interplay between race and gender or race and ability. Finally, those who take 
on the fundamentality assumption often further assume that ‘race only’ inquiries are transcendent. 
This transcendence assumption is that “‘race-only’ inquiries and conclusions are not, in general, 
impacted by ‘race-and’ inquiries and conclusions.”182 
This dissertation is clearly a ‘race only’ investigation, but in doing so I have been careful not 
to assume that ‘race only’ investigations are more fundamental—I think they are not—nor do I 
think such inquiries are transcendent.183 One mark of a philosopher of race assuming ‘race only’ 
inquiries are transcendent is to think that their work is essential for ‘race-and’ inquiries, but the ideas 
and conclusions of ‘race-and’ inquiries cannot have impact on ‘race only’ investigations. I have 
attempted, in working through issues of racial perception, to think about how what I argue could be 
criticized from a Black feminist or other perspective. One clear place where this has affected my 
conclusion is in The Racial Veil chapter where I initially was committed to the idea that racial 
stereotypes were always clearly negative. However, there are many racial stereotypes that some 
 
180 “Words to the Wise,” p. 70. 
181 “Words to the Wise,” p. 70. 
182 “Words to the Wise,” p. 71. 
183 Dotson does remark that the disaggregation assumption is primarily problematic due to how it leads to the other two 





people, though not often the victims of the stereotype, believe are positive and this kind of 
stereotype is most noticeable when paying attention to the experience of women of color. 
Recognizing this dimension helped make my account of stereotyping more nuanced and show the 
various ways even potentially positive stereotypes could be distortive and morally problematic. 
Similarly, I spent a significant amount of time looking at personal accounts from trans people of 
color to see if there were similar issues with my account from that perspective. I did not notice any, 
though for a separate paper on moral perception and gender affirmation, I realized issues of race do 
alter the theorizing about ‘trans only’ issues. So, look at ‘race-and-trans’ inquiries helped avoid the 
same kind of problematic assumptions in my ‘trans only’ work.  
Finally, I feel it is important to note that in restricting my attention to issues of interpersonal 
racism, I do not mean to take interpersonal racism as the most significant or the most important 
dimension of racism. It is pure philosophical curiosity that has driven my focus on this area, and not 
due to my thinking that this is necessarily central or fundamental to understandings of race. It very 
well may be important, but this is not to ignore other ways racial oppression is perpetuated. For 
example, a significant portion of racism is now upheld through what many have called “racial 
capitalism.”184 Briefly, the idea could be put that the way many races in the U.S. are constructed now 
are for economic control and exploitation in our contemporary capitalist system. Race, on this view, 
is highly bound up with economic injustice and fighting racism will necessitate fighting economic 
exploitation. I find myself extremely sympathetic to this analysis, but do not think this poses a 
problem for any of my work. It is consistent to think that dismantling racism requires dismantling 
capitalism while also thinking that there are interpersonal moral issues with racism that may be 
improved without bringing an end to oppression. It is perhaps a somber outlook that we could make 
 





such interpersonal moral progress without making systemic progress, but it is the position we may 
find ourselves in.  
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